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Report of the Administration of
Lord Chelmsford, *Viceroy and*
Governor General of India,
1916-1921

GENERAL SUMMARY
VOLUME I

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LORD CHELMSFORD'S ADMINISTRATION

1916—1921

Volume One—General Summary

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General Summary OF Lord Chelmsford's Administration

CHAPTER I. India and the War.

The keynote of Lord Chelmsford's Viceroyalty is to be discovered in the fact that during the first half of his term of office, the world was at war. During the latter half of that term, India, in common with the rest of the world, was suffering from the aftermaths of the struggle. The events described in this brief introduction have been entirely conditioned by the war and to it must be ascribed those tremendous changes in the moral and the material spheres which during the last five years have altered the face of India. Great as has been the effect of the World War and its *sequelæ* upon the material progress of India, their consequences to the moral progress of the country have been even more startling. A change has come over the spirit of India within the last five years, the like of which no man living has seen. There has been an immense quickening of life among the politically minded classes, accompanied by the birth of a new spirit. Stormy and restless, self-reliant and impatient of compromise, this spirit has none-the-less the qualities as well as the defects of a national idealism. Its birth has served to separate, as by an interval which can scarcely be measured in terms of time, the India of 1921 from the India of 1916. This period has indeed witnessed the consummation of the progress which India has been accomplishing under British protection. It has witnessed the crowning achievement of Britain's work for India in the provision of opportunities for the practice of responsible government and in the definition of the goal to which India by her own exertions may bring herself. Nor is it only in its effects upon India herself that the struggle of

nations has exerted an influence so marked during the course of Lord Chelmsford's Viceroyalty. But for the events of the World War, it would have been impossible to have aroused the British people to a realization of India's changed position. But for the War, with its quickening of democratic ideals, its shattering of the old imperialistic notions of the 19th century, India might still have found herself regarded as a dependency and an out-caste among the nations of the Commonwealth. But as the World War drew to its conclusion it became evident that the effect of the struggle upon India's position relative to the other component parts of the Empire had been decisive. And from the point of view of the historian of the future, there can be little doubt that the Viceroyalty of Lord Chelmsford will stand out clearly as the time when India found herself upon the path of nationhood ; as the time when her position within the Empire was profoundly modified ; as the time when her feet were set firmly upon the path leading to responsible government. It is then with the war and its consequences that he who attempts to describe in the compass of a few pages these five years, the most pregnant hitherto traversed in the connection of England with India, must first concern himself.

It should be noticed that from the point of view of the Empire as a whole India figures both as an asset and as a liability. In the first and all important months of the war, the control of India's resources in men exercised an immense, possibly a preponderating, influence upon Great Britain's ability to sustain the first German onrush. Lord Chelmsford himself described the situation thus :—

The winter of 1914-15 was one of the most critical periods of the War, for it was evident that the troops then available on the Continent and in the United Kingdom were inadequate for the defensive rôle allotted to them, and that the only way pending the raising and training of the new armies, in which the position could be saved, was by replacing the regulars serving in the Mediterranean and colonial garrisons with territorials and by drawing upon India for troops to the fullest possible extent. The demands then made on us were honoured in full and with the utmost promptitude. Two cavalry and two infantry divisions completely equipped in every respect with staffs, guns, horses, transport, ambulances and all requisite auxiliary services were despatched to France.....At the same time as the despatch of these troops nearly the equivalent of a Division was sent to East Africa while one cavalry and six infantry brigades were despatched to Egypt. Very soon after a Division, complete in every respect, was sent to Mesopotamia..... while similar forces were employed at Mascat in the Persian Gulf and at Aden. All these forces were based on India, which provided the drafts of men and animals and the food, forage and material required for their maintenance..... The army in India has thus proved a great imperial asset and in weighing the value of India's contribution to the War it should be remembered that India's forces

were no hasty improvisation but were an army in being fully equipped and supplied, which had previously cost India annually a large sum to maintain.*

But if India has shown herself to be in war-time an asset to the Commonwealth of Nations, she has also figured not less prominently among its liabilities. Over a century ago the great Napoleon saw in Britain's eastern dependency an avenue by which he might advance to strike her power a death-blow. The strategy of Napoleon has descended to those less noble imperialists of modern Germany whose attempt to secure world domination precipitated the Great War. Throughout the whole course of the struggle, the control of India exercised a marked influence upon the policy of His Majesty's Government. It was not merely that India represented an extensive and vulnerable target for the attacks of the enemy. It was also the fact that her own problems became, for the period of the war at least, matters of all-Empire concern. The presence in India of a large Muslim population handicapped in no small degree the conduct of hostilities with the Turkish Empire. The necessity of safeguarding India's frontiers from attack did far more than immobilize a large proportion of India's troops ; it profoundly affected the whole position presented to His Majesty's Government by the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. As a result of British control of India, His Majesty's Government has been compelled to shoulder an increasing burden of world responsibility, until at the termination of hostilities, the obligations of the British Empire had become a burden too great to be sustained for long with safety to the supporting fabric.

It is less with these broader aspects of India's position that we are concerned in this place, than with her immediate contribution to the effort evoked by the struggle and to the price of final victory ; but it is necessary to keep them in mind because, apart from some understanding of them, it is impossible to focus in its right perspective the advance which India has made in importance relative to other parts of the Empire. This advance has of itself been a vital factor in influencing His Majesty's Government to undertake schemes of constitutional reform for India, which not merely in their magnitude but also in their nature indicate a change of mind in the responsible Ministers of the Crown which would have been incredible but a few short years ago. In the remainder of this chapter we shall summarise very briefly India's contribution to the War and shall also endeavour from the purely material

* Speech in the first meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council, Simla Session, 1916.

side to outline some of the effects which the War has exerted upon her. But from the point of view of the historian it cannot too often be emphasised that the whole course of Lord Chelmsford's administration is but the history of the reaction upon India of the world-shaking consequences of the War.

Lord Chelmsford remarked in the course of a speech delivered at the last meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council, 1916-17, that three stages seem clearly to stand out in India's contribution to the War. The first was that in which India threw all she had and far more than had ever been contemplated, into the great struggle. The second was the inevitable breakdown, due in part to the exhaustion of her military resources and in part to adverse fortune. The third was the patient building up again of forces and material which ultimately made possible the triumphs in Mesopotamia, Palestine and East Africa. It is to be noticed that Lord Chelmsford came to this country when the first stage had already passed into the second, and his administration may well take pride in the fact that it was their exertions and their perseverance which made possible the passing of the second stage of depression, chaos and despair into the third stage of renewed vigour, energy and hope. But in order that the work of Lord Chelmsford's Government may be seen in its right perspective it will be necessary to give here a brief account of India's war effort from the beginning of hostilities until their termination. At the outbreak of the War, India was not equipped for the part she was ultimately compelled to play therein. Only a short time previously it had been finally determined by the Nicholson Committee that the standard of the Indian Military establishment was to be that required for the defence of India's own Frontiers, it being understood of course that this defence was not merely confined to the passive awaiting of attack. As a consequence, all the equipment, all the transport, all the supplies, were based upon that standard. But as the struggle persisted India found herself obliged to undertake the task not merely of safeguarding her Frontiers, but of rendering assistance to the British Commonwealth in half a dozen theatres of war remote from her confines. The services rendered by Indian troops in France, in East Africa, in Palestine, in Mesopotamia, in Salonika, in Aden and the Persian Gulf cannot here be described, but some idea, however inadequate, of the strain to which the Indian military organisation was subjected may be gathered from the fact that by the end of the second year of the War nearly 8,000 British officers and men, and 210,000 Indian officers and men, all fully trained and equipped, had been despatched overseas. From the

very first day, it was the policy first of Lord Hardinge's and then of Lord Chelmsford's administration to give readily to the Home Government of everything they possessed, whether troops or war materials. In August 1914, the Indian army was the only fully trained reserve force which the Empire could summon to its need. Every effort was made both then and subsequently to meet the increasing demands of the War Office, and India was, as Lord Hardinge said, bled "absolutely white" of military resources. At first, there was no question of an expedition to Mesopotamia. The Government of India's sole pre-occupation was to make every possible sacrifice to secure a successful prosecution of the War in France. But when operations in Mesopotamia had once been started, and the complexity of Turkish participation in the war was making itself fully felt, India's own needs became pressing and the results of her previous sacrifices were severe. Some of her best troops had been taken, there had been a heavy drain of all supplies. At the same time, there was a shortage of sea transport; and essential munitions from England were in a large measure cut off. The Indian military machine showed signs of breaking down under the strain. The setback to our prestige and to our armies represented by the disastrous campaign terminating in the fall of Kut, led by direct transition to the third period of renewed effort, for which Lord Chelmsford's administration is entitled to full credit. The report of the Mesopotamia Commission proved how inadequate was the standard laid down by the Nicholson Committee to the exigencies of a World War. But even before that report was published, the Indian Headquarters staff had been strengthened, fresh heart had been infused into those who were overwhelmed by impossible difficulties, and the Government of India had begun to concentrate the whole of its administrative effort upon the successful prosecution of the War. The brilliant campaign of Sir Stanley Maude, culminating as it did in the capture of Baghdad, relieved the situation appreciably. But at the same time it must never be forgotten that Lord Chelmsford's administration found itself compelled to bear a double burden. Not merely had it to lend to the Empire at large resources in men, money and material which could ill be spared, but it had also to safeguard India herself from external aggression and internal disorder. In the second chapter we shall deal more fully with the foreign policy of Lord Chelmsford's Government, and we shall not anticipate by examining in detail the difficulties to which that Government was exposed. It was in the early part of the year 1918 that the collapse of Russia seemed to herald a renewal in a more formidable guise, of the Napoleonic plan of

striking at England through India. After the Brest Litovsk treaty, when Germany exploited the Bolshevik Government in Russia with the object of carrying war into the East, the situation became extremely dangerous. The Central Powers, already gambling beyond the limit of their resources, were making a final effort to prevent the withdrawal of troops from British possessions in Asia for the purpose of reinforcing our Western front. German troops overran and occupied a large part of Southern Russia, penetrating across the Black Sea to Batum and into the Caucasus, while Turkish troops invaded Persia. The maintenance of the *status quo* in Persia was, as will be seen more clearly in the next chapter, one of the obligations to which the control of India subjected the British Empire. The Persian Government had shown itself powerless to resist attack and maintain order, and enemy forces in violation of Persian neutrality seized and kept various strategic points. It was a matter of the utmost importance that we should assist Persia. In the next chapter we shall see that cordons were established along Western and Eastern Persia, the Nushki Railway was extended to the Persian frontier and Baku was temporarily occupied to block the enemy line of advance along the Transcaucasian and Transcaspiian Railways.

It was with the idea of rallying the whole resources of India in this crisis of the utmost gravity that Mr. Lloyd George addressed to Lord Chelmsford a telegram on April 2nd, 1918. The most important part of this telegram was as follows : " At this time, when the intention of the rulers of Germany to establish a tyranny, not only over all Europe, but over Asia as well, has become transparently clear, I wish to ask the Government and people of India to redouble their efforts. Thanks to the heroic efforts of the British armies assisted by their allies, the attempt of the enemy in the west is being checked, but if we are to prevent the menace spreading to the east and gradually engulfing the world every lover of freedom and law must play his part. I have no doubt that India will add to the laurels it has already won, and will equip itself on an even greater scale than at present to be a bulwark which will save Asia from the tide of oppression and disorder which it is the object of the enemy to achieve."

To this Lord Chelmsford replied on April 5th as follows :—

Your message comes at a time when all India is stirred to the depths by the noble sacrifices now being made by the British people in the cause of the world's freedom and by the stern unalterable resolution which these sacrifices evince. India, anxious yet confident, realises to the full the great issues at stake in this desperate conflict and your trumpet call at this crisis will not fall upon deaf ears. I feel confident

that it will awaken the Princes and the people's leaders to a keener sense of the grave danger which, stemmed in Europe, now threatens to move eastwards. I shall look to them for the fullest effort and the fullest sacrifice to safeguard the soil of their motherland against all attempts of cruel and an unscrupulous enemy, and to secure the final triumph of those ideals of justice and honour for which the British Empire stands.

In order to secure the rally of India's resources to the Empire's assistance a War Conference was held at Delhi from April 27th to 29th 1918. Certain Ruling Chiefs were asked to attend, as well as all the non-official members of the Imperial Legislative Council. The Central Government also invited the Provincial Governments to send delegates of all shades of opinion. The object of the Conference was to invite the co-operation of all classes, first, in sinking domestic dissensions and in bringing about a cessation of political propaganda during the present crisis; secondly, in concerting measures for the successful prosecution of the war, with special reference to man-power and the development of Indian resources; and thirdly, in cheerfully bearing the sacrifices demanded for the achievement of victory.

The Conference was opened by the Viceroy in a speech explaining the menace of which the Prime Minister had spoken. He pointed out how Germany had already thrown into Central Asia her pioneers of intrigue and her agents of disintegration; how the collapse of Russia into anarchy had opened a door for Germany leading up to the very confines of India. He then briefly referred to the salient features of the political situation on the North-West Frontier:—

In the north, there is a bulwark against German intrigue and German machinations. I refer to our staunch friend and ally, His Majesty the Amir of Afghanistan. As you are aware, at the outbreak of the war, His Majesty gave his Royal word that, so long as the independence and integrity of his kingdom were not threatened, he would maintain neutrality. He has kept his Royal word unswervingly, in spite of every attempt of our enemies to seduce him from his purpose, and to embarrass his position, and I do not believe that in the history of this country, the relations between any Amir of Afghanistan and any Viceroy of India have been more cordial or mutually confident than they are to-day. But in Afghanistan, as in India, there are many ignorant people, credulous people, fanatical people, such as at a time of world excitement may be carried away by any wind of vain doctrine. Such persons may at any moment become a serious embarrassment to wise and level headed statesmanship. One of our first thoughts therefore at this time must be how we can best assist the Amir of Afghanistan, who has in the interests of his country which he loves, and in accordance with the pledges which he has given, kept his ship on a straight course of neutrality between the reefs that have so often surrounded him. We can, I believe, best do so by showing our enemies first that India stands solid as rock and that the lambent flame of anarchical intrigue will find nothing inflam-

mable in this country—nay rather, will be smothered and extinguished forthwith, should it approach, by the dead weight of our unity of purpose ; second, that should ever our enemy have the hardihood to bring force in the direction of our borders, we are ready with munitions and men to fulfill our obligations to the Amir of Afghanistan by assisting him in repelling foreign aggression and further to guard our own with the whole man-power and resources of India ready behind us.

At the conclusion of his speech, the Viceroy read to the Conference a gracious message from His Majesty the King-Emperor, which contained the following passage :—

Great as has been India's contribution to the common cause of the Allies, it is by no means the full measure of her resources and strength. I rejoice to know that their development and the fuller utilization of her man-power will be the first care of the conference. The need of the Empire is India's opportunity, and I am confident that, under the sure guidance of my Viceroy, her people will not fail in their endeavours.

The response of the Conference was immediate. The lead given by the English officials was heartily followed by the English and Indian non-officials. Committees were appointed on man-power and on resources, which made recommendations with the object of furnishing increased provisions of men, munitions and money. The provision of men had already been taken in hand by the Central Recruiting Board, constituted in June 1917, the activities of which were now redoubled. A similar organisation for the provision of munitions was already in existence in the shape of the Munitions Board, under whose care the resources of India were developed and materialised with a rapidity never before reached. Special Boards were set up to achieve particular purposes. The Central Publicity Board undertook active propaganda for the information of the public, which was executed through the medium of Provincial Boards and the agency of the Press of India. The Central Communications Board, to which reference is made elsewhere, was constituted to co-ordinate the working of the railways. The Central Food Stuffs and Transport Board was designed to facilitate the equitable distribution of supplies. The Central Employment and Labour Board aimed at furnishing Government with the necessary labour, and at utilising the many offers of voluntary service which poured in.

The impetus which the Delhi Conference, and the organisation set up in consequence of it, afforded to the war effort of India was very remarkable. In man-power, in particular, the results surpassed all expectations. As a sequel to the Conference, India undertook to contribute half a million combatant recruits during the twelve months commencing

on June 1st, 1918. Doubts were expressed in some quarters as to the possibility of fulfilling this pledge, since the previous years had yielded only 270,000 combatants. But so successful was the increasing effort made by the recruiting organisations, both central and local, that by November 11th, 1918, the date when the Armistice was declared, over 200,000 recruits had been obtained, and there is every reason to believe that the 300,000 recruits required during the remaining seven months would have been forthcoming, had recruiting continued. The efforts which were made by the provincial authorities both before and after this time were beyond all praise. Space would be lacking to deal justly with the efforts made by each province, but two examples may be picked out for special mention. The Punjab during the first $2\frac{1}{2}$ years of the war furnished 110,000 fighting men to the Indian Army. During the single year from April 1st, 1917, to March 31st, 1918, it raised over 114,000 to fight the battles of the Empire. In the United Provinces, the number of combatants serving in the Army on January 1st, 1917 was only some 35,000. But with the inauguration of the territorial recruiting system and the establishment of the United Provinces War Board in the middle of the year 1917, the recruitment of men from the Provinces expanded greatly. During the latter half of the year, nearly 28,000 combatant recruits were enrolled; and a year later, during the corresponding period of 1918, this number was doubled. The total number recruited during the last two years was just under 140,000. In the matter of non-combatant recruiting, the United Provinces was far ahead of the other provinces of India, and the total number of combatant and non-combatant recruits furnished between April 1917 and November 1918 was over 200,000. The efforts made by the Punjab and the United Provinces, though calling for special mention as the most striking examples, are generally typical of the efforts which were made by the provincial administrations in India.

Fortunately for India the anticipated menace did not materialise; the great German stroke in the West failed, and with its failure the Empire's greatest peril came to a close. But as we shall have occasion to notice from time to time, the termination of the World War did not bring peace to India. The problem of the Middle East became even more pressing to her and she was shortly involved in a new Afghan War. But the time of the cessation of hostilities affords a convenient opportunity to recount in brief the summarised history of her contribution to the successful termination of the struggle. Her efforts in the way of man power were unprecedented. At the outbreak of the War there were

some 80,000 British officers and men in India ; and some 230,000 Indian ranks, combatant and non-combatant. During the War, India recruited on a voluntary basis over 800,000 combatants and more than 400,000 non-combatants, giving a grand total of 1·3 million men. Prior to the War the normal recruitment of combatants for the Indian Army was about 15,000 men a year. In the year ending May 1917, thanks to the efforts of Lord Chelmsford's Government, this figure had risen to 121,000, and in the year ending May 1918, to over 300,000.

It must not, however, be forgotten that British India is far from furnishing the only recruiting ground for the Indian Army. The services rendered in the way of man-power by the Indian States call for more than a passing mention. In 1914, twenty-seven Indian States had contingents of Imperial Service Troops, and these were without exception offered for service overseas in the first weeks of the War. Offers of cavalry came from Alwar, Bhavnagar, Bhopal, Gwalior, Hyderabad, Indore, Jodhpur, Kashmir, Mysore, Navanagar, Patiala, Rampur and Udaipur ; offers of infantry came from Alwar, Bahawalpur, Bharatpur, Gwalior, Jind, Kapurthala, Kashmir, Khairpur, Nabha, Patiala and Rampur ; offers of mountain artillery came from Kashmir and of camelry from Bikaner ; offers of sappers from Faridkot, Malerkotla, Sirmur and Tehri ; offers of transport from Bahawalpur, Bharatpur, Gwalior, Indore, Jaipur, Khairpur and Mysore ; and offers of despatch riders from Idar and Rutlam. All these have been on active service in France, in Mesopotamia, in Salonica, in Egypt, in East Africa, and on the North-West Frontier and on duty in India. The States were later invited to allow their troops to be incorporated during the War in the regular Army. In certain States a scheme was set on foot to raise battalions for the Army, composed, as far as might be, of subjects of the States and officered, paid and equipped by Government. In addition, the great majority of States have given every facility to British recruiting parties to enter their territories and the numbers recruited from them for the Indian Army have increased very materially in the last part of the War. In the year ending with March 31st, 1917, the States in direct relation with the Government of India gave to the Imperial Service Troops and to the Indian Army nearly 9,000 combatant recruits ; in the year ending with the 30th June 1918, they gave some 33,000 combatants and more than 5,000 non-combatants. To these again must be added the figures of recruitments for the Indian Army in States which are in direct relation with local Governments and not with the Government of India. The total contribution of all the Indian States in the year

ending the 30th June 1918, is probably some 50,000 men, and since the outbreak of the War, the total recruitment from this source cannot be less than 100,000 men.

Special mention must be made of the assistance rendered to the Empire by our ally Nepal. More than one-sixth of the total population belonging to the martial class between the ages of 18 and 35 was given to the colours.

It should be realised that all these men have been recruited upon a voluntary basis. Considerable inducements to enlistment were constituted by the improved pay and prospects which have been introduced since the outbreak of the War. Since January 1917, the pay of the Indian commissioned and non-commissioned ranks has been substantially increased. A Jamadar's pay, for example, was raised by nearly 20 per cent. and a Havildars' pay by more than 10 per cent. Since June 1917 a bonus of £3-7s. has been given to every combatant recruit, and war bonuses every six months to trained soldiers. The ordinary pensions given to retiring officers and men of the Indian army have been considerably raised and arrangements made for liberalising the conditions under which family pensions are granted to relations of deceased soldiers. In addition to these substantial advantages, a long-standing grievance has been removed in the admission of Indians to commissioned ranks in the King's Army. Under the scheme devised to carry out a promise made in the declaration of August 20th, of which more hereafter, a number of Indian gentlemen have been granted substantive commissions in recognition of their war services; temporary commissions in the Indian army have also been granted to selected candidates: a Cadet training college has been established at Indore; and a number of Indian gentlemen have been nominated for cadetships at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. The effect of these concessions upon the spirit of the Indian Army has been considerable. Efforts are being made as far as possible to see that the Indian soldier receives the same care and attention as does his British comrade. A system is now on foot by which station hospitals will be provided for Indian troops on a plan parallel to that already sanctioned for British troops. The spirit of comradeship between Englishmen and Indians, which has always formed so striking a feature of the Indian Army, cannot fail to be enhanced by the increasing equality of treatment now meted out to Indians.

It is not only in man-power that India has made a great effort during the War. In view of her poverty, her financial contributions have been very considerable. There are rigid limits to the taxable capacity

of India, leaving out of consideration the fact that three quarters of the population depends upon agriculture, and hence upon the incidence of the monsoon, for its means of livelihood. As a result of these two factors, the expansion of direct taxation, a primary element in the war finance of Great Britain and her Dominions, has been very difficult in India. Despite this disadvantage, the financial assistance which India has rendered in the war has been substantial. In the first place comes expenditure in the way of military services. The cost of military expeditions sent outside India does not normally fall upon the India Exchequer ; but in compliance with a request made by the Government of India, it was decided that India should continue to pay the normal pre-war cost of maintaining those of her troops sent overseas, while the extra expenditure involved was met by the Imperial Government. That this burden has been no light one, is proved by the fact that the net expenditure on military services rose from about £20 millions in 1912-13 to about £30 millions in 1917-18. Nor was India content with rendering this assistance, considerable as it is in light of the fact that her annual revenue for the last six years has averaged less than £ 100 millions. In September 1918, under circumstances which will be described in a later chapter, the non-official members of the Imperial Legislative Council accepted by a large majority a proposal that India should take over, as from April 1st, 1918, the normal cost of 200,000 more men than she was then paying for. The effect of this decision was to raise the number of troops, for the normal cost of which India was responsible, from the ordinary peace strength of 160,000 to the substantial figure of 360,000. At the same time, it was agreed that from April 1st, 1919, the normal cost of 100,000 men more should be taken over. Fortunately, as it turned out, the cessation of hostilities rendered this unnecessary. It was estimated that these charges would work out to a grand total of £45 millions, but owing to the fact that the war terminated more speedily than was anticipated, the actual cost to India up to the end of the period under review was some £12 millions.

It has already been noticed that the expansiveness of taxation in India is strictly limited. In the first year of the war, before financial conditions had had time to adjust themselves to altered circumstances, great damage was inflicted on the Indian revenues. By the end of the year 1915-16, none-the-less, additional taxation was found to be possible, and the new taxes proved more productive than had been expected. Details of these transactions will be found in the chapter dealing with India's finance ; here it is sufficient to say that India found herself able to

make a free gift of £100 millions towards alleviating in some measure the immense burden borne by the Imperial Government. Small as this sum may seem in comparison with the expenditure of European countries during the last four years, it must be remembered that it adds over 30 per cent. to India's national debt, that it is rather more than her entire income for a whole year, and that it entails an extra annual burden of 6 per cent. of that income for its maintenance. In 1916, again further taxation was found possible; and nearly £10 millions have been raised in this way during the last two years—a very substantial contribution from so poor a country as India.

This gift was fully appreciated by His Majesty's Government, who realised that India of her own poverty was contributing what she could to the common fund. On the 21st March 1917 Lord Chelmsford received the following message from Mr. Lloyd George: "I wish on behalf of the British Government to express to the Government and the people of India our most sincere gratitude for the magnificent contribution which India has just made to financing the War. Coming in addition to the enthusiasm and loyalty manifested throughout India on the outbreak of War and to the invaluable services since rendered by the Indian Army, this gift is to us a living proof that India shares whole-heartedly with the other subjects of the Crown in the ideals for which we are fighting in this War. That India should come forward of her own accord on this crisis and render such real and opportune assistance is not only a source of sincere satisfaction to His Majesty's Government, but must produce a better mutual understanding among all the resources and peoples under the British Crown."

Further particulars as to the two War Loans, by which part of the £100 millions was raised, will be found in another place. The two loans between them realised nearly £75 millions—an immense sum when it is remembered that before the War the largest loan ever raised by Government in India was only some £3 millions.

Another very important means whereby India rendered financial aid in the prosecution of the War, was found to be the expenditure undertaken by the Government of India on behalf of the Imperial Government. India undertook to finance many war services, and to arrange for the export of enormous quantities of food-stuffs and munitions of various kinds. For this, it is true, she received payment in London, but owing to the difficulty of transferring funds from England, she had herself to find the money in the first instance. During the financial year 1918, India spent on behalf of the Imperial Government some £110 millions

and the funds which had to be provided in 1918-19 amounted to no less a sum than £140 millions.

Lastly, mention must be made of generous contribution by public bodies and by individuals. The funds under which Red Cross work has been carried on in India have been almost entirely furnished from this source. The main income of the joint War Committee of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem and the British Red Cross Society, the Indian Branch of which has been responsible for the provision of almost the whole of the supplies of comforts for the sick and the wounded since August 1916, has been the "Our Day" fund. This fund amounting to the magnificent sum of over £0·8 millions was raised as a result of an appeal by Lord Chelmsford. Besides the help thus afforded, the joint War Committee has received very generous aid in the form of subscriptions and donations. Between January 1st and December 31st, 1918, the amount of this assistance was more than £20,000. By the end of June 1918, more than £1 million had been given to the Imperial Indian Relief Fund which was inaugurated by Lord Hardinge to alleviate distress caused by the War. Lavish contributions have also been made by all classes in India to the various provincial war funds, to funds for comforts for the troops and to Their Imperial Majesties' Silver Wedding Fund.

In money contributions, as well as in gifts of all kinds, the Indian princes have played a worthy part. Their assistance began in the first week of the War, and continued up to the moment of its close. Gifts have come not only from great princes, but from petty chieftains on the furthestmost frontiers or in the interior of Burma. The bare list of these donations is long enough to fill more than 200 pages of a closely printed pamphlet. Their total value can hardly be less than £5 millions. While it is not possible to enumerate in detail these contributions, it may be said in general that they are touched with an imagination and a good will which are a great Imperial asset. The spirit which inspires the generosity of great princes is the same as that which lies behind the humbler gifts of smaller chiefs—gifts to fire the enthusiasm of any one conscious of the foundations of loyalty upon which the Indian Empire is based.

India's part in providing munitions has certainly not been inferior in extent to that of any portion of the Empire. It is interesting to summarise briefly the effort which has been made since the outbreak of the War to furnish the materials of which the Allies stood in need. In the first half of 1915, the Railway workshops as well as the principal

engineering firms in Calcutta and Rangoon, undertook to supply shell cases to supplement the inadequate output of the United Kingdom, and this assistance continued until the Premier had made the Ministry of Munitions independent of such provision. From the very first, moreover, India had a great task to perform in equipping her expanding armies in Mesopotamia, Egypt and elsewhere and in furnishing the Allies with many essential requisites. In 1917 the Indian Munitions Board was set up under the chairmanship of Sir Thomas Holland, with the primary object of securing the supply of essential stores for armies in the field, and the subsidiary object of developing the industries of India. The Munitions Board gathered together hitherto isolated fragments of purchasing departments and welded them into a single organised machine for regulating contracts and amalgamating demands. Buying was undertaken on a large scale, and competition between various Government agencies was avoided. In co-operation with the Local Governments, outposts were instituted in every province, and the development and consolidation of the whole organisation proceeded on thoroughly sound lines. By revising the indents made by Government officials on the Stores Department of the India Office and by controlling the applications made by private importers for articles on the English list of prohibited exports, it was found practicable to curtail numerous demands made in ignorance of India's local resources and to encourage the manufacture of supplies that formerly could only be obtained from abroad. Before the end of the year 1918, Sir Thomas Holland's Board was controlling expenditure upon war material amounting to £2 millions a month. The complete utilisation of local resources went far to make India an adequate base of supply for Mesopotamia and other theatres of war besides lessening the strain on the manufacturing resources of Great Britain and America. Up to the end of September 1918 the equipment and stores supplied by India to the various fronts amounted to some £80 millions. Nor was this India's only service in the way of munitions. She performed work of inestimable value in supplying raw materials and partly manufactured articles for the munitions manufacturing of other lands. The yield of the wolfram mines in Burma, almost negligible before the War, was developed until it became one-third of the entire world output. About 15,000 tons, valued at over £2 millions was sent to England at fixed prices considerably below those ruling in other countries. In manganese ore, moreover, India was practically the only source of supply to the European Allies. Her exports amounted to nearly 2 million tons valued at over £2½ millions.

India was the main source of the supply of mica. Indian mica is in great demand on account of its high insulating properties, and special measures have been taken to increase the output of the mica mines in Behar. Some 6,000 tons were exported to the United Kingdom. Indian saltpetre also was reserved for the Allies, and about 90,000 tons valued at over £2 millions were supplied at a moderate price. In timber also India was a very important source of supply. More than 300,000 tons of timber and of bamboos—115,000 tons of which came from Burma alone—were supplied to Egypt, to Mesopotamia, to Salonika and to other places. Every effort was made to substitute indigenous timber for foreign supplies, in order to reduce the demands on shipment to a minimum. In addition to the commodities already mentioned, India supplied large quantities of raw silk, hemp, coir, tea, rubber, skins, petroleum and so forth.

Not the least important war service which India rendered was her help in provisioning Great Britain. As Mr. Lloyd George said, the people of Great Britain may have suffered some deprivation, but they have not known the pangs of real privation. This immunity must be ascribed in part at least to the assistance rendered by Indian shipments of foodstuffs in supplementing the home production. Wheat purchases came under Government control early in 1915 and more than 3 million tons were shipped to the Allies. During the period of their operations, the Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies purchased in India nearly 5 million tons of various foodstuffs to a total value of over £ 40 millions.

In textiles also, India rendered great services. The importance in war-time of India's monopoly of jute can hardly be exaggerated. Her exports during this period have been valued at no less than £ 137 millions, comprising in addition to 2 million tons of raw jute, nearly 3,000 million bags, and more than 4,000 million yards of cloth. The great cotton industry also was an important aid to the Allies. After the supply of British-made goods fell off, recourse was had to the Indian mills for army supplies, and the cotton textiles required for army purposes were for some time entirely manufactured by them. To meet the requirement of a single year, 20 million yards of khaki drill and $3\frac{1}{2}$ million yards of khaki drill shirting were made. In addition, large quantities of army blankets were manufactured and the exportable surplus of Indian wool was reserved for the War Office at controlled places. Some £8 millions worth of wool was shipped to England, and altogether more than 42 million articles of troops' clothing were manufactured. The leather industry also boasts of some very remarkable figures.

Though India has been using ever growing quantities of local leather for the manufacture of army boots and accoutrements, Britain relied very largely on Indian tanned hides, which provided leather for nearly two-thirds of the army boots manufactured. The value of these hides since the outbreak of war was over £12 millions. Indian raw hides to the value of some £8 millions were acquired for the British and Italian Governments. Taking the tanned hides and raw hides together, the contribution of India during the war exceeded the value of £20 millions. She was the most important source of supplies of oleaginous produce required for food, for lubricants and for industrial purposes. Various measures have been taken to stimulate production and to increase, as far as possible, the surplus available for export. Since August 1914, the Empire and the Allies received from India $2\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of oils and oil-seed to a total value of £ 31 millions. In iron and steel also India performed important services. The Tata Iron and Steel Works, which turned out its first rails some $2\frac{1}{2}$ years before the outbreak of the War, was the chief source of supply of rail for Mesopotamia, East Africa and Palestine. From the beginning of the War in August 1914, this Company supplied to the Government nearly 300,000 tons of steel material at an average base price of less than £10 a ton. Had these steel works not been in existence, Government could not have secured their requirements at anything like so low a figure. In addition about 4,000 tons of pig iron were supplied for military requirements at rates which were very low in comparison with the price of pig iron in England. Thanks to the Company's efforts, not only Government, but many public bodies in India were able to obtain considerable quantities of steel at reasonable prices. The Tata Works, together with the Bengal Iron and Steel Company, were responsible for a large part of India's contribution to the iron and steel required in various theatres of war. Altogether some, 1,800 miles of track, 13,000 feet of bridging, 200 engines and more than 6,000 vehicles have been sent out of the country. In Mesopotamia, in particular, it would have been impossible to carry on the campaign without the iron and steel of India, which supplied the foundation not only of railway but also of water transport in the country. The river flotilla on the Tigris and the Euphrates was mainly composed of vessels drawn from Indian rivers or put together in Indian workshops. Nearly 900 vessels were supplied to Mesopotamia, and more than 500 anchor boats and dinghies. India also supplied to Mesopotamia the whole of the railway transport, as well as the telegraphic and telephonic equipment employed

in the country. The demands thus made upon the Railway Department and the Posts and Telegraphs Departments of India were very heavy both in the way of material and of personnel; but they were met both ungrudgingly and successfully by the unceasing efforts of the respective staffs.

The moral effect of the War upon India has been most remarkable. Her rally to the Throne at the outbreak of hostilities was but the manifestation of a great wave of loyalty which swept over the country. The classes interested in politics realised, as never before, that India was part of the Empire, that her very existence was intimately bound up with the Empire's survival. To the first feeling of enthusiasm there succeeded a steady determination to discharge whatever obligations the War might place upon the country. This again was followed by a widespread pride in the success of India's war efforts and in the generous recognition accorded to them by the Mother Country and the Dominions. As a consequence of this development, the politically minded classes steadfastly set before their eyes the aim of asserting India's right to a place among the self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth. The ideal of responsible government within the Empire came to the front in political discussions as never before, and afforded a marked stimulus to constructive constitutional activities. At no time was there any symptom of a desire for the severance of the ties which bound India to the Mother Country. There was on the contrary a demand for the strengthening of these ties, combined with a fixed resolve that India's position within the Empire should not fall short of that which deemed to be rightfully her due. Satisfaction was felt at the recognition of India's status in the Empire through her admission to the Imperial War Conference and the Imperial Cabinet. This satisfaction was strengthened by the admission of representatives of India among the Imperial delegates at the Peace Conference. The removal of certain standing grievances has also helped to stiffen the growing feeling of self-respect and pride in India's war achievements. The acceptance by the Dominions' representatives of the principle of reciprocity of treatment, the grant of King's Commissions to Indians, and other like developments have served at once to stimulate India's devotion to the Empire and to awaken her pride in her own growing national spirit.

The material effect of the War has been hardly less marked. There has been a notable stimulus to commerce and industry. The peculiar circumstances arising out of the War have introduced an atmosphere of economic protection in which the industries of India, both nascent

and established, have flourished to an unprecedented degree. Great public interest has been aroused in the industrial development of the country, and it is noticed in the Report of the Indian Industrial Commission that there has been a definite demand for the adoption of the policy of State participation in industrial development, and of State assistance to industrial undertakings, which is likely to produce results stretching far into the future. As a consequence of this interest in industrial matters, there has been a growing desire on the part of the politically minded classes that Government assistance should be directed towards the aim of making India more economically self-sufficing than has been the case hitherto. The report of the Indian Industrial Commission points out the grave danger to which India and the Empire are alike exposed, owing to the fact that the principal industries in India depends very largely upon certain key industries, which are not adequately developed in the country. Hence any marked interruption of communications between India and the Empire, such as nearly resulted from the campaign of unrestricted submarinism, threatens to bring the industries of India to a standstill. There is every reason to hope that it will be found possible to take measures for the avoidance of any future danger upon this score. The Government of India has lost no time in considering the report of the Indian Industrial Commission and in consulting the local administrations on the proposals made therein. In the near future, we may confidently expect to see great and far-reaching industrial developments.

On the whole, then, it may be said that both in the moral and in the material sphere, the War has acted as a great stimulus to India. It has broadened her outlook, it has deepened her interest in the Empire. It has aroused hundreds of people to a realisation of the problems lying outside their immediate environment. It may well prove to be the beginning of a new era, not merely in the relations of India to the Empire, but also in the internal life of India herself.

CHAPTER II.

Foreign Policy.

During the period of Lord Chelmsford's administration, the problems of the defence of India on the landward frontier bulked very large. The course of His Excellency's policy towards Persia and Afghanistan may be briefly indicated, as constituting an essential portion of the history of these strenuous years.

When War broke out in 1914, the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, which had been framed to put an end to the incessant rivalry of the British and Russian Governments in Teheran, was still in existence. This had two unfortunate consequences. By dividing Persia into so-called spheres of influence, it aroused the suspicion of the Persian Government, who saw in it a barefaced scheme of partition ; and countenance was lent to this suspicion by the policy and action of Russia, who proceeded to constitute herself dictator in the northern parts of Persia included within her sphere. In consequence when war broke out Great Britain received her share of the unpopularity of Russia among the Persian people. German Agents carried on their intrigues far and wide ; anarchy and disorder prevailed in most parts of the country. We could not afford to let Persia become a new theatre of war, and all our energies were directed towards steadying the situation. Such in brief was the position at the time when Lord Chelmsford assumed the reins of Government in India.

Throughout the year 1916 despite the ascendancy of German influence in some of her provinces, Persia managed to maintain her policy of neutrality. By the end of the year, of the many German parties who roamed over Southern Persia seeking to stir up popular feeling against the Russians and ourselves, few remained at large, and fewer still retained any influence. The signal breakdown of the Swedish Gendarmerie on which Persia had built such high hopes, induced her to consent to Russia and ourselves raising military forces, each eleven thousand strong, to restore order and to open trade routes in our respective spheres of influence. The task of organizing our own force was

entrusted to Sir Percy Sykes. Sir Percy proceeded with a strong escort to Bunder Abbas where the first recruits for the new force were enlisted. His column then marched inland and reached Kerman without incident. Unfortunately, the general situation in the west deteriorated on account of a Russian reverse at Karind; and orders were received for the column to march as quickly as possible to Shiraz. A move on Teheran seemed so imminent as a result of the Turkish advance that the Shah was with difficulty prevented from leaving his capital, while the Russian and British legations made preparations for a hasty flight. On the opportune arrival of the forces to relieve them, it was thought necessary to divert Sykes' column at Yezd to join hands with the Russians at Ispahan. The situation still remained very unstable and Sir Percy's force was ordered to move to Shiraz which it reached without incident. The old Gendarmerie was won over by the payment of their arrears and finally embodied into the South Persian Rifles, which proceeded to take over the portion of the Ispahan road as far as Aminabad and of the Bushire road as far as Tangi Tarkan. But a hostile force seized the South Persian Rifles post at Kazerun and repulsed a detachment which was sent out from Shiraz to recover it. The local authorities advocated the clearance of the Shiraz Bushire road by simultaneous operations from Shiraz and Bushire against the hostile Khans. But the Government of India were emphatically opposed to any attempt at punitive measures until sufficient troops could be spared to undertake this work in force. This policy was accepted by His Majesty's Government. After prolonged discussion all responsibility for the South Persian Rifles, except as regards the supply of material and personnel and the audit of accounts was transferred from the Government of India to the Minister. Steady progress was made in the organization of the South Persian Rifles in the Kerman area. Law and order was so far restored that the survey for a metalled road and the construction of a telegraph line from Kerman to Bunder Abbas were carried through without opposition.

Further east in Persian Baluchistan, where the Persian Government had for years been unable to retain any vestige of authority, German intrigue had temporarily met with some success. The Damanis of the Sarhad committed a series of raids on the Nushki-Robat road and for some time interrupted the line of communications of the troops which had been despatched beyond Robat into Sistan to cut off German emissaries attempting to make their way into Afghanistan. A force under General Dyer entered the Sarhad and reduced the Damanis to

submission ; and while this was in progress a peaceful mission under Major Keyes was despatched to eradicate the last trace of enemy influence and to restore British prestige. Starting from Mand with a military escort towards the end of June 1916, Major Keyes proceeded slowly northwards to join General Dyer. From the Sarhad he turned south to Sib, then westward to Banpur and so on to the sea. In the course of its journey the mission established friendly relations with the chiefs and tribes throughout that part of Persian Baluchistan which impinges on our border, securing written undertakings from Behram Khan of Banpur to accept Persian authority and to pay revenue to the Persian Government. As a result of the knowledge of the country brought back by the mission, proposals were submitted to His Majesty's Government for the resuscitation of Persian rule in the outlying portion of their country. An integral feature of these proposals was the raising in a small body of levees in the Persian Mekran and the retention of the levees already raised in Sarhad.

Our relations *vis-à-vis* Persia were radically modified by the Russian revolution. At the beginning of the War, a forceful domination of the situation had been possible, since the Russians had been able to supply any necessary force at short notice. But with the Russian revolution, we were thrown back upon our own resources. All that was available apart from a small column at Shiraz and a few scattered troops along the Eastern Cordon, was the army in Mesopotamia, separated from Teheran by hundreds of miles of difficult road. Hence, throughout the changes of Persian politics during the years 1917-18 Lord Chelmsford held fast to the cardinal principle that our policy must be strictly conditioned by the military strength available to support it. In consistently urging the abandonment of any attempt to dominate the Persian situation by force, he was taking a firm stand on actual facts. This policy was far from being advocated merely from opportunism. The traditional rôles of Russia and England in Persia were now being reversed, since Russia had ostentatiously renounced the old imperialistic aims of Czardom and had proclaimed herself the champion of universal brotherhood. It was no longer a case of liberal England putting a drag as best she might on reactionary Russia, for the Russian revolution both by example and precept gave a great impetus to the nationalist movement throughout Persia and lent it for the time a definitely anti-British colour. We were thus left with a choice either of trying to stamp out this movement by force or of guiding it in safer and more friendly channels. In the gradual evolution of Lord Chelms-

ford's policy of conciliation, the South Persian Rifles played a large part. At first it was considered essential to retain them as a British force; and Lord Chelmsford advocated that Persia should be allowed a greater measure of control and be humoured in her desire for a uniform force under neutral officers after the War. But it soon became clear that the South Persian Rifles was distasteful to the Persian Government and the public, and that the trend of existing policy was merely to create a mercenary army which the Persian Government could never hope to finance or maintain. Lord Chelmsford therefore urged that we should agree to such radical modification of the force as would make it acceptable; but since the Persian Government obstinately continued to withhold their official recognition of the South Persian Rifles and insisted on its immediate transfer to themselves, he proposed its abandonment on grounds of military as well as political necessity. Similarly in regard to the trouble on the Shiraz-Bushire road, Lord Chelmsford set his face resolutely against any forcible resolution of the dead-lock, preferring to seek a peaceful settlement with the hostile Khans. Since this policy was not accepted by His Majesty's Government, he urged complete inaction, believing that the sole justification for a military diversion on our part would be found to lie in a genuine request from the Persian Government for our assistance in bringing about a settlement by force. Lord Chelmsford similarly wished to find a constructive solution of the problem of Persian Baluchistan by inviting the Persian Government to resume control over the province which had so long slipped from their grasp. Unfortunately, however, the proposal had to be dropped for the time, owing to the difficulty which was felt in presenting this offer to the Persian Government in a sufficiently attractive form. In East Persia, where we were confronted with the possibility of an enemy advance towards Afghanistan the situation was different. Owing to Persian helplessness, the defection of Russia and the weakness of our own cordon, the danger was a real one. Lord Chelmsford prepared to meet it as far as possible by reinforcing and extending the cordon and improving communications by road, railway, and telegraph. Here again, he sought throughout to enlist Persia's actual co-operation first by advocating a general understanding with the Central Government; secondly by assisting the Local Government, and lastly by enjoining on all troops the scrupulous observance of the sanctity of Meshed.

In 1918-19 Lord Chelmsford's advocacy of a liberal policy gained fresh force from the fact that His Majesty's Government found it neces-

sary to push [up] troops through North-West Persia to secure the country from the Turkish menace proceeding from Azarbaijan and the Caucasus. But when the Turkish collapse occurred and the armistice was signed, Sir Percy Cox who, on his first appointment at Teheran, had realised the necessity for proceeding on the lines of least resistance, now persuaded His Majesty's Government to consider the desirability of securing an inter-allied or international mandate for reforming Persia. Lord Chelmsford strongly deprecated this course and reiterated his view that on the one hand, Persian confidence should be regained by a liberal policy and on the other our influence maintained by the removal of all causes of irritation. He urged that it was only necessary to continue some assistance in arms and money and to give Persia a real chance of putting her house in order and administering her provinces herself. Sir Percy Cox, however, had induced the three principal pro-British Ministers to place an offer for the regeneration of Persia in British hands; and he suggested an elaborate scheme entailing the employment of British advisers and a British departmental staff. Lord Chelmsford doubted the wisdom of this policy, considering that the pro-British optimism of men so closely bound up with us as the ministers in question was a very uncertain index to public opinion. His Majesty's Government, however, instructed Sir Percy Cox to proceed with the preliminary discussion, and towards the end of the year 1918-19, his negotiations were progressing toward a formal agreement with the Persian Government, and the elimination of the Persian peace mission which had been despatched to Paris. Lord Chelmsford was, however, successful in inducing His Majesty's Government to agree to the transfer of the South Persian Rifles to Persian control. The difference between the policy advocated by Lord Chelmsford and that put forward by Sir Percy Cox was also illustrated in their dealing with the interruption of the Shiraz-Bushire road. Owing to the Kashgai rising Lord Chelmsford agreed to despatch troops for the relief of Shiraz, but he insisted that the advance from Bushire with the object of affecting a junction with the Shiraz force should be undertaken with the co-operation and concurrence of the Persian Government. This was obtained, the operations were successfully carried out, and the recalcitrant Khans were ignominiously ejected. The future outlook was none-the-less unsatisfactory, for the hostile Khans were still at large and the local officers appeared to think that the permanence of the results achieved depended on an indefinite maintenance of the force. The latter contingency could not be contemplated and the only alternative seemed to be to

come to a settlement with our enemies. Lord Chelmsford was of the opinion that since we had issued triumphantly from the war, no arguments based on the necessity for maintaining local prestige should be allowed to deter us in seeking, on the lines suggested by him, to regain to our pre-war position. Sir Percy Cox was opposed both to this policy and also to the reduction of our troops to the pre-war scale. He was moreover anxious, in the interest of the agreement he desired to negotiate with the Persian Government, to retain troops in the country. Discussion for a settlement with the Khans were in progress, when His Majesty's Government sanctioned the withdrawal of the bulk of the force, the balance to remain for a few months pending the final settlement.

Lord Chelmsford continued his support of the measures for strengthening the East Persian cordon, and for enabling the Governor-General of Khorasan to co-operate with us in resisting the threatened Bolshevik incursion into North-East Persia. But he set his face resolutely against the desire of the Governor-General of Meshed and the Persian Government to maintain the military occupation of Russian Sarakhs, which formerly belonged to Persia. Lord Chelmsford thought that this Persian attempt to rectify the frontier by taking advantage of the disorganization in Russian Territories was likely to lead to trouble both for Persia and ourselves, and might provoke counter aggression by the Bolsheviks. The Persian detachment was accordingly withdrawn from Sarakhs after meeting the emergent call of the inhabitants.

The whole Central Asian situation began shortly after this to deteriorate.

The Soviet Government of Russia delivered itself in no uncertain terms of its opinion concerning Great Britain, and the accredited spokesmen of the Bolshevik régime, Lenin, Trotsky and Tchitcherin, now definitely asserted that the British Empire stood forth as the main antagonist of the doctrines which they profess. Nor did the unveiled hostility of the Soviet Government find expression in words alone. It became increasingly plain as the period under review proceeded that the Bolshevik threats of attack upon India could no longer be ignored. For Great Britain has, owing to post-war developments, been placed in a position of great vulnerability *vis-à-vis* Russia. In the first place, as will be mentioned later, she has become a party to the much decried peace treaty with Turkey. In the next place, she was given the mandate for Mesopotamia, and as we have seen was also attempting to maintain a stable Government in Persia. Further, the newly formed Caucasian republics were looking to her for assistance. It thus happened that

British commitments stretched right across the middle east and everywhere seemed to offer the Bolsheviks an opportunity for lowering the prestige of the Empire.

It must be realised that for some time after the revolution of 1917, Russia no longer found herself in an advantageous position for directing her activities against Persia, Afghanistan and India. Transcaucasia had fallen away from her and was split up into independent republics such as Azarbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Daghistan. On the other hand Russian Turkistan was in a state of the utmost chaos. So long as hostilities with Poland continued and the counter-revolutionary forces of Koltchak and Denikin remained in being, the Soviet Government found it impossible to devote to their policy of aggression in the East that attention which they felt it required. But in the course of the year under review by dint of the conclusion of terms with Poland and the successive defeat of Koltchak, Denikin and Wrangel the Moscow Government obtained a freer hand; and aided by armies of propagandists succeeded in consolidating for the movement at least the position in Transcaucasia and Turkistan. The republican Government of Azarbaijan was overthrown and a Soviet erected in its place; Daghistan also became honeycombed with Bolshevik intrigue and an obedient vassal of the rulers of Russia. The practice of the Soviet officials did not, however, square with their precepts; and wanton oppressions of the Mussalman population goaded the sturdy Tartars to madness. But the ill-equipped peasants and workmen could not achieve success against the better disciplined Red armies, and the only result of these movements was to provoke ruthless reprisals which shocked Muslim sentiment.

With Georgia and Armenia, the Bolsheviks had less success. The propaganda which had served them so well among the Mussalmans of Azarbaijan and Daghistan was useless in the case of the two small Christian republics. Command of the resources of these two countries was important to the Soviet Government, for without them it was difficult to join hands with the Turkish National forces of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who with Angora as his headquarters was at this time rallying Turkish sentiment to resist the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire foreshadowed in the Treaty of Sevres. Common opposition to Great Britain and the Allies served to reconcile, at least for the moment, such bitter enemies and Russian Bolsheviks and Turkish Nationalists; with the result that from the middle of 1920 the alliance of Bolshevism and Islam was openly proclaimed. Strenuous attempts were now made

to undermine the republican Governments of Georgia and Armenia. In the autumn of 1920, Red troops occupied Tiflis, without opposition from the Georgians; and the Armenians entered into negotiations with the Soviet Government of Russia. About the same time the Persian town of Enzeli was entered by sea from Baku. The pretext put forward was the necessity of safeguarding the Bolshevik position on the Caspian, but despite lavish promises of early withdrawal, the Red troops seized Resht and advanced to Menjil on the Teheran road. A little more and the grip of the Bolsheviks would have been rivetted on North-Western Persia. In great triumph, they summoned an Oriental Congress at Baku, which should advertise to the world the triumph of communism, and sound the death-knell of British power in the Middle East. But scarcely had the Congress met, than the whole structure of Bolshevik power in the Caucasus suddenly collapsed. Muslim feeling, bitterly incensed at Red insults to Islam, broke out in fury at Resht. The Communists were expelled. Enzeli followed the example of Resht. The Georgians, stark fighters that they are, massed on the mountains, and the Bolsheviks found themselves obliged to withdraw not only from Tiflis but also from Baku. Batum fell into Georgian hands, and for the moment the Trans-Caucasian Railway passed out of Communist control. Their allies the Turkish Nationalists then stepped in by attacking Armenia from the South. Situated as it was between two fires, the Armenian Republic after a despairing appeal to the League of Nations, made the best of a bad situation by proclaiming itself a Soviet Government. At the moment of writing, its soil is occupied jointly by Russian and Turkish Troops. The latter having done most of the work of subjugation, now find themselves about to be ousted; and it may well be that this strange alliance of Turk and Russian will split once and for all over the Armenian question.

In Turkistan the future is equally uncertain. Aided by its temporary command of the railway to Baku, the Soviet Government had established itself at a base to the west of the Caspian which enabled its work to be continued eastward. Turkistan had for some time been nominally under Bolshevik control, and the capture of Krasnovodsk in February stamped out the last element of open resistance. But the bulk of the population were opposed to Bolshevik rule. Terrorism had been rife and the resources of the country had been ruthlessly exploited for the benefit of distant parts of Russia. To consolidate their hold the Bolsheviks now initiated a policy of conciliation, and with Tashkent as their centre they embarked once more upon a widespread campaign

of propaganda. The conservative Amir of Bokhara with the support of the major portion of his people and of the religious leaders withstood their energies. But gold and propaganda did their work, and by degrees a "young Bokharan" party, composed largely of refugees, adventurers, and the scum of Central Asia, was brought into existence in the heart of the Anirate. All being prepared, the Bolsheviks fomented a revolution in Bokhara at the end of August, and used this as a pretext to step in and complete the establishment of a Soviet Government by force. The fall of an independent Mussalman principality of such importance excited no little perturbation in the Islamic world. Its effect upon the attitude of the Amir of Afghanistan will be noted later.

The steady advance of the Bolshevik power towards India which has been outlined in the preceding paragraphs has naturally exercised a predominating effect upon India's relations with Persia and Afghanistan. In Persia the situation was delicate. As Lord Chelmsford had foreseen, the pro-English party which was willing to subordinate immediate national pride to ultimate national advantage was less potent than the young Persian party which bitterly resented the predominant influence which they thought Great Britain was achieving in their country. In consequence, the Bolsheviks during the summer of 1920 have found in Persia a fruitful soil for their intrigues. At Enzeli and Resht, as we have already seen, they went too far and sustained a set back that seriously damaged their prestige. But in deference to English opinion as to the necessity of limiting rigorously our commitments in the Middle East, the British troops were withdrawn from the Bolshevik zone, and His Majesty's Government made it increasingly plain as time went on that they would bring no pressure to bear upon the Persian Government in the direction of ratifying the Anglo-Persian agreement; but that Persia must be left entirely to decide her own destinies. The driving forces of Persian nationalism, being exploited by Bolshevik propaganda and Bolshevik insistence upon self-determination and independence, succeeded in preventing the ratification of the Anglo-Persian convention. This has been hailed as a great triumph for Bolshevik diplomacy, and has been received by certain irresponsible sections of opinion in India and elsewhere as a not unwelcome set back to the overwhelming influence of Great Britain in the Middle East. As will be realised, this reverse justified Lord Chelmsford's Government in the cautious attitude they had throughout assumed *vis-à-vis* the proposed Agreement.

We must now turn to a brief resumé of Lord Chelmsford's policy towards Afghanistan.

At the outbreak of the War the Amir Habibullah had given assurance to Lord Hardinge that he intended to maintain neutrality. This assurance was reiterated when Turkey entered the War and Habibullah since then continued to give every indication of his desire to carry out his undertaking. His task was, however, far from easy. The association of Turkey with the Central Powers introduced a religious element into the situation of which the war party in Afghanistan was not slow to take advantage. This war party was led by Sardar Nasrullah Khan, brother of Amir Habibullah and Mahmud Tarzi, editor of the *Sirajul Akhbar*. Lord Hardinge's Government, appreciating the difficulties in which the Amir was involved, adopted a policy of frank friendliness in all communications with him, carefully avoiding any action which might embarrass him or increase his difficulties, at the same time supplying him with such material assistance as might help to tide him over a difficult period. Lord Chelmsford on assuming office cordially concurred in this policy. One of his first acts was to obtain authority from His Majesty's Government to announce to the Amir that at the close of the War a sum of Rs. 44 lakhs which the Amir had lately drawn as the balance of a subsidy due to him from the Government of India, would be presented to him. The Amir acknowledged this token of friendship without great enthusiasm; and plainly nourished aspirations for something further. In May 1916 he put forward the specific request that a representative of Afghanistan should take part in the Peace Conference with the representatives of other Powers at the close of the War. Lord Chelmsford replied that the matter was entirely premature, as it was uncertain what form of Peace Conference would take place; while in any case the Peace Conference would only be attended by representatives of the belligerent powers and would be concerned only with matters concerning them. The Amir was however assured, under authority from His Majesty's Government, that no proposal affecting Afghanistan would be made or agreed to in the Peace Conference.

A Turko-German mission which had been despatched with the object of winning over the Amir from his neutrality, definitely failed in its efforts; and though it succeeded in securing the Amir's signature to a draft treaty in the course of the year 1916, was formally dismissed from Kabul. Its members appear to have dispersed in different directions over Afghanistan; some few who tried to evade the cordon of troops on the British border were captured, while others succeeded in escaping to Turkey. Certain Indian seditionists who had been in touch with the Turko-German mission, such as Maulvi Barkat Ullah and Mahindro

Pratab, attempted while in Kabul to engage in a campaign of international intrigue against the Government of India. They sent letters to the *ex*-Czar of Russia and the Governor of Russian Turkistan, and further organized political missions to Japan, Turkey and China. A fortunate chance brought into the hands of the Government of India letters which threw considerable light upon the whole conspiracy then being hatched in Kabul. These documents, now known as "Silk letters" led to the arrest of several of the parties in Russian territory and to the detention of a number of persons in India connected with the conspiracy. Throughout the year 1917 the internal situation in Afghanistan remained quiet. The Amir not only maintained his neutrality, but also exerted his influence actively in securing peace on the North-West Frontier. His open discouragement of the Mahsuds before and during the operations, which will subsequently be noticed, contributed largely to their speedy and successful termination; while his repressive measures against the Khost outlaws resident in Afghan limits checked a perennial source of trouble.

During the course of the years 1917-18, the anxieties of the Government of India in regard to Afghanistan were increased by the chaotic condition of Russian Turkistan which seemed to lay the Amir's country open to Turko-German attack. While the Bolsheviks were endeavouring to gain the upper hand by terrorism, a strong movement existed in the south provinces of Russian Turkistan in favour of autonomous Governments. There were also movements in favour of a Central Turkish or Muslim federation, consisting of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Caucasian Turkistan and possibly India. Further, taking advantage of the general disorder, enemy agents were busy in Central Asia sowing discord and renewing their designs on Afghanistan. But by the end of March 1918 the autonomous Governments which had been established in Farghana and Samarkand were reported to have been overcome and the Bolsheviks were stated to be supreme throughout Russian Turkistan. This success brought them into conflict with the Amir of Bokhara who was at this time believed to be intriguing either for his own independence or for the establishment of a Mussalman Turkistan of which he should be the head. Communications relating to this plan were reported between Bokhara and Afghanistan, although there was no evidence of active Afghan assistance in the course of the hostilities which broke out between the Bokharians and the Bolsheviks early in 1918.

At the suggestion of the Secretary of State, Lord Chelmsford sent the Amir of Afghanistan an autograph letter on the 10th January 1918

warning him of the danger lest the anarchical movement in Turkistan should spread to his territories. The Amir was informed of the assistance we were lending to Persia in her efforts to ward off the anarchical wave, and was invited to send Lord Chelmsford a frank appreciation of the situation as it was likely to affect his country.

In reply Habibullah replied that while recognizing the possibility of anarchy spreading from Russia, he believed that the remedy lay in strengthening his own kingdom with arms and money and in conciliating Indian sentiment, profoundly affected in common with the rest of the Muslim world by Turkey's participation in the War. Lord Chelmsford then pointed out that the danger was not of active invasion by a well equipped enemy force, but of a small expedition whose appearance would be heralded by intrigue and propaganda; in the hope that the more credulous in Afghanistan would regard it as the main Turkish Army and would join their co-religionists. In view of this consideration, Lord Chelmsford believed that no considerable strengthening in arms was necessary. But as proof of his desire to assist the Amir in maintaining his neutrality Lord Chelmsford proposed to cancel his previous promise of Rs. 44 lakhs at the end of the War and to give the Amir instead a crore in gold; half at once and the other six months thereafter. The Amir sent no acknowledgment of this offer until the following February, when in a routine subsidy letter addressed to the Foreign Secretary he asked for the delivery of the crore together with 17 lakhs of his balance, including the additional subsidy of two lakhs which he had hitherto not deigned to recognize.

Throughout the whole of this period Afghanistan continued to be the object of intrigue on the part of German emissaries and Austrian refugees. Some of these were interned but many appear to have had opportunities for hostile propaganda. None-the-less, in the face of all temptations the Amir baffled the endeavours of German, Turkish and Bolshevik agencies to shake his neutrality, being helped in his handling of a difficult situation by the avoidance on our part of anything calculated to embarrass him. For example, as early as January 1917 he had intimated considerable concern regarding the general military activity of the Government of India on the North-West Frontier, and in particular certain road construction in the vicinity of the Khyber. Lord Chelmsford replied that there was no intention of attacking the tribes or any portion of the Frontier—an operation, which as the Amir had pointed out in his conversation with our Agent at Kabul, might produce very serious reflexes which would re-act on Afghanistan and make his own position

difficult. In reassuring the Amir on this subject Lord Chelmsford had remarked "I appreciate the value and soundness of Your Majesty's remarks regarding the inadvisability of such action at present, and I sincerely trust that the tribes will continue to behave quietly and that we shall not be forced, against our will, by any outrageous conduct on their part, to alter our present pacific policy." As regards the road making in the vicinity of the Khyber Lord Chelmsford informed the Amir that no work would be undertaken in doubtful areas, a course of action which had indeed been forbidden by explicit orders. As a result of the consistent policy of which this incident is an illustration, the Amir was enabled to maintain his position. Lord Chelmsford, however, in pursuing this course was obliged to resist certain proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government in 1918-19. The first of these was that we should try to conclude an offensive alliance with the Amir definitely committing him to our side. The second was that we should enlist his assistance in Bokhara's struggle with the Bolsheviks. But Lord Chelmsford's policy of non-interference was entirely vindicated by the action of the Amir himself, who, on receipt of an important letter from Turkey, decided in his secret Council that Afghanistan should forcibly resist armed intrusion from whatever quarter and should keep out of the War, using the munitions and money obtained from either side against the first invader.

Unfortunately on the 20th February 1919, Habibullah was assassinated near Jallalabad. On the day of the murder, his brother Sardar Nasrullah Khan wrote to Lord Chelmsford announcing his election to the throne. But while the question of his recognition was being considered, a further communication was received intimating that his position had been challenged by the late Amir's third son, Amanullah Khan. On the 3rd March 1919, a letter was received from Amanullah Khan announcing the deposition of Nasrullah Khan and the fact of his own succession. The letter terminated with the intimation that the Government of Afghanistan considered itself "ready at all times to conclude, with due regard to the requirements of friendship, such agreements and treaties with the British Government as may be to the commercial advantage of the two Governments." In addressing His Majesty's Government on this matter Lord Chelmsford proposed that provided there was no radical change in the situation by the time their instructions were received, his reply should connote recognition, and not merely undertake recognition on receiving evidence of the consolidation of his Amirship. At the same time, Lord Chelmsford drew atten-

tion to a significant pronouncement of policy in an Afghan proclamation dated 11th March, which intended that the "Government of Afghanistan shall be internally and externally independent and free, that is to say, all rights of government that are possessed by other independent powers of the world shall be possessed in their entirety by Afghanistan." Lord Chelmsford felt that this left little room for doubt that the repudiation of the existing treaty, and an offer to replace it by a non-political commercial treaty were foreshadowed.

The position of the young Amir was difficult, owing to the opinion which prevailed in influential quarters in Afghanistan that certain of his supporters were not without complicity in the guilt of his father's murder. He himself owed his throne to the army and was particularly susceptible to the influence of the party in Afghanistan which was traditionally impatient of friendly relations with India. The confinement of Nasrullah alienated the religious leaders; and the public acquittal of the Musahib family of any guilt in Habibullah's assassination offended the army. Just at the time when the Amir's position seemed impossible, the Rowlatt agitation in India culminated in the Punjab disturbances. Afghanistan was flooded with exaggerated accounts of Indian unrest, it being represented that there would be a revolt against the British as soon as Afghan troops crossed the Frontier. The unusual phenomenon of a strong agitation in the North-West Frontier Province probably strengthened the Amir's delusion; while the disturbances in the Punjab were magnified by rumour until they assumed the proportion of a general rising against British Rule. These circumstances not merely strengthened the hands of the War party, but seem to have convinced the Amir that the solution of his difficulties lay in relieving the internal crisis by a successful war of aggression. By the 25th April 1919 his troops were in motion, and on the 3rd May an Afghan force under Zar Shah attempted to provoke hostilities with the Khyber Rifles on the Khyber border. An opportunity was given to the Amir to disavow at once Zar Shah's action and a proclamation protesting strongly against the alleged cruelty and injustice of the British India. The Amir, however, sent an impudent reply, received on the 17th May, admitting the authorship of the proclamation and demanding removal of the "tyrannical laws" which he suggested had been imposed upon India. Various acts of aggression took place on the Khyber border culminating on the 5th May in the capture of Bagh Springs and the heights commanding Landi Kotal. The Amir seems to have relied upon moving small columns of Afghan regulars up to our border with the object of

encouraging the Frontier Tribes to rise against us. But the result of his incitements fell very short of his expectations, and in point of fact serious hostilities on the part of the tribesmen did not materialise until they were too late to be of any use to him. Aeroplanes, wireless and high explosives had revolutionised Frontier War in a manner most disconcerting to the Afghan troops. In ten days they had not only been severely defeated and driven from British territory on the Khyber Front, but at the same time their defences at Dakka were occupied by us and their Commander-in-Chief wounded. Further south, however, matters went better for the Amir and the arrival of General Nadir Khan at Matun, the Capital of Khost, produced considerable unrest among the Wazirs and Mahsuds. All the militia posts in advance of Miran Shah had to be evacuated to assist in the concentration of our available forces in the Upper Tochi. The evacuation of the posts in southern Waziristan also became necessary, with very unfortunate effect. But the success of Nadir Khan's efforts was short lived. The Afghan positions on the heights north of Thal were assaulted and the enemy was forced to retreat. Further south still, the Afghan fort of Spin Baldak was stormed and all danger to our railhead at Chaman removed. By June 2nd the Afghans had suffered a series of severe defeats up and down the front. For some time the Amir hoped that he might be able to save his reputation by the restlessness which he had instilled into the border tribes. On May 28th, he had written a letter in which he laid the blame for recent hostilities upon us, but none-the-less asked for terms. He enclosed a copy of an order commanding his Generals to refrain from aggressive action. Lord Chelmsford's reply contained a specific recital of the various acts of hostility committed by the Afghans prior to any action on our part, but agreed to the Amir's request for a general conference to conclude peace provided that certain terms were complied with.

These terms were as stringent as the case demanded. The Afghan troops were to be withdrawn first from the Frontier and secondly for a space of twenty miles from the nearest British force. Messages were to be despatched to the tribes cancelling the orders inciting them to hostilities against us and announcing the Amir's request for a cessation of war. Our aeroplanes were to be allowed to reconnoitre Afghan territory freely. It should be noticed that while the Amir had entirely suspended all military operations, he did not immediately accept these preliminaries. On June 18th a somewhat evasive reply was received, which took exception to certain of the armistice conditions. In reply

the Amir was informed that if he would accept them broadly, arrangements would be made to receive the Afghan envoys in Rawalpindi. On June 29th he wrote again dwelling upon what he called the one-sided character of the armistice conditions, and pointing out some practical difficulties in the way of their literal observance; he emphasized the fact that he had suspended all military operations and reiterated that the action he had taken was a token of his earnest desire for peace. Lord Chelmsford in his reply emphasized the real character of the situation, which was that the Afghans began the War, and the Afghans were now suing for peace. The terms were naturally one-sided. The Afghans were then directed to present themselves in our lines towards the end of July. On the 26th July a conference met at Rawalpindi, the chief of the British delegation being Sir Hamilton Grant. Finally, on the 8th August, a treaty of peace was signed which provided for the confiscation of the arrears of the late Amir's subsidy and the cessation of all further subsidy to Afghanistan; the withdrawal of the privilege enjoyed by former Amirs of importing arms and ammunition through India; the acceptance by the Afghan Government of the Indo-Afghan Frontier, accepted by the late Amir and the early demarcation by a British Commission of the undemarcated portion of the lines west of the Khyber where the recent Afghan aggression took place. At the same time Lord Chelmsford's Government stated their desire for the re-establishment of the old friendship which had so long existed between Afghanistan and Great Britain, and announced their readiness to receive another Afghan mission after six months, provided that the Afghan Government showed themselves sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government. Further, the Afghan delegates, were given a letter which officially recognized the freedom of Afghan foreign relations from British control, for it was thought better to terminate an agreement which had not in effect been very scrupulously observed even by the Amir's predecessors. As certain popular misconceptions arose connected with this provision, it may be well to quote Lord Chelmsford's explanation.*

Your Highnesses will forgive me if I take this opportunity of dealing with another matter of public interest though not directly affecting Your Highnesses. I have always made a rule of ignoring attacks made in the press, but I must make an exception in the case of an article in the *Times* cabled out by Reuter. A summary which appeared yesterday contained the following passage:—

Earl Curzon's statement that vital letter of Sir Hamilton Grant, by which Government relinquished control of external affairs of Afghanistan was not kept

* The conclusion of the Chiefs' Conference at Delhi.

back, was erroneous. Letter was not only withheld from public for some days, but was not even received by Mr. Montagu until day after text of treaty had reached London. Whole episode, says *Times* is in keeping with policy of evasion which too often marks action of present Government of India.

I do not propose to deal with the question of policy embodied in that letter of Sir Hamilton Grant, beyond saying this, that we deliberately turned our backs on the past policy of attempting to control Afghan foreign relations through a paper condition. The aim of our policy is, to quote Lord Curzon's recent speech in the House of Lords, as summarised by Reuter :—

"Some arrangement with the Afghan Government which would differ in many important respects from the preceding arrangements, but which would give us what was really solely the essential thing, namely, a neighbour on the frontier who was friendly and loyal to Britain and with whom we could live in the future amicably."

If we secure this result, it connotes that Afghanistan's foreign relations will be such as to have our approval. Till we are satisfied that Afghanistan's foreign relations are such as meet our approval, the second chapter containing the treaty of friendship will not be written.

But what I wish to refer to more particularly to-day, is not the wisdom or unwisdom of my conduct of our foreign affairs, but the charge of a policy of evasion which is made against my Government. Here again, if the charge had been couched in general terms. I would have ignored it because it is obviously unprofitable to bandy argument over a question which must largely be a matter of opinion. In this case, however, it is coupled with the concrete accusation that we had withheld Sir Hamilton's letter, not only from the public for some days, but even from the Secretary of State until the day after the text of the treaty had reached London. Now this allegation can obviously only be based on conjecture, for the Secretary of State alone could inform the *Times* of the facts, and no one is more punctilious than Mr. Montagu in such matters.

Let me give one or two dates which will, I hope, dispose of this matter. I find that I communicated the terms of the proposed letter to the Secretary of State by telegram on the 4th August. It presumably reached him either on the 4th of August or on the 5th, as I received his reply on the 6th of August. The treaty was signed on the 8th of August and the actual text of the letter, as delivered to the Afghans, was telegraphed the next day. It is said that the letter was not even received by the Secretary of State until the day after the text of treaty had reached London. It must be obvious that with the best will in the world and with the most efficient cable system the text of a letter delivered with a treaty of peace on the 8th of August could not have reached London more expeditiously. And, moreover, the substance of the letter, as actually delivered to the Afghan delegates was contained in my telegram to the Secretary of State of August 4th to which I have referred above."

The policy of Lord Chelmsford's administration subsequent to the Afghan War cannot be better summarised than by the insertion of a

quotation from a speech delivered to the Legislative Council. In the autumn of 1919, Lord Chelmsford remarked :—

I now come to the treaty of peace and the policy embodied in it. I want to make this clear—our policy was divided into two chapters, the first comprising a treaty of peace, the second, which has yet to be written, envisaging a treaty of friendship. In view of the aggression which had taken place we felt that it would be a hollow mockery to conclude at once a treaty of friendship. Anxious though we are to see our Afghan neighbour prosperous and friendly, we felt that time must pass before we can wipe away the memory of what has occurred. I believe myself confidently that the time will come when Afghanistan will realise that we have no designs upon her and that we only wish to see her prosper and live on friendly terms with us. But the initiative towards a *rapprochement* must come from her. Not only have we no designs on her, but India is in no way dependent upon her. If Afghanistan wishes for our friendship, nothing will give us greater pleasure than to respond, but if she prefers to hold aloof we shall not force ourselves upon her. That being the position then, we made the treaty of peace with the terms of which Hon'ble Members are familiar, and if the Afghan Government after an interval of six months wish to expand that treaty of peace into a treaty of friendship we shall be delighted to consider their overtures, provided always that they have in the meantime given us by their conduct satisfactory evidence of the sincerity of their purpose."

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks were making persistent efforts to secure a foothold in Afghanistan. In the course of 1919, an Afghan mission had been despatched to Moscow, and had received what was construed as a promise of the restoration of the Panjdih area, formerly wrested from Afghanistan by the Tsarist government. Early in January 1920, a Bolshevik mission came to Kabul, and was well received. But instead of concluding negotiations for the cession of Panjdih, it embarked on an elaborate campaign of propaganda and intrigue, thereby adding considerably to the Amir's difficulties.

It will be realised from the course of events previously described, that the rapid advance of Bolshevik influence, together with the reduction of Khiva, Fergana, Turkistan and Bokhara to dependence upon Moscow, has for the moment at least rendered futile the ambition which the Amir undoubtedly cherishes to stand out as the head of a great Muslim confederation. Early in the year 1920, the Amir made the first advance towards a better understanding with India by putting forward a proposal for a conference of British and Afghan officials on the border. This proposal was not accepted ; but he was informed that the British Government was prepared to permit a discussion between representatives, with the object of clearing away misunderstandings and of preparing a foundation on which negotiations for a treaty of friendship can be opened. In April, the Afghan delegates were settled in Mussoorie, and for sometime

negotiations continued with a British delegation under the direction of Mr., now Sir Henry, Dobbs.

As a matter of fact, towards the end of April, a succession of unpleasant frontier incidents, which could hardly have been carried out without the connivance or cognizance of local Afghan officials, necessitated the suspension of the negotiations at Mussoorie. After more than a month these incidents were adjusted to the satisfaction of both Governments and negotiations were again resumed. From that time forward they proceeded satisfactorily and towards the end of July, the Afghan delegation returned to Kabul there to lay the results of the conference before the Afghan Government. The subjects discussed included the proposed peace terms of the Ottoman Empire and their bearing from the point of view of Afghanistan on the question of the Khilafat; the frontier tribes; the international status of Afghanistan; the renewal of commercial relations with India; and the acceptance of British assistance towards the peaceful development of Afghanistan. The work which was accomplished in the Mussoorie Conference was unquestionably useful, clearing the ground as it did for later and more formal negotiations. The Afghan Government did not, however, follow up the matter hastily. The pitiful failure of the "religious emigration" of pious Muslims from India to Afghanistan, which was intended to exhibit the solidity of the Islamic world, undoubtedly exercised a salutary influence by revealing to the Afghans the relative power of the Indian Government and the pan-Islamic party in India. The obvious alarm which was caused in Afghanistan by the fall of Bokhara and the expulsion of the Amir of Bokhara from his capital city, probably account for the rapidity with which the Afghan Government invited the Government of India to despatch an official mission to Kabul for the purpose of negotiating a treaty. Even then, relations between Afghanistan and the Bolsheviks still continued; and the Bolshevik Agent, Suritz, together with the Turkish General Jemal Pasha, continued to remain in Kabul at the same time as the British delegation. At the moment of writing it is impossible to state what the upshot of the negotiation with the Amir is likely to be; although it is much to be hoped both in the interests of Afghanistan herself and of British India that it will be possible to revert to the pre-war system of friendship.

We now turn to a brief consideration of the North-West Frontier problems with which Lord Chelmsford's Government has been confronted.

Throughout the whole of his Viceroyalty the North-West Frontier has been a subject of considerable anxiety. The history of this region

during the years 1916—21 falls into two well-marked divisions ; the first, comprised by the last three years of Amir Habibullah, the second, by the first two years of his successor. So long as Afghanistan maintained the strict neutrality to which Amir Habibullah pinned his faith, the disturbances upon the North-West Frontier were confined within bounds which gave us comparatively little cause for anxiety. But with the accession of Amanullah and the outbreak of the Afghan War the situation was materially altered. It was indeed fortunate that the lamentable assassination of Habibullah did not take place until after the termination of the World War had relieved the Government of India of many of its most pressing embarrassments.

The history of the North-West Frontier and of Baluchistan during the years 1916—19 may be outlined very briefly . One outcome of the Turko-German mission to Kabul was the despatch of Turkish emissaries to the Tirah with the object of raising a Jihad among the Afridis by lavish promises of armies and funds from the Amir. As soon as information of this reached the ears of Habibullah, he hastened to send to Lord Chelmsford an emphatic repudiation of all connection with the emissaries, who since they failed to make good their extravagant promises, soon became discredited. So utter was their discomfiture that Lord Chelmsford speaking at Peshawar in the spring of 1917 was able to congratulate the Afridis and with two exceptions only the frontier tribesmen generally, on their staunch loyalty during these troublous times. Vigorous action was taken against the intruders. At the end of March 1917 the Kuki Khel Afridis endeavoured to drive them out, and succeeded in killing Mullah Halim who was sheltering them. In November, the Kambar Khel attacked and burnt the village in which the Turks were residing, drove them out and expelled them to Ningrahar in Afghanistan. So terminated a dangerous intrigue.

The two exceptions to the general good behaviour of the tribesmen were the Mohmands and the Mahsuds. The former incited by fanatical preaching threw over in September 1916 a settlement arrived at after their submission in the previous March, demanding the restoration of the allowances which had been withheld owing to their persistent misconduct. On being told that the restoration of these allowances was a matter to be decided in the light of their conduct during the war, all sections residing in British territories crossed the Frontier in a body. This was a signal for an outbreak of sniping and raiding ; and by the end of the month hostilities were being organized on a large scale. But a strong blockade was established along the border from Michni to Abazai.

Tribal lashkars were disconcerted by the first appearance of aeroplanes in Frontier warfare and after a half-hearted resistance dispersed before our troops. By June 1917, though small raids continued, the Mohmands had suffered severely through their prolonged exclusion from the British territory and made offers to us which it was decided to accept. In July, a jirga of all the subsidised Mohmand sections accepted our terms which included the forfeiture of tribal allowances, the maintenance of the blockade line, the restoration of stolen rifles and assumption of responsibility for raids and religious preaching by fanatical Mullas. The blockade was raised, tribal towers were constructed along the blockade line and the withdrawal of the troops was completed in September 1917.

The other exception was the Mahsuds, whose history for a good part of the year 1916-17 consisted in a long series of depredations culminating in a raid in Zhob. Towards the end of February 1917 a large tribal gathering collected under the leadership of Mulla Fazl Din who inflamed them with promises and exhortations which he professed to have received in writing from high personages in Kabul. They marched in force upon Sarwakai, and a party of Militia which advanced against them from the fort was driven back by weight of numbers with the loss of its commandant. This success attracted fresh numbers to the Mahsud lashkar, which, however, melted away again when the Derajat Moveable Column advanced to the relief of Sarwakai. On the retirement of the Column attacks on convoys and blockades were renewed with considerable success. By May 1917 all sections of the Mahsuds were engaged in attacking the troops in the Gomal Valley. This effort culminated in an engagement in Khuzma Sar and our retirement on Sarwakai with some loss. A field force was in consequence organized under Major-General Beynon which concentrated at Jandola in June 1917 and advanced into the Mahsud country. The strength of this punitive force with its compliment of modern arms new to the Mahsuds, such as bombing aeroplanes and Lewis guns, not only dissipated the rumours of our military weakness which had in a great measure been responsible for the attitude of the tribes, but convinced them of the futility of resistance. On July 2nd, 1917, the Mahsuds sued for peace, and in August accepted the terms dictated to them ; which included settlement in accordance with tribal custom for the murder of Major Dodd in April 1914, the return of 385 captured rifles and all prisoners ; the expulsion or surrender of outlaws and future good behaviour. By the September 1st, as the tribes had shown that they were sincere in their efforts at reparation, sanction was given to the restoration of their allowances.

Throughout the first period, the history of Baluchistan remained generally satisfactory, but in January 1918, the attitude of the Maris became suddenly changed. The cause of the trouble appears to have been a belief generally current among them that India was denuded of troops and that the time was ripe for the vindication of their independence : its immediate occasion was apparently the general recruiting campaign in Baluchistan. The Maris invited the Political Agent of Sibi to their country to enable him to obtain recruits, but on his arrival declined to furnish any ; and when subsequently summoned to Sibi refused to attend. Early in February 1918 reports were received of attacks by Maris on Kholu and Gumbaz. Although attempts were made to pacify the tribe, which had assembled near Mohamand, Gumbaz was attacked by them in force on the 19th February. They were beaten off with a loss of about 100 killed and wounded, but the Kholu Tahsil was evacuated as a precautionary measure and the officials moved to Barkhan. Efforts were made through intermediaries to secure the submission of the Maris and avoid hostilities ; but the tribe was now finally out of hand. The Kholu Tahsil and the levy thana at Hosri were burnt, a train was attacked, a tunnel blocked and defenceless villages raided. On the 7th March 1918 it was reported that the Khetrans had joined the Maris and Barkhan was evacuated. In March 1918 a punitive force was instituted and despatched against the tribesmen. While the punitive force was assembling at Duki, the Maris collected at Rakhni and Bhowatta, where they were bombed by aeroplanes on the 13th March. They then attacked Fort Munro in strength, but were dispersed with loss. A force from Dera Ghazi Khan under General Miles reached Rakhni on the 17th March and Barkhan soon after ; whereupon the Khetrans preferred their submission. On the 15th March the main force started from Duki and concentrated at Gumbaz. With the advance of our troops the Maris retired into the hills, but before the end of March they began to show signs of surrender. On the 2nd May our terms were announced to the Maris and to the Khetrans five days later. These terms were accepted by both tribes with due submission and the punitive operations and terms of settlements acted as a salutary warning to other tribes in Baluchistan.

The second period of the history of the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan during the Viceroyalty of Lord Chelmsford may be said to begin with the outbreak of the Afghan War. Under the stress of hostilities there was a complete breakdown of certain institutions, designed to secure the peace of the border, which had for long performed good service. It was found that the small isolated levy posts which in

normal times were so useful for restraining raids and keeping the border quiet presented in war a difficult problem ; since they were unable to hold out for any length of time and had either to be relieved with comparatively large forces or abandoned altogether. The former course was generally so unsound from the military point of view that withdrawal was found in practice to be the only solution. The disturbing effect of this on the independent tribes was great. Moreover, the institution of tribal levies which during peace time performed functions of great utility was dangerous in war time. With the outbreak of hostilities they had either to be disbanded or in the alternative deserted in large numbers to the enemy. The consequence was in either case that the tribal armies were reinforced with men not only trained in the British system of discipline but also fully accustomed to the use of arms of precision. The disturbances caused by the breakdown of our system north of Gomal reacted seriously upon the peace of Baluchistan. To take first the situation in the north. The Afridis had remained fairly quiet throughout the course of hostilities with Afghanistan though it was later found necessary to destroy the fort at Chora. But the evacuation of the posts in Southern Waziristan which was called for by the concentration in the Upper Tochi, gave the signal for the Mahsuds and Waziris to rise. Among them, Afghan emissaries had been particularly active ; and since they had become thoroughly excited they refused to follow the example of the Afghans and make peace. Throughout the last three weeks of August, and right into September the Mahsuds and Wazirs continued their raids into our territory. Insecurity of life and property in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts became such as to make the position perilous ; and by the beginning of October 1919 it became necessary to take punitive measures. Tribal Councils of the Waziris and Mahsuds were summoned to consider reparation for the damage which had been done ; and we announced at the same time our intention of applying to Waziristan the policy which had previously been so successful in Baluchistan, of locating regular troops at strategic points in their territory and opening up the country by improved road communications. As they refused our terms, after fair warning an aerial bombardment was begun. A column then advanced as far as Data Khel, with the result that the Tochi Waziris promptly accepted our terms. Our troops were then transferred south with Jandola as their base of operations. On December 1st, 1919, our advance began and it was marked from the start by heavy fighting. We advanced to Mandana Kach, establishing per-

manent piquets as we went. The fighting was very severe, as the Mahsuds undoubtedly expected Afghan help. They fought in a way they had never done before, their attacks being well organised, and their combination of fire and shock tactics being excellent. None-the-less by the 28th December 1919, the first phase in the operations was over. Very heavy losses had been sustained by the tribesmen, and they were considerably disheartened. We pursued steadily our policy of establishing permanent piquets, and advanced with little opposition to Kot Kai. On the 11th January very severe fighting took place at Ahnai Tangi, which led to the capture of this ravine by our troops. We then advanced north of the gorge and again encountered severe opposition on January the 14th. This fight the most stubborn of the whole campaign, our casualties amounting to nine British Officers killed and six wounded; ten Indian Officers and 365 Indian other ranks killed or wounded. The enemies' losses were estimated at about 400. Permanent piquets were established as usual and the troops moved forward again to the Sora Rogha plateau.

We then continued our advance steadily into the Mahsud country, and by the 6th March were established at Kani Guram. From this centre punitive expeditions were directed to various localities, and owing to the severe losses which the Mahsuds had sustained during the heavy fighting in our advance, practically all resistance had now ceased and our troops were unmolested. On the 7th May, the campaign came to a close.

It still remained, however, to settle with the Wana Wazirs. Since June 1919, the attitude of this tribe has been consistently hostile. Their fighting men assisted the Mahsuds to resist our advance during the operations which have just been described, and played a prominent part in the fighting at Mandanna Kach and in the Ahnai Tangi battle. During the summer of 1920, there have been a series of raids and attacks on troops by the Wana Wazirs in the Derajat and Zhob, and since they had been responsible for thirty-two raids and offences of various kinds between May and November 1919, it became plain in the course of the period under review that punitive operations could not be avoided. One of the contributory factors to the misbehaviour of the tribesmen was unquestionably the presence among them of the Afghan adventurers Haji Abdur Razak and Shah Daula. Led astray by false reports as to the collapse of British power and attracted by specious promises of these adventurers, the Wana Wazirs have indulged in a series of unforgivable offences against peace and order. Accordingly on the 10th

October 1920, they were directed to attend a tribal council fixed for a month later at Murtaza, in which guarantees of their good faith in the shape of arms and a money fine should be handed over to us. But so little did they appreciate this period of grace that they carried out a daring raid on the night of the 21st-22nd October, inflicting heavy loss on the camp followers at the Kaur Bridge. As the tribal council failed to meet on the date fixed, a column of our troops advanced from Jandola, arriving at Sarwakai on the 18th November. Little opposition was encountered and a tribal council was held on the 20th which accepted our terms. A further twenty days' grace was allowed within which certain preliminary conditions had to be fulfilled; but the tribal leaders at the head of the section which favoured peace were unable to secure the adhesion to this settlement of the younger and more adventurous tribesmen, excited as they were by the uncertainty of our relations with Afghanistan. On the 16th December 1920, operations were resumed, and the column moved forward to Wana which it reached on the 22nd December. Concurrently with this advance a column from Fort Sandeman reoccupied the militia posts of Mir Ali Khel and Moghal Kot which had been abandoned since the 1919 troubles. The situation, however, differs from that which obtained in 1919, because we now hold Wana and the posts of the Zhob with regulars, while the Gomal posts are still unoccupied. In 1919 on the other hand, we held both the Zhob and the Gomal posts with militia and levies.

The future policy regarding Waziristan which at the moment of writing commends itself for the administration may be gathered from the following extract of a speech delivered by Lord Chelmsford on August 20th, 1920.

"At our last Session I gave some account of the measures we were taking to restore the disturbed situation on the North-West Frontier caused by the Afghan war, and I mentioned that the rejection by the Mahsuds of our terms had necessitated the advance of troops into their country. The operations against the Mahsuds have now practically been brought to a close, and as the result of hard fighting we have occupied a central and dominating position in Waziristan. The campaign thus forced upon us, with its heavy cost in treasure and lives, has compelled us to bring under scrutiny the whole of our policy in this troublesome border tract. For many years, ever since we inherited from the Sikhs the task of controlling Waziristan, and especially since the Amir Abdur Rahman formally recognised it as lying within our sphere, we have followed the policy of non-interference with its inhabitants. We have, it is true, held two lines of militia forts along the Tochi in the North and towards Wano in the South, for the purpose of checking raids upon the settled inhabitants of India and upon the caravan traffic proceeding up and down the Gomal. But to this end we have employed mainly

the Wazirs and Mahsuds themselves. We have not interfered with their internal affairs and beyond granting them subsidies, to enable them to live without raiding, we have had as little to do with them as possible. We hoped that, if we left them alone they would leave us alone. This hope has, I regret to say, proved fallacious, and the time has come when we can no longer shut our eyes to the fact. We have had a campaign, more or less important, against Waziristan on an average every four years—sometimes it has been called an expedition and sometimes a blockade. Since 1852 we have had 17 of these military operations, and since 1911 we have had four, including that just concluded. These have all been occasioned by deliberate aggression against us on the part of tribesmen, who have ravaged the plains whenever they saw an opportunity. During the last few years, when we were occupied first with the Great War and then with the Afghan War, their depredations have been bolder and more intolerable than ever before, since, in spite of our efforts to the contrary, they have obtained arms of precision from certain sources. During the Afghan War they swept over the border tracts of the Derajat and Zhob and even penetrated into the Punjab, robbing and murdering the peaceful villagers, especially the Hindus; and after the signature of peace with Afghanistan they became even more truculent and absolutely refused the lenient terms which we offered them in the hope of avoiding a campaign.

On a review of the facts we have now made up our minds that this continual and gratuitous provocation can no longer be suffered; and we have decided, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, that our forces shall remain in occupation of Central Waziristan, that mechanical transport roads shall be constructed throughout the country, especially roads linking the Gumal with the Tochi line, and that our present line of posts shall be extended as may seem necessary. It is not possible to set any limits to the period of our occupation, our main care being that we shall not lose the advantage gained during the past nine months at the cost of valuable lives and of much money and that there shall be no recurrence of the series of outrages of which I have given you an outline. We hope that the peace which must eventually attend our domination of these tribesmen will bring its usual blessings in its train; that they may be weaned from their life of rapine and violence and may find both in material improvements in their country, such as the extension of irrigation and cultivation and in civilising intercourse with India, a more stable prosperity than they have ever derived from their traditional profession of robbers and marauders.

In order to improve our frontier communications we have, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State sanctioned the extension through the Khyber of the broad-gauge railway which at present terminates at Jamrud. I trust that the time may not be distant when the Afghan Government similarly may build railways down to their frontier, and that in this way a connection may be made between the two countries. Nothing, I am convinced, would more conduce to the mutual advantage and good understanding between the two countries than such a connection, and if the Afghan Government were to wish for it, I can assure them that we shall be ready to co-operate."

Largely as a result of the disturbed conditions that have been briefly described, the administration of the border during the period under review has been a matter of grave anxiety to the authorities. Both in the North-

West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan the most distressing feature of these years has been the abnormal number of dangerous and destructive raids upon peaceful inhabitants within our territories. The unrest which has swept over the tribes up and down our borders is in large degree the heritage from the third Afghan War. But there have been at work other forces, including the general disquiet consequent upon the world struggle; the presence in tribal areas of a large number of deserters from the army, mainly hot-blooded young men without employment and without means of livelihood; the perennial economic pressure of growing populations on land too poor to feed them; and fanatical excitement caused by the military misfortunes of Islam as mirrored in the glass of Indian political agitation. During the year 1919-20, no fewer than 611 raids took place in the Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts. They resulted in the killing of 298, the wounding of 392, and the kidnapping of 463 British subjects. Property to the estimated, though probably exaggerated, value of Rs. 30 lakhs was looted. The difficulties against which the officers of the North-West Frontier Province have to contend are now very great. Such numbers of modern rifles have poured into tribal territory through losses in action, desertions from our civil and military forces, and the looting of Afghan stores during the third Afghan War, that almost any young man on the border who has the taste for a highwayman's career can obtain the necessary weapons with little difficulty.

Everything that can be done to stop the depredations of the tribesmen under present conditions is being done. Adequate preparations are made to inflict exemplary punishment upon such gangs as can be encountered; and precautions are taken for transmitting early information of raiding parties known to be out. But the difficulty of the situation is increased by the fact that modern military forces are not adapted for dealing with isolated raiding gangs on the Frontier. In the days of the old Punjab Frontier Force, stationed permanently on the Frontier and consisting largely of Pathans, the wiles of the frontier raiders could be met effectively. But at present, with troops and officers ignorant of the language and unable to distinguish between a friendly village pursuit party and a hostile band, reliance has naturally to be placed more upon the civil forces than upon the regular army. The existing forces of police and Frontier Constabulary have been largely increased and motor transport employed to increase their mobility. The success of the defensive measures employed may be gauged from the fact that during the year 1919-20 forty-one raids were successfully repelled, 119

raiders were killed, 80 wounded and 41 captured. Among these exploits perhaps, the most notable was the engagement and rout of a Wazir force estimated at 500 to 600 strong by mounted policemen in the Kohat district.

A contrast to this somewhat gloomy picture is afforded by the history of Baluchistan. A severe blow had been given to our administrative efforts in the Zhob district by the incursion of the Wazirs and Mahsuds who had followed upon the track of our forces in their withdrawal from Wana. The structure of peace and order which had been built up so carefully in forty years collapsed rapidly. But the foundations had been well and truly laid, and during the early months of 1920, the structure of the civil administration was again built up. The most difficult tribe of all, the Sheranis, evinced a keen desire to atone for past misdeeds, rifles were surrendered and old outlaws came in. But the disturbed conditions of the North-West Frontier Province, combined with the continuance of military operations against the Mahsuds, exercised an unsettling effect upon Baluchistan. More marked even than this was the uncertainty along the border as to British relations with the Afghan Government, which was generally believed to be giving material help to the Mahsuds in their resistance. Most unfortunate was our failure to re-occupy the abandoned outposts in outlying parts of Zhob. This was inevitable; for the old Zhob militia, as has been described had become disorganised and was below strength. The settlement which shortly occurred between the British and the Afghan Governments of disputes arising from certain Frontier incidents already mentioned, and the resumption of negotiations at Mussoorie, exercised a quietening effect. But for some time to come there was cause for anxiety and vigilance. There was also a recrudescence of raiding and kidnapping, and the Afghan officials were the reverse of obliging in securing the prompt return of kidnapped British subjects. But during the last three months of the year 1920 a change for the better came over the situation in Baluchistan. There was a notable freedom from raids in the Zhob and Hindubagh areas, and the peaceful re-occupation of southern Waziristan exercised a quietening influence upon the tribes. The old Zhob militia is gradually being reorganised as irregular levies, and confidence in British power is beginning to return. Already many outlaws long supposed to be irreconcilable are returning to settle in their own homes and at the moment of writing things are more hopeful along the Baluchistan Frontier than they have been for some time past.

CHAPTER III.

Lord Chelmsford's Task.

No small feat of mental gymnastics is required to cast one's mind back to the stage of India's development at the time when Lord Chelmsford took over the reins of government. Leaving aside the remarkable distance traversed by the Indian national consciousness since 1916, which to a historian writing in 1921 threatens to render impossible any accurate estimate of the position now left so far behind, all attempts to re-capture the spiritual atmosphere of that time are necessarily obscured by the cloud of war. And just as the waging of the world struggle and its consequences to India conditioned the whole of Lord Chelmsford's administration, so at the commencement of his term of office was the position of India, political, social and economic, unintelligible apart from its relation to the struggle upon which the Empire was already engaged. If by a determined effort of mental detachment we recall the respective attitudes which distinguished the average official and the average member of the politically minded classes in India in the year 1916, we cannot fail to be struck by the magnitude of the gulf which separates them from the respective angles of vision characteristic of the year 1921. But it will be impossible to understand the measure of the advance achieved by India under Lord Chelmsford's administration, unless some attempt be made to describe the general atmosphere of the country immediately prior to his assumption of office.

It cannot be too clearly emphasized that at the beginning of the year 1916, India was in an uneasy condition. Indeed, the guess may be hazarded that had it not been for the outbreak of the world war, and the consequent direction of their energy by Indian political leaders into channels other than customary, the politically minded classes of the country would, some time prior to 1916, have made plain their disappointment and disgust at the position in which they found themselves. Not least among the consequences to India of the great war is the fact that it served for more than two years to disguise the national disappointment at the Morley-Minto Reforms. This disappointment had reached

an acute stage in 1914 ; at a time when the rally of the Empire's resources served for some period to prevent it from finding full expression.

In order to make clear the position of India at the time when Lord Chelmsford took over charge it is necessary to remember the psychological effect upon officials as well as upon non-officials, of that tremendous wave of war enthusiasism which overran the country in August 1914. It has sometimes been said, not without a measure of truth, that India's reception of the world war came as a surprise to those in charge of her administration. After the first shock of relief that the confident prophecies of Bernhardt and Reventlow had proved so far wide of the mark, those who guided the destinies of India at the close of 1914, found themselves somewhat embarrassed. That India should remain quiet and peaceful at the time when the Empire was fighting for its life, would have come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the mind of the masses. But that India should, in so far as her opinion could be formulated by the vocal classes, have adopted the war as her own quarrel came almost as a shock to many. In consequence this wave of national enthusiasm was neither duly exploited nor adequately encouraged by those who, had they but been prepared for it, might have employed it in directions more worthy of the spirit by which it was inspired. For a while, all India's grievances were forgotten, she stood shoulder to shoulder with Britain ; and as in the mother country so in the dependency all personal quarrels and indeed national differences were forgotten.

To those in India, somewhat overwhelmed as they must have been by these unexpected phenomena, the situation presented difficulties. To English opinion, on the other hand, the attitude of India made by a wholly new and distinct appeal. As Colonel Buchan wrote :—

The effect upon the people of Britain of this amazing rally of the Empire was a sense of an immense new comradeship which brought tears to the eyes of the least emotional. For, consider what it meant. Geographically, it brought under one banner the trapper of Athabasca, the stockman of Victoria, the Dutch farmer from the back veld, the tribesman from the Khyber, the gillie from the Scottish hills, and the youth from a London back street. Racially, it united Mongol and Aryan, Teuton and Celt ; politically it drew to the side of the Canadian democrat the Indian feudatory whose land was still mediæval ; spiritually, it joined Christianity in all its forms with the creeds of Islam, Buddha, Brahma, and a thousand little unknown gods. The British Empire had revealed itself at last as that wonderful thing for which its makers had striven and prayed—a union based not upon statute and officialdom, but upon the eternal simplicities of the human spirit.

The effect of this upon English statesmen was noticeable in their successive pronouncements as to the obligation under which India had

placed Great Britain. From Mr. Asquith's dictum that a changed angle of vision was necessary, to the more emotional declarations of the British Socialist Party, the Press of England was for some time full of pro-Indian sentiments which roused in the hearts of Indian nationalists a sense of pride only more lofty than their newly-aroused expectations.

But time went on, and it seemed to those on tip-toe with expectation that nothing was done. The breakdown in the Mesopotamia campaign, with the renewed demands upon India's resources in men, money and materials which that breakdown necessitated, served to implant in the minds of many of the politically minded classes an uneasy suspicion that India was being exploited for the Empire's needs. Further while the gallant deeds of Indian troops were everywhere acclaimed, it was notorious that Indian soldiers, veterans and heroes as they might be, could not aspire to a King's Commission. In the second place, there was every reason to believe that the attitude of the Dominions towards India did not reflect that generosity not merely of conduct but even of sentiment which was now characteristic of Great Britain. Indian settlers in self-governing Dominions and in Colonial dependencies were subjected to treatment which filled the hearts of leaders of their nation with shame and indignation. The widespread feeling excited in this country on account of the disabilities imposed upon Indians by the self-governing Dominions is only partly to be explained by the hardships that were actually inflicted upon individuals. Indian political leaders felt that the whole cause of their country was jeopardised if the Dominions, whose share in the future constitution of the Empire was obviously to increase, remained under the impression that the inhabitants of the whole Indian sub-continent were on a par with the helpless and obsequious settlers who constituted an un-welcome element in the population of outlying portions of the Empire.

But if on the one hand, there was fear of India's exploitation for Imperial purposes and on the other hand, apprehension lest the change in the constitution of the Empire, so confidently foreshadowed in the public press, should for ever exclude India's claim to Dominion status, there were not wanting in the year 1916 domestic grievances which served in the eyes of the politically minded classes to point the dangers of the situation in which their country found herself. In the first place, the Morley-Minto Reforms were a failure obvious to all save the officials who conducted them. In at least one of the Provincial Legislative Councils, it is true, the elected members were in a majority ; but the tendency

of the officials who sat side by side with them as well in Bengal as elsewhere was to constitute themselves into a solid Government bloc which of itself tended to give every debate a racial colour. If this was so in the case of the provincial Councils, it was much more the case with the Imperial Legislative Council. The mere fact that in some provinces the local Governments could not rely upon their own legislators to give them that support in times of stress which they considered necessary, inaugurated a tendency to place upon the Government of India, with its clear official majority in the Supreme Legislative Council, the obligation of stepping into the breach. Accordingly, the Indian members of the Legislative Council were from time to time treated to the exasperating spectacle of the employment of the official majority for the purpose of forcing through legislative enactments in the teeth of non-official opposition. There was thus given to the debates in the Indian Legislative Council an air of unreality, almost of futility, which was not without its effect upon the attitude adopted by the European officials towards their Indian colleagues. There was a noticeable tendency to treat the questions, speeches, and resolutions of the elected members as though they were the exercises of a schoolboy, of value to no one save their author. In this connection, it should be noticed, the rejection by the official majority of Mr. Gokhale's appeal for primary education came as a severe shock to those who still retained some lingering faith in Government's intention to make the Morley-Minto Reforms an instrument of further advance. In the next place, the Arms Act was a recurrent grievance; and particularly so in time of war, when the galling racial disabilities which it inflicted became a thorn in the flesh of India's pride. Finally, mention must be made of the fact that no adequate steps had yet been taken to ensure that progressive Indianization of the Public Services which the politically minded classes in this country had for so long demanded.

These then were the elements of the situation at the time when Lord Chelmsford took over charge. On the one hand, the first wave of war enthusiasm had died down, and was gradually being replaced by an attitude of suspicion: on the other, the expectations aroused by the pronouncements of English statesmen had not been satisfied, and in their turn were feeding the smouldering flame of distrust. Moreover the severity of the shock which German might was dealing to the fabric of the Empire was being dimly appreciated, and the recent *debacle* in Mesopotamia had served, however unjustly, to discredit very seriously the Government of India.

Lord Chelmsford clearly realised the importance of the part which the Legislative Council could be made to play, and, as will be explained in more detail later, early destroyed that fatal spirit of unreality and make believe which was beginning to fill thoughtful Indians with despair. His consistent policy was to take the Council into his confidence : to bring home to the elected members of it their privileges and responsibilities : to treat it as the mouthpiece of politically minded India. In a very remarkable speech delivered at the opening of the Imperial Legislative Council in 1917, the Viceroy emphasized the lines upon which he had attempted in the past and would continue to attempt in the future, to solve the more pressing problems which presented themselves :—

“It is just a year ago,” he said, “since this Council came together as a new Council, and I presided over you as Viceroy for the first time. It was then early days for me to put before you my hopes and fears, my aims and aspirations. Moreover, I laid down for myself as a principle of conduct that I would make no promises of which I could not see the prospect of early fulfillment.” ... “You, gentlemen, are here to co-operate with Government in its policy and administration. It is before you then in the first place that, I lay an account of what my Government has done and is hoping to do.”

“I think I may outline our policy generally as follows :—We put before ourselves three main tasks. Firstly, to secure that the services of the Indian Army should not go unrecognised or unrequited and that rewards to them should hold the foremost place. Secondly, that we should endeavour to remove any grievances either sentimental or material which we found to exist. Thirdly, that we should define the goal of British rule in India and map out the roads leading to that goal.”

Lord Chelmsford then proceeded to lay down the various steps which he had already taken towards the achievement of these three ends. Broadly speaking, the second and the third of his main tasks, and the story of their accomplishment, serve to epitomize the most significant portion of his Viceroyalty. But before proceeding to describe these in brief outline, it will be well to summarise, once and for all, what his administration succeeded in accomplishing for the Indian Army.

The first and the greatest of these achievements was the opening to Indians of British Commissions in the King's Army. As a mark of his approbation of their services during the war the King-Emperor was pleased with effect from the 5th August 1917, to appoint nine Indian Officers to British Commissions. The first initial step having been taken the rest was not so difficult. Under the scheme later devised, a number of Indian gentlemen have from time to time been granted substantive Commissions in recognition of their war services ; during the war, temporary commissions in the Indian Army were granted to selected candidates ; a cadet training college was established at Indore, and a number

of Indian gentlemen were nominated for cadetships at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. Further, systematic efforts were made in the subsequent years of Lord Chelmsford's administration to see that the Indian Army received the same care and attention as the British Army. A system was set on foot by which station hospitals are to be provided for Indian troops on a plan parallel to that already sanctioned for British troops. Since January 1917, the pay of the Indian commissioned and non-commissioned ranks has been substantially increased. A Jamadar's pay, for example, has been raised by more than ten per cent. The ordinary pensions given to retiring officers and men of the Indian Army have been considerably raised and arrangements made for liberalising the conditions under which family pensions were granted to relations of deceased soldiers. A permanent organization entitled the "Indian Soldiers' Board" has been set up to administer the various charitable funds intended for the benefit of Indian soldiers and to exercise a watchful eye upon the interests of those who have suffered during the war. It is difficult to describe in words the effect of these changes upon the sentiments of the Indian Army. The pride in past achievements and the loyal devotion to the British Raj so characteristic of the force, have been greatly increased and set upon a more solid foundation by the earnest efforts of the administration to do greater justice to the claims of the Indian soldier.

We may now turn to a brief consideration of the work accomplished by Lord Chelmsford's administration in dealing with the grievances under which India laboured at the time of his accession to office. In the course of the same speech to which reference was made above, Lord Chelmsford proceeded to enunciate clearly the attitude he took up regarding India's position relative to the rest of the Empire.

"The position of India within the Empire has obviously the first claim on our attention. You will perhaps, remember what Lord Hardinge said in his speech of the 22nd September 1915 to this Council. From this statement of the actual constitution of the Imperial Conference you will see that the ultimate decision upon the representation of India at the next meeting of the Conference rests with the Conference itself. It is of course, premature to consider the manner in which the representation of India, if admitted, should be effected, *primâ facie* it would appear reasonable that India should be represented by the Secretary of State and one or two representatives nominated by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Viceroy, such nominees being ordinarily selected from officials resident or serving in India."

Lord Chelmsford continued :

The next step was taken when His Majesty's Government decided at the beginning of this year 1917 to convene a special War Conference in London and the

Secretary of State, in consultation with the Government of India, nominated His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner, the Hon'ble Sir James Meston and Sir Satyendra Sinha as his colleagues in the representation of India—a notable advance on the representation of India which Lord Hardinge foreshadowed. In alluding to this subject I said at our last session, "I am sorry to think that the enormous importance of the decision taken by His Majesty's Government stands in danger of being minimised and discounted by hasty and not very well informed criticisms. As the French proverb has it, 'It is the first step which counts,' and India has been admitted to-day for the first time to a place of honour at the Council table of the Empire. It marks a point in the history of India which, though it may not be seen in its true perspective to-day, will, I have no hesitation in saying, be the beginning of a new chapter in India's history under the Imperial flag."

As to the magnitude of the advance in India's position in the Empire here foreshadowed, there can be no two opinions. It is a significant commentary upon the state of public opinion in India during the first year of Lord Chelmsford's office that the admission of India's representatives as equals to the Council Board of the Empire was minimised and, so far as might be, discredited in the public press, because these representatives were official nominees. As in the case of the advance signified by the admission of Indians to King's Commissions, the magnitude of the gain to India from the concession of a principle pregnant with future possibilities, was largely obscured from public notice by short-sighted criticisms as to its early and perhaps, hesitating application. But the cardinal fact remained. As Lord Chelmsford said, "An Imperial Cabinet, it is now announced, is to meet once a year. India is to be represented in this Cabinet and one representative from India is to attend the Cabinet in the same way that one representative attends from each self-governing dominion. The status of India in the Empire is thus fully recognized and an advance has been made, such indeed as might have been hoped for, but was scarcely to be expected a year ago."

With the admission of India to the innermost Council of the Empire there naturally followed a change in the attitude adopted towards her by the self-governing Dominions. In the 1917 Conference, the Dominion representatives accepted the principle of reciprocity of treatment, and commended to the favourable consideration of their Governments three general principles. The first was that the privileges of settlement accorded to Indians were to be not less advantageous than those allowed to subjects of other Oriental nations. The second was that the facilities were to be accorded to educated Indians visiting the Colonies for travel and study as apart from settlement. The third was that Indians already permitted to settle should receive sympathetic treatment. Upon this Lord Chelmsford remarked "We, in this country may regret that these

principles do not go further but I think that Hon'ble Members will admit that a great advance has been made in this most important question."

Unfortunately, as experience has shown, the theoretical acceptance by the Governments of the self-governing Dominions of equitable principles has not been found incompatible with the continuation of certain violations of those principles. Throughout the whole of Lord Chelmsford's administration the Government of India has maintained a stout and well-directed endeavour to safeguard the right of Indians abroad. It is not too much to say that never before have the grievances of which Indian settlers complain received such prompt and such unhesitating condemnation from any Government. During the year 1919, for example, serious trouble arose in South Africa; a Bill was passed which was regarded by Indians as a departure from the spirit of the agreement which had been arrived at in 1914 between General Smuts and Mr. Gandhi. The Government of India has done all that it can to press for a sympathetic consideration of the Indian case. It has deputed an experienced officer to lay before the Commission sitting in South Africa the Indian point of view. In East Africa also, where the local administration has lately assumed an attitude towards Indians which has been hotly condemned by all shades of opinions in this country, the Government of India has pressed upon His Majesty's Government with unfailing energy the necessity for an equitable settlement of the question. Further, the Government of India has succeeded after much toil in removing the long-standing grievance of indentured emigration. In regard to this, Lord Chelmsford said in his speech to the Imperial Legislative Council in September 1917 :—

I think Honourable Members in the past scarcely realised the difficulties with which the Government of India had to contend in relation to this matter. Pledges had been given with regard to the maintenance of the system until a substitute had been found which, though understood in India to mean abolition within a very short period, were understood in a very different sense in the Colonies. I had to be jealous of India's good faith in this matter, but I am glad to say that the action which we took in prohibiting emigration under the Defence of India Act, thus leading to abolition, is now fully accepted and understood by the Colonies and Colonial Office, and for this removal of any misunderstanding we have to thank our delegates to the Imperial Conference, Sir James Meston and Sir Satyendra Sinha, who by their explanation of India's attitude at a meeting held at the Colonial Office were able to remove any suspicion of bad faith which might have attached to our action.

Pains were also taken to remove the other grievances which existed at the time when Lord Chelmsford came to the country. The Arms Act was taken into consideration as soon as urgent war pre-occupations al-

lowed and the rules under it were in 1920 amended so as to abolish all racial distinctions, while at the same time discharging the main purpose of the old Act, namely, to keep lethal weapons out of the hands of irresponsible persons. Prior to this, definite steps had been taken to dispose of the old accusation that it was the policy of the British Administration to "emasculate" the people of India by depriving them of opportunities for training in the use of arms. The plain truth about this accusation is, it may be pointed out, that those who now raise it belong to classes which have not up to the present time displayed either martial inclinations or martial aptitude ; but since it is obviously desirable that the educated classes of India should receive such training as may enable them to take their share in the defence of their country under modern conditions, Lord Chelmsford's administration proceeded to tackle the difficulty systematically. The opening of the Indian Defence Force to Indians of the educated classes did not produce very satisfactory results although it must frankly be admitted that in the press of war-time no particular pains were taken to make a success of what was generally regarded as a dubious experiment. But after the war, when the question of voluntary and territorial forces was taken up seriously by Government, provision was made, to the satisfaction of all responsible opinion among the politically minded classes, for a real Indian Territorial Army which should act as a second line of defence in case of invasion and should be brought up to a standard of high efficiency. This line of defence is obviously important in view of the increasing obligations of His Majesty's Government in various parts of the world. Its development along steady lines would seem to offer some solution to the dilemma so often put forward by those who can see no future for India in constitutional government, namely, that under the new conditions it will be extremely difficult to induce British soldiers to undertake the responsibility of India's defence.

The other standing grievance, the failure to take adequate steps to Indianize the Public Services, was also attacked by Lord Chelmsford's Government. The Report of the Public Services Commission, which was not published until early in 1917, created much disappointment, as its recommendations were regarded as already out of date. The consideration by the Government of India of these recommendations resulted in a liberalization of the percentage of Indian recruitment of the various services, which, it is hoped will result in the rapid increase of the Indian personnel without damage to what has sometimes been described as the "British character" of the Services. It is noticeable that during the

last two years of Lord Chelmsford's administration, this grievance, which used to provide favourite ammunition for the politically minded classes of India, has been tacitly dropped out of consideration.

Along all these important lines, as will be seen, Lord Chelmsford's Government has made notable advances. These advances have been achieved under circumstances of the utmost difficulty. This has prevented them from being appreciated at their true value. But there can be no doubt that to the historian of the future, Lord Chelmsford's administration will stand out in the history of the relations of India with England as the period which witnessed the first systematic attempt to remove the grievances which in Indian eyes hindered the consummation of nationality. But perhaps, the most important part of Lord Chelmsford's work for India is that connected with India's constitutional advance. Consideration of this will be reserved for the succeeding chapter.

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CHAPTER IV.

Political Progress and Constitutional Aspirations.

The outstanding service to India which has been performed by Lord Chelmsford's administration may be summed up in a few words. It consists in the definition of the goal of British rule in India, and the marking out of a clear road towards that goal's attainment. As early as the year 1915, the problem of India's immediate future had begun to attract the attention of many thoughtful persons who realised the failure of the Morley-Minto Reforms. It must be remembered that at the time these Reforms were passed, Lord Morley had expressly disclaimed any suggestion that he was setting up a Parliamentary system of Government. Some idea of the change which has come over opinion both in England and in India since Lord Morley's time may be gathered from the fact that the whole work of the framers of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report depended upon the assumption that Parliamentary Government was India's inevitable destiny.

It has been pointed out in the previous chapter that the politically minded classes of India had early become disillusioned as to the possibility of advance under the Morley-Minto Scheme. There is considerable reason to suppose that but for the outbreak of the world war their dissatisfaction would have expressed itself in no uncertain terms at least two years earlier than was actually the case. But it happened that in the first place, their efforts were directed into war channels, and in the second place, their disappointment was to some extent assuaged by the generous pronouncements made by responsible British statesmen upon the topic of India and India's future. None-the-less by the year 1916, at the time, that is, when Lord Chelmsford took over charge, the war was already 18 months old. The first wave of enthusiasm had spent itself in India. Nothing had so far been done to satisfy the expectations aroused by the applause with which the politicians and people of Great Britain had greeted India's war effort, and there were significant symptoms, in the continuance of the anarchic movement, that the discontent was on the point of expressing itself in a form that was the more dangerous for being

subterranean. Not least among the claims of Lord Chelmsford upon India's gratitude will be reckoned, so soon as the dust of controversy shall have subsided, his instant perception of the necessity of satisfying her legitimate constitutional aspirations. Speaking in the House of Lords on December 12th, 1919, Lord Crewe revealed to the public a secret which, had it been but earlier known, could not fail to have modified the attitude assumed even by Lord Chelmsford's most vehement and least reasonable critics: "I hope I am committing no breach of confidence—and I do not know whether I very much care if I am—in saying that I know from personal knowledge that before Lord Chelmsford went out to India in 1916, he had become clearly convinced in his own mind, from conversations he had had with those competent to give opinions and from his own reflections on the matter, that it would be necessary at once to make an announcement of the character which was made in 1917—namely, that this country was looking forward to an advance in India with responsible Government as the goal."

But of this India knew nothing. The politically minded classes with that divorce between words and things too often characteristic of their mental outlook, were clamouring for a pronouncement upon Indian Constitutional Reform which should be carried into immediate effect. There is some reason to believe that certain leaders who were honestly desirous of constitutional progress under British protection, became alarmed about this time at the possibility of agitation turning into anarchy unless a safety-valve were provided. Whether this alarm was well-grounded or not, the Home Rule movement, which had been initiated by Mrs. Besant some few months previously, came prominently into notice towards the end of 1915, and instantly attracted the younger members of the Nationalist party. At first, it was received with some coldness by the older and more cautious leaders: the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, both of which bodies met at Bombay in December 1915, had formally withheld countenance from it, despite the fact that they passed Resolutions recommending a considerable advance in the same direction. But undiscouraged by this early reverse, Mrs. Besant continued her propaganda in Madras while Bal Gangadhar Tilak organised a parallel movement known as the Nationalist Home Rule League in Bombay.

Between December 1915 and December 1916, a period which witnessed Lord Chelmsford's first few months of office, the two Home Rule Movements, voicing as they did so accurately the aspirations of educated India, gathered to themselves a wide following and probably did con-

siderable service in providing an outlet for emotions that might otherwise have expressed themselves in cruder form. None-the-less, both the promoters brought themselves into conflict with authority by speeches which were more vigorous than well timed. Mrs. Besant was under the Defence of India Rules excluded from Bombay Presidency and later from the Central Provinces. Mr. Tilak was prosecuted under the Criminal Procedure Code and ordered by the District Magistrate of Poona to execute a bond to be of good behaviour for one year. This order was, however, subsequently cancelled by the High Court of Bombay. By Christmas 1916, the followers of Mrs. Besant and Mr. Tilak were in a distinct majority in the Lucknow Congress. For the first time since the Surat Congress in 1907 the left Wing Party was in a position to put forward its own demands. This change was a result of the attitude of impatience and suspicion into which the politically minded classes of India had fallen, owing to the causes previously related. The moderate Party had recently lost two of their most influential leaders in Mr. Gokhale and Sir Pheroze Shah Mehta, and their habitual temperance of expression placed them at a disadvantage as compared with their more aggressive colleagues. It is true that the Moderates were actually first in the field with a definite plan for constitutional reforms; for shortly after the close of the Delhi session of the Imperial Legislative Council in 1916, a Memorandum was presented to Lord Chelmsford on behalf of nineteen elected members, embodying a list of reforms which they considered should be undertaken with reference to the constitution of the Government of India. Now, it must be remembered that as a result of Lord Chelmsford's personal interest in the question of constitutional reforms, a despatch had been sent in the autumn of 1916 for the consideration of His Majesty's Government. The consideration of this despatch could not be hurried, and many references back and forth between England and India were required. It is not, however, always realised that the lapse of the period between the autumn of 1916 and the autumn of 1917, owing both to the aforesaid references and to the pre-occupation of His Majesty's Government in war matters, seriously effected the position, not merely of the Government of India but of the Moderate Party. It was naturally impossible for the Government of India, while their own proposals were under consideration, either to communicate their substance to the Indian public or to give any definite pronouncement upon the Memorandum of the Nineteen Members. It thus came about that when the Congress of 1916 met, the Moderate Members had little or nothing to oppose by way of offset

to the suggestions of their more advanced colleagues. The whole atmosphere of the time, being such as has already been described, favoured extreme as opposed to temperate proposals. The actual tone of the debates in the Congress was materially affected by the unauthorised publication of a private letter written by Mr. L. Curtis, a distinguished if unofficial expert in the machinery of constitutional Government, who was misrepresented as the embodiment of a conspiracy to subordinate India to the control of the Dominions. Passionate speeches were delivered and India's claim to some form of responsible Government was hotly urged. The scheme of the Nineteen Members was taken as a useful basis, despite the fact that it would have subordinated the executive to the orders of a Legislature upon which was laid no responsibility for the continuance of the work of Government. In this respect, it was a natural development of the Morley-Minto Reforms, for at any moment the Legislature could have brought the whole machinery of administration to a standstill without being given power to create a Government in harmony with its own wishes. The general outline of the scheme commended itself to those in command of the Lucknow Congress, with the result that it was elaborated and made more preemptory. At the same time Home Rule Propaganda through the medium of local Leagues and Committees was formally countenanced. But on the whole the most important event in the historic Congress of 1916 was the Hindu-Muslim compact. Throughout the course of the preceding year, a definite *rapprochement* had taken place between some of the leaders of advanced Hindu and of advanced Mohammadan opinion, who clearly perceived that communal differences were not only in themselves an obstacle to the achievement by India of constitutional progress, but were also among the most formidable arguments in the armoury of those who were believed to be unfavourable to such development. It is noteworthy that during the year 1915 the Muslim League, which had until shortly before that time stood mainly for the protection of Mohammadan interests against anticipated Hindu ascendancy, had gradually become dominated by those members of the "young" Muslim party who upheld the new ideal of Self-Government for India. And by the end of 1916 as a result of skilful negotiations, the Muslim League under the guidance of the advanced party of political Mohammadans agreed to accept the scheme of Nineteen Members as modified by the Home Rule party, on condition that the interests of their community were safeguarded by the concession of overweighted Mohammadan representation upon certain of the proposed Councils.

This compact was ratified at Lucknow, the net result being that the Congress and the Muslim League, as political organizations, were committed to the cause of Home Rule and to the modified scheme of the Nineteen Members, which was henceforward known as the Congress-League Scheme.

After the Lucknow meetings the Home Rule leaders entered upon a campaign of vigorous propaganda, which definitely put forward the scheme adopted by the Congress and the League, as its minimum immediate demand. Acting in the uneasy political atmosphere which then existed, the activities of Mrs. Besant, Mr. Tilak and their numerous followers began shortly to be felt. Since the Allies were avowedly fighting in defence of the rights of small and weak nations and since their watch-words were democracy and self-determination, it was not to be expected that the advanced party in India should content themselves with such demands as they conceived might be susceptible of immediate realization. There further occurred a number of incidents early in 1917, which, though small in themselves, served to accentuate the prevailing discontent. Public opinion was disappointed in the report of the Public Services Commission, which was considered by the Nationalist party as a typical example of the failure of Englishmen to understand the new spirit of India. The contrast between the hopes which had been aroused by the appointment of the Commission, and the results achieved after so much time, expense and labour was turned into a weapon for use against the Government. Feeling was also aroused by proceedings, —subsequently cancelled—commenced against Mr. Gandhi, who had gone to Champaran in Bihar to enquire into the grievances of labourers employed in Indigo cultivation.

The rise in the political temperature did not escape the notice of those in charge of the administration, and in February 1917 Lord Chelmsford in addressing the Imperial Legislative Council pleaded for patience and moderation :

“In this connection there is a matter which I regard as of great importance and which I wish to bring to the attention of the Members of this Council. Lord Hardinge in his speech of the 12th January 1915 appealed to your predecessors in office to abstain from any action which might provoke controversy or bitterness at a time when the Empire was engaged in the death struggle with a powerful and implacable enemy. That appeal did not fall on deaf ears and the Council, as then constituted, loyally and patriotically recognized that, while the Empire was fighting for its very existence, domestic difficulties must be sealed. I think, however, there must have been many who were present at the meeting in 1915 who cherished hopes that 1917 would find us with peace within our borders and

able to resume the ordinary course of our debates. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and it is as necessary for me as it was for Lord Hardinge to invoke your co-operation in this matter. Though feelings of impatience and discontent are not unnaturally generated when we see matters on which we may feel strongly continuously deferred or postponed, yet prudence and common sense and above all our deep sense of loyalty to the Empire, must recognize the necessity of such a course in times like these. I do not wish to dwell on these, but it must be evident that with some of the various items of business to be laid before the Council there is a tendency to press the discussion of what are obviously controversial questions. I cannot help thinking that this is due in part to that very natural impatience at the postponement of measures to which I have already alluded, and in part to the fact that this is a new Council and that new Members are unaware of the unwritten understanding which obtained in the last Council."

Such was the political atmosphere of India, that this appeal failed in its purpose. So also, strange as it may appear to the future historian, did the decision of the British Government that India was to be represented at the Imperial War Conference by two non-official Indians and one British administrator in addition to the Secretary of State. The one thing that the politically minded classes in India wanted to know, and the one thing it was unfortunately impossible to tell them, largely on account of the war pre-occupation of His Majesty's Government, was what was going to be done about constitutional reform.

In the summer months of 1917 uneasiness reached its height. Various heads of provinces found it necessary to deliver emphatic warnings against the employment of political propaganda of a type which they considered likely to increase popular uneasiness and obstruct national concentration upon war aims. Hence arose to a most unfortunate suspicion that Government was about to embark upon a campaign of repression with the object of crushing all political activity. This apprehension was reinforced in the minds of Home Rule workers by the issue of official circulars pointing out the undesirable effects on college discipline of students—upon whose high ideals and generous enthusiasm the Home Rule movement primarily depended—identifying themselves prominently with political meetings; and seemed confirmed beyond question by the internment of Mrs. Besant and two of her followers on June 16th. While it is difficult to see in what manner the administration could have calmed the growing excitement, it cannot but be admitted that the action taken served lamentably to strengthen the suspicion, already prevalent in the atmosphere of the time, that India, after being exploited for war needs, was to be left out in the cold with her demands unsatisfied. To the nationalist workers these various official actions, particularly the internment of Mrs. Besant,

seemed to demonstrate a firm intention on the part of Government to discourage all political activity.

The order made a great sensation in India and protest meetings were organised in many places. Not merely Home Rulers but also Moderates, sunk their individual and party differences, announcing their intention of fighting out once and for all the question whether self-government was or was not a legitimate aspiration for India. At the same time, the publication of the Report of the Mesopotamia Commission afforded a ready opening to those who desired to criticise the efficiency of the administration. Moreover, the resignation of Mr. Chamberlain and the appointment of Mr. Montagu gave rise to fears, even among those who still believed in the genuineness of Britain's intentions of giving India her constitutional due, lest the anxiously awaited pronouncement upon her future position should be still longer delayed. While the excitement was at its height, the message for which all were waiting made its appearance. The Secretary of State, in reply to a question—surely the most casual manner in which a decision of such profound importance has ever been conveyed—announced that “the policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible, and that it is of the highest importance as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at home and in India. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, that I should accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with the Viceroy and the Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the view of local Governments, and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others. I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom the new opportunities of services will thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of

responsibility. Ample opportunity will be afforded for public discussion of the proposals, which will be submitted in due course to Parliament."

The effect of this announcement was to rally the Moderate party who welcomed it as the "Magna Charta of India." On the other hand, the more advanced members of the Home Rule party, who were fast drifting into an attitude of racial intolerance, expressed dissatisfaction of the guarded phraseology of the announcement, which they deemed to fall very far short of India's desires and aspirations. None-the-less by the time the Legislative Council met in September the political tension had been largely relieved. Lord Chelmsford was now able to make the announcement, which, if it could have been made even a few months earlier, would have done so much to relieve the tension and avert bitterness.

"At the very first Executive Council which I held as Viceroy and Governor General, I propounded two questions to my Council:

- (1) What is the goal of British rule in India?
- (2) What are the steps on the road to that goal?

"We came to the conclusion—which, I trust most Honourable Members will agree, was inevitable—that the endowment of British India as an integral part of the British Empire with self-government was the goal of British Rule, and His Majesty's Government have now put forward in precise terms their policy in respect of this matter, a policy which I may say that we as the Government of India regard in substance as practically indistinguishable from that which we put forward. With regard to the second question, after a careful and detailed examination of the ground, we arrived at the decision that there were three roads along which an advance should be made towards the goal. The first road was in the domain of local self-government, the village, the rural board, and the town or municipal council. The domain of urban and rural self-government is the great training ground from which political progress and a sense of responsibility have taken their start, and we felt that the time had come to quicken the advance, to accelerate the rate of progress, and thus to stimulate the sense of responsibility in the average citizen, and to enlarge his experience.

"The second road, in our opinion, lay in the domain of the more responsible employment of Indians under Government. We felt that it was essential to progress towards the goal that Indians should be admitted in steadily increasing proportion to the higher grades of the various services and departments and to more responsible posts in the administration, generally. It is, I think, obvious that this is a most important line of advance. If we are to get real progress, it is vital that India should have an increasing number of men versed not only in the detail of everyday administration, but in the whole art of Government.

"I doubt whether there is likely to be anyone who will cavil at the general conclusion at which we arrived as to these two roads of advance; but agreement must not blind us to their importance. There is no better source of instruction than the liberty to make mistakes. The first and foremost principle which was

enunciated in Lord Ripon's Self-Government Resolution in May 1882, and was subsequently emphasised by Lord Morley and Lord Crewe in their despatches of 27th November 1908 and 11th July 1913, respectively, was that the object of local self-government is to train the people in the management of their own local affairs, and that political education of this sort must take precedence of mere considerations of departmental efficiency.' We are in complete accord with that principle, hence our advocacy of an advance along the first road.

"Equally we realise the paramount importance of training in administration, which would be derived from an advance along the second road. There is nothing like administrative experience to sober the judgment and bring about an appreciation of the practical difficulties which exist in the realm of administration, and it is from this source that we may look forward in the future to an element of experienced and tried material for the legislative assemblies.

"We come now to our third road, which lies in the domain of the Legislative Councils. As Hon'ble Members will readily appreciate, there is no subject on which so much difference of opinion exists and with regard to which greater need is required for careful investigation and sober decision. I may say frankly that we as the Government of India recognise fully that an advance must be made on this road simultaneously with the advances on the other two, and His Majesty's Government, in connection with the goal which they have outlined in their announcement, have decided that substantial steps in the direction of the goal they define should be taken as soon as possible. Some criticism has been directed against the Government of India on the score that we have not disclosed the policy outlined in our despatch. I must remind Hon'ble Members that the decision on such a question rests, not with the Government of India, but with the authorities at home. Moreover, on the larger question of a declaration of policy, in view of its unique importance, I have steadfastly refused, in the face of much adverse criticism, to anticipate by any statement of my own the decision of His Majesty's Government who alone could make a final and authoritative statement, and I was careful to warn Hon'ble Members in my opening speech to them last February of the likelihood of delay, owing to the grave pre-occupations of the Cabinet at home. Well, this however is, I hope, now immaterial, for His Majesty's Government have announced their policy and have authorised the Secretary of State, with His Majesty's approval, to accept my invitation to visit India and to examine the issues on the spot. I had invited Mr. Chamberlain to visit India some time back. He was on the point of accepting when his resignation took place. Immediately on Mr. Montagu's assumption of office, I expressed the hope that he would see his way to accept the invitation which I had extended to his predecessor, and I am delighted that the Cabinet have decided that he should accept. Some apprehension has been expressed lest the Government of India is about to be superseded temporarily by the Secretary of State. There need be no anxiety on that score. As I have told you, Mr. Montagu is coming on my invitation to consult informally with myself, the Government of India and others. He will make no public pronouncements of policy, and business between the Government of India and the Home Government will be conducted through the regular channels and the Council of India. There is no question of supersession, but the outstanding advantage of Mr. Montagu's visit is that he will now have the opportunity of making a first hand examination of the questions in issue, and for my part I shall leave nothing undone to enable him to receive all

the suggestions of representative bodies and others which he may desire. In these circumstances and in view of Mr. Montagu's assurance that there will be ample opportunity for public discussion of the proposals which will be submitted in due course to Parliament I would suggest to Hon'ble Members that the intervening time before his arrival might be spent in the quiet examination of the arguments to be placed before Mr. Montagu. For myself I am anxious that, when Mr. Montagu arrives, we—and in that pronoun I include all those representative bodies and others mentioned in the announcement—should have ready to place before him all the material which will enable him to form a reasoned judgment.

“ I hope Hon'ble Members will not regard my advice as suspect, but I would press it on their attention. Is it too much to ask that, when Mr. Montagu arrives in India, he should find a calm atmosphere, suggested policies carefully thought out and supported by sober arguments and concrete facts, and a spirit of sobriety dominating everyone, worthy of the issues to be examined ? ”

In another portion of the same speech Lord Chelmsford described the attempts which were being made to remove such long-standing causes of complaint as the cotton duty which had penalised India in favour of Lancashire ; as the race-bar which had hindered the bestowal of King's Commission upon Indians ; as the invidious treatment to which Indian immigrants and visitors had been subjected in certain parts of the Empire. He also emphasized the acceptance by the Dominions' representatives on the Imperial War Conference, of the principle of reciprocity of treatment which was the first fruits of India's admission to a place at the Council Board of the Empire. He referred to the opportunity which was being given to Indians to undergo military training in the Indian Defence Force ; and to the examination to which the rules of the Arms Act were being subject with a view to the removal of racial discrimination.

This speech, which was the clearest expression of the views of Lord Chelmsford's Government yet received by the Indian public, was the subject of much favourable comment by the press. Unfortunately a few days later Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, who had acquired in his own province the reputation of extreme hostility to the aspirations of educated India, delivered a speech which was widely interpreted as reflecting upon the patriotism of nationalist leaders. The resentment aroused by this was very strong and its effects upon the political atmosphere most lamentable, although Lord Chelmsford delivered in the following meeting of the Council an expression of regret which was construed as a public rebuke to Sir Michael O'Dwyer.

The consequence of the release of Mrs. Besant, which occurred about this time, and of the storm of protest aroused by Sir Michael O'Dwyer's speech in the Nationalist press, was to awaken among the

European commercial community a sense of alarm; uncertainty as to the future of English interests in India under the newly announced revision of the constitution, and instinctive approval of many of Sir Michael O'Dwyer's conservative sentiments, combining to convince them of the necessity of some organised form of self-expression. Accordingly, the European Association, which had come into existence some thirty years previously as the result of the Ilbert Bill agitation, was revived with such rapidity that its membership soon spread to thousands. This was inevitably regarded by Nationalist opinion as a hostile move; and the charges and counter-charges which found their place in the Indian-edited and English-edited press were not calculated to produce the calm atmosphere for which Lord Chelmsford had pleaded.

At this time the Hindu-Muslim *entente* received a serious setback from the outbreak of religious disturbances at Arrah. The Muslim press as a whole was loud in its denunciation of the Hindu fanatics who had inflicted so much injury upon helpless Mohammadans, and the Left Wing of the politically minded classes made a belated attempt to fasten the responsibility for these riots upon Government. But the sense of political solidity was already sufficiently strong to survive the shock, and the only practical result of the riots from the Nationalist point of view was the demand put forward at the next meeting of the Muslim League that the representation of the Mohammadan community upon the Councils contemplated in the Congress League Scheme should be increased to 50 per cent. There is reason to believe, however, that the Arrah riots, combined with the failure of the Muslim League to take adequate notice of them, served to weaken the position which that organisation had hitherto held as the exponent of the wishes of the Mohammadan community as a whole. Henceforward until the time when the successful Khilafat agitation rallied the major portion of educated Muslim opinion once more beneath the banner of those at the head of the Muslim League, there was a marked divorce between these leaders and the mass of conservative Indian Mohammadans.

All classes of interests began to prepare memorials and addresses in readiness for the approaching visit of the Secretary of State; and on his arrival in India, Mr. Montagu settled down with the Viceroy to receive many deputations and to grant innumerable private interviews. No class or community in India desired to be left out in the cold; and many associations were hurriedly formed at the last minute by bodies of persons who had not hitherto perceived the need of organising themselves for the expression of their opinions. The more im-

portant of these addresses favoured the Congress League scheme, with such additions and qualifications as appealed to the particular interest concerned in each deputation. But the non-Brahmin communities of Madras and the Deccan, while favouring political advance under such conditions as they imagined would safeguard their own constituents generally opposed the Nationalist programme. This opposition was also found in many of the addresses presented by the larger landlords, by the conservative Mohammadans, and by other classes who either because of their inclinations or their position in the social scale, were but slightly affected by recent political movements. The European Association, as representing the interests of the English non-official community, expressed itself strongly in deprecation of hasty advance, but gave little counsel as to the forward steps which everybody knew must be taken before long.

A masterly attempt to rally the whole of educated India in support of the Congress-League Scheme was made by Mrs. Besant, who presided over the Indian National Congress in December 1917. Her presidential address asserted the right of India to receive immediately the constitutional concessions embodied in the scheme together with a promise of complete Home Rule in five or ten years. As to those demands there was little division of opinion in Nationalist campaign; but her assertion that the decision of the majority was binding upon every member of the Congress came to many as a complete innovation; and was indeed the cause of considerable trouble later. The most important result of the meeting was probably the confirmation of the Home Rule Wing of the Nationalist party in its possession of the Congress machinery. During the early months of 1918 the divisions already noted between Moderate and Extremist politicians began to widen; just as did those between conservative and advanced opinions among the Mohammadans. Home Rule propaganda was vigorously pushed and as vigorously rebutted in the columns of the press. There was one aspect of Home Rule propaganda which, although it aroused alarm, was not at the time assessed at its true importance. The non-Brahmin wing of the Home Rule party in Madras, known as the Madras Presidency Association, devoted itself to an attempt at labour organization. A Labour Union was formed and articles appeared in the press describing the hardships suffered by mill-hands and industrial workers. Although this movement appears to have been mainly political in its origin, it was based upon solid economic foundations. To it may be traced the beginning of a well-marked movement towards Trades Unionism

among the industrial population of the large cities in India. This movement was to receive striking support from the economic pressure resulting from the war. From the political point of view it marked the beginning of that systematic attempt of the Indian Nationalist Party to enlist the sympathies of the British Labour Party, which is now an increasingly influential factor in the relations between India and Great Britain.

Despite all this political activity the situation had been eased by Government's manifest determination to evolve a scheme of constitutional advance at an early date. In February 1918 when the Imperial Legislative Council met, the question of Reforms still overshadowed everything else. Lord Chelmsford informed the Council briefly of the progress of the work which had been undertaken during the preceding three months by Mr. Montagu and himself :

"If I were now to resume my seat, Hon'ble Members would, perhaps, have a right to complain that there remains a subject of momentous importance to India, second in importance to nothing except the war, upon which I have not so far specifically touched. It is a subject which naturally claims at this hour the serious attention of every man interested in the welfare of India. But Hon'ble Members will on reflection realize that at this stage it is not possible for me to say much on the topic of Constitutional Reform. For the past three months the Secretary of State and I have been in daily consultation on the subject. We have received numerous deputations and given still more numerous interviews. In the addresses presented to us we have had clearly placed before us the hopes and aspirations, as well as the doubts and fears, of the various communities in India. In the interviews, we have endeavoured to elicit the opinions of those whom we were meeting. We have proved those opinions by searching cross-examination, not for the pleasure of mere dialectic but to satisfy our minds that beneath the opinions expressed there was a solid substratum of fact and experience. I can say for my part—and I believe I can also speak for the Secretary of State—that we regarded these interviews as a liberal education. They enabled us to clear our minds, and they assisted us to see how far opinions expressed in addresses were based on genuine conviction and solid thought. The whole scheme of the tour and the arrangements made at each centre seemed to me admirably suited to the purpose which the Secretary of State and I had in hand ; and I shall like to pay a tribute to the great ability with which so many of the addresses we heard had been drafted and to the careful labour and thought which they embodied. I also take the opportunity of cordially acknowledging the almost universal spirit of genuine co-operation which animated those who came to meet us in interview. Availing ourselves then of all the help that offers, we are threshing out the great problems with which we have to deal, and I have every hope that the Secretary of State may be able to take home proposals embodying a sane and sober advance, with future steps duly outlined, so that, provided we get that co-operation on which the announcement of August the 20th laid stress, we shall be able to progress towards the realisation of responsible Government. Let me remind you

of the words of the announcement, that 'ample opportunity will be afforded for public discussion of the proposals which will be submitted in due course to Parliament.' If His Majesty's Government accept our request for publication, then it will be for those who represent the numerous communities interested to put their heads together and make reasoned representations to me upon them for transmission to His Majesty's Government. I notice that it has been suggested that a deputation should go home and lay the case for the Congress-League scheme before His Majesty's Government. The same intention may exist in other quarters. I think that at the right moment that is a course worthy of consideration, and I would not have it thought that there is any desire on the part of Government to hamper any such representations. On the contrary, I will gladly give all the advice and all the help which it lies in my power to give.

"You will observe that the procedure we propose to adopt is that which was followed on the occasion of the Morley-Minto Reform Scheme. It opens the door to full discussion and seems to me a highly convenient course to pursue. I do not disguise from myself that there will be those who will criticise our proposals, whatever they may be, as not going far enough while others will regard them as going dangerously far. That is inevitable. But they will represent a sincere and honest attempt to give effect to the announcement of August the 20th, which the Secretary of State and I have regarded as constituting our terms of reference and therefore binding upon us. I would ask people generally to re-read that announcement as a whole, resisting the temptation to select that portion which suits their particular views and to reject the rest. I believe that in the main the announcement commanded general acquiescence and it behoves us all to endeavour to work together in general harmony with it and to accept its spirit.

"The first practical step in fulfilment of that announcement has a directly personal aspect in that it accounts for the presence here in Delhi to-day of the Right Honourable Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India. It is our privilege to be able to greet him in our midst, and I am sure that all Hon'ble Members would wish me to extend to him a most sincere and cordial welcome on behalf of the Imperial Legislative Council of India. His task and mine is a joint task, and in its discharge we stand in a relationship peculiarly personal; but this consideration will not deter me from thanking him here and now for the whole-heartedness of his co-operation with me. He has, moreover, met others freely and widely, the leading figures in our political life, official and non-official; and, knowing as I do, the spirit which has animated him, I feel sure that Hon'ble Members would like me to express to him on behalf of India as a whole our great appreciation of the manner in which he has approached his task. We do not know whether our work of the past three months will lead us to success. It will be for history to record the result of those labours. 'It is not in mortals to command success,' but if ever a man, engaged in a task beset with difficulties, deserved success, that man, I most emphatically hold, is the Right Honourable the Secretary of State."

CHAPTER V.

The Realisation of Reforms.

About this time the turn taken by the war introduced a complicating factor into the Indian political situation. For one thing, India was just beginning to feel the economic stress of the struggle. The shortage of shipping resulting from unrestricted submarinism operated to hinder the import of two things much in demand by all classes; salt and cotton goods. In some parts of the country prices rose high and were aggravated by speculation until they pressed upon the masses, causing great discontent and uneasiness which in turn led to lawlessness. Further, the added burden imposed increasingly upon the British Empire and the Allies by the collapse of Russia, called for fresh efforts from India.

Indian Nationalist opinion, in the mood in which it then found itself, was hardly attuned to the demand for renewed and greater sacrifices in the cause of the Empire. It must be accounted a great triumph for Lord Chelmsford's administration that the Delhi War Conference of April 1918 achieved so much success as it did. There was noticeable a tendency on the part of certain political leaders to exploit the difficulties of the situation in which the Government found itself for the purpose of extorting political concessions. Such a disposition, though hardly commendable was most intelligible in the circumstances; and it is a cause for wonder, not that this policy was pursued in certain quarters but that it was repudiated with such vigour by many other Nationalist leaders of unquestioned authority.

The concentration of Lord Chelmsford's Government upon an intensified war effort gave the Home Rulers an opportunity which they were not slow to use. Their propaganda continued with great vigour, being rather stimulated than blighted by the undisguised hostility of the English-edited press. Such was the concentration of the country upon its domestic problems that the most critical period of the war passed almost unnoticed in India. But the final defeat of Turkey and her lapse into chaos alarmed the Muslims, already sufficiently disturbed by the pretensions of the King of the Hedjaz. It was thus in an atmos-

phere somewhat highly charged that the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was published on July 8th, 1918. The specific recommendations of this document must be sought elsewhere: we are here concerned rather to analyse the reception which it encountered in India.

It must be remembered that the scheme of Dyarchy upon which the Montagu-Chelmsford Report turned, was an expedient entirely without precedent in the history of constitutional experiment. The plan of making provincial electorates definitely responsible for certain functions of Government through Legislators and Ministers of their own, while leaving other functions in the hands of an executive responsible to the Government of India and the Secretary of State, though it remained the ultimate solution to those who had exhaustively investigated the problem of Indian Reforms, came somewhat as a shock to people who had no opportunity of appreciating the unprecedented character of the Indian situation. The Home Rulers, who now anchored their faith to the Congress League scheme, were not prepared upon the spur of the moment to consider an alternative so radically different from it, while at the same time they resented the merciless criticism which, as cooler heads saw, had given it the death-blow. Accordingly they pronounced Dyarchy to be both disappointing and unsatisfactory. Since their own scheme had been riddled, they retorted bitterly if ineffectively upon the new proposals. On the other hand the Moderate Party, which, while unwilling to weaken national solidarity by voicing disapproval of the Congress League scheme, had to some extent refrained from committing themselves to it, made up their minds after a sufficient period for consideration that the plan outlined in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report would constitute a substantial instalment of responsible Government. Although it did not go as far as they would have liked, it seemed to them to constitute an honest endeavour to meet the aspirations of educated India. As the far-reaching character of the proposals became more generally appreciated, there was a sense of re-action in the Extremist camp. Before very long, several of the Left-Wing leaders found it desirable to revise the uncompromising condemnation which they had hastily poured upon the scheme, in many cases for no other reason than the fact that it did not square with their own preconceived ideas. They made a concerted effort to overcome the division which existed between themselves and the Moderates. They summoned an emergency meeting of the Indian National Congress at the end of August 1918, to which the Moderate leaders were personally invited. But these, knowing that the

Extremists now controlled the machinery of the great unofficial convention, rated their own independence too high to sink their opinions in those of the opposing party. Accordingly, they decided to hold their own session soon after the meeting of the Imperial Legislative Council, which was fixed for September 4th, 1918. The special session of the Congress did what the extremists desired of it. It pronounced the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme disappointing and unsatisfactory, demanding that full responsible Government should be established in the whole of India within a period not exceeding 15 years and in the provinces within a period not exceeding 6 years. On the other hand, the Moderate Conference accepted the broad principles of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, but announced its desire of carrying the scheme further in certain directions. The Moderates were anxious that the principle of responsibility should be introduced into the Government of India; and that Indians should occupy half the number of seats on the Viceroy's Executive Council. They expressed apprehension of the power allotted to the Government; they feared the budget arrangement on the ground of possible starvation of the transferred subjects, they also disliked the suggested Grand Committee procedure—a feature of the scheme which, it is interesting to note, was subsequently rejected by the Joint Select Committee of Parliament. None the less, the Moderates showed that they were prepared to accord to the scheme a hearty measure of support.

In addition to the re-action of the two great parties to the scheme, mention must be made of the opinions of certain separate interests which began to make themselves heard. The English commercial community, which was seized by somewhat unreasonable fear that its stake in the country had not been sufficiently considered, found particular cause for discomfort in the criticisms of the principle of communal representation to which the Report gave prominence. The European Association issued a manifesto expressing alarm at what it considered a double weakening of the position of the English in India, through the simultaneous processes of Indianizing the services and of introducing far-reaching changes into the machinery of administration. This criticism, which showed conclusively how little its authors appreciated the change which was coming over the whole political situation in India, while it produced little effect in responsible quarters, served to embitter racial feeling at a moment when it was important that all parties should concentrate themselves upon a dispassionate examination of the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme. This racial feeling was further augmented by

popular misconception as to the activities of the Civil Service Associations, which once more came to the front with the object of clearing up questions of retirement, pensions and the like, in the event of service under the new conditions proving uncongenial. Another body which considered it had a cause of grievance in the recommendations of the Report was the non-Brahmin community of Southern India. Its members were dismayed at the condemnation of communal representation and were only appeased when it was pointed out that the community would have ample opportunity of stating its case before the two committees which were shortly to investigate the formation of the Electorate and the division of the functions of Government. In the third place the Mohammadan community which was disappointed with the prospective loss of the over-weighted representation which the Muslims of some provinces were to have secured in the Congress League Scheme, became rather uneasy. The occurrence about this time of religious riots in Calcutta and at Katarpur, combined with the military misfortunes which were overtaking the Turkish Empire, produced a feeling of serious restlessness among Indian Muslims.

In the September Session of the Imperial Legislative Council, Lord Chelmsford explained in some detail the standpoint of his administration in regard to the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.

"But Hon'ble Members will expect me to say something on the question of Reforms, and I think I can deal best with the subject by recalling past history. Men's memories are so short that they dwell on the present and ignore the past which leads up to and conditions the present. And this has been notably the case in connexion with this great subject of Reform.

"At the outset of my tenure of office I warned those who were insistent on political reform that the British temperament was averse from catastrophic change. This expression of opinion was the subject of criticism, and the Russian revolution which took place shortly afterwards was seized upon as a text on which to base claims to sweeping changes. I think those who sang a paean over the Russian events have since repented. Russia indeed has pointed a moral which it would do us all good to take to heart.

"Let me remind Hon'ble Members further. In my opening speech to the Council of February 1917, I informed you that the Government of India had addressed His Majesty's Government on the subject of political Reform; and, as I told you in the September Session, I continued to press His Majesty's Government for a declaration of policy throughout the first six months of the year.

"This declaration of policy we obtained on August 20th. That policy was not a new policy devised on the spur of the moment by a Secretary of State fresh to office. It was a policy long and anxiously considered by His Majesty's Government, the promulgation of which happened to coincide with a change in the office of Secretary of State. Nor was Mr. Montagu's visit a happy thought on his part,

As I pointed out last September, it was merely the carrying out of a plan on which I had long set my heart, with this change only that Mr. Chamberlain's resignation involved the transfer of my invitation to Mr. Montagu.

"It is well to recall these events to the memory of those who attack the Secretary of State as the rash innovator stepping in with a new and cut-and-dried policy immediately on his assumption of office. To these critics I would point out the sequence of events. Can it be seriously suggested that after a few day's tenure of office by a new Secretary of State, His Majesty's Government would embark on an announcement of the gravity of that of August 20th unless they had previously had it under their most careful consideration? The suggestion in its statement carries its own refutation. Mr. Montagu simply took up the policy where Mr. Chamberlain had left it.

"As for those who repudiate what they choose to term disappointing and unacceptable proposals, I would remind them again of my repeated warning that expectations must not be carried to heights of catastrophic change. In the Legislative Council in Delhi last February, with Mr. Montagu present, I spoke of sane and sober change. I have always been careful to weigh my words, to avoid raising expectations beyond those which my words would warrant. If there are those who have built up hopes on the word of others, it is of them they must make complaint and not of me.

"I turn now to the announcement of August 20th. I cannot help thinking that some of our critics to-day have forgotten that any such statement of policy was ever made. That announcement carried the weight and authority not of the Viceroy or Secretary of State, but of His Majesty's Government. It was not challenged in Parliament at the time; it has not been challenged in Parliament since. It was received both at home and in India—I believe I do not put it too high—with general satisfaction. And those who criticise our Report are on sure ground if they can show that our proposals are not in consonance with it. But am I far wrong when I suggest that there are two schools of critics who write and speak as if the announcement of August 20th had never been made at all:—those who reject its basic pledge and those who reject the limitations whereby that pledge was conditioned?

"I have always regarded the announcement of August 20th as the terms of reference in accordance with which the Secretary of State and I had to discharge the duty laid upon us during these last winter months. I regard it now as the touchstone that must be applied to our proposals. If they fall short of the policy embodied in it, then those who complain of their inadequacy have good ground for asking for a further extension of the scheme. On the other hand, if our proposals trespass beyond the limits it imposed upon us, they should be brought within its bounds. We had the right neither to fall short of, nor to go beyond, our terms of reference.

"I come now to the proposals themselves. Let me once again refer to the two schools of our critics. According to one, the Secretary of State is the villain of the piece; the Viceroy his unhappy victim, who has put his signature to the Report perforce and against his better judgment. According to the other, a sympathetic Secretary of State has been enmeshed in the net of the cold hard bureaucracy and has consented to proposals far short of those he would otherwise have advocated,

"I am going to ignore these criticisms. Issues of the magnitude of our proposals are outside and beyond the personal factor. Our proposals are before the public for criticism. How we arrived at our results, is neither here nor there. The one question at issue is : the scheme, is it good or bad ? if bad, how best can it be amended ? But that you may know that it did not spring forth in full panoply from our brains, like Athene from the head of Zeus let me give you in brief the history of its production.

"In the third paragraph of the Report we have sketched in the barest outline the course of our investigation. The sketch gives but a faint impression of the close touch which we preserved with the Members of the Government of India throughout. Indeed from our return to Delhi early in January up to our departure for Dehra Dun at the end of March we were in daily communication with them. All that time the proposals were being hammered out in frequent conferences both with them and with the Members of the Secretary of State's delegation. I could point out the originators of this or that proposal in our scheme, but it would be beside the mark. What I wish to emphasise is the very careful examination which this great problem received not only from the Secretary of State and myself, but from my Colleagues and those distinguished gentlemen who accompanied Mr. Montagu. We followed up every possible line of advance. We scrutinized all the suggestions which had been offered to us. It was only after the most careful sifting of suggested policies that we decided upon the proposals in our scheme.

"Surely it is not without significance that my Colleagues signed a despatch conveying their ' cordial support to the general policy which the Report embodies,' that the associates of the Secretary of State recorded their united support of our recommendations, which in their view, ' while safeguarding Imperial interests and providing for the proper maintenance of law and order, carry out His Majesty's Government's announcement of 20th August last by providing at once for such an instalment of self-government as is at present practicable and safe, together with statutory machinery for its development at subsequent stages ' : and that the Council of India put on record a minute giving the general policy of our scheme their unanimous support.

"Those who would lay stress then on the personal factor in this issue would do well to remember that it is not enough to dispose of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. They have to account for this very weighty consensus of official opinion.

"I will now turn to a general consideration of the criticisms of our proposals. It is obviously impossible for me to deal with them *seriatim* within the compass of a speech, but it may be useful to indicate my attitude in general terms. I take my stand in the first place on the announcement of August 20th. The policy embodied in that announcement is binding at all events on me. I cannot recognise the validity of criticisms which impeach it. For me they must be out of court. The place where they should be heard is the High Court of Parliament. And I would remind Honourable Members that such criticisms have never once been advanced in Parliament during the twelve months since that statement of policy was made. They were not even forthcoming in the debate on the Indian Budget, the occasion of all others when the critics of our policy might have been expected to make a brave show.

"In the second place, I wish to remind Honourable Members of a significant sentence which occurs in paragraph 289 of the Report: 'We have carried the advance right up to the line beyond which our principles forbid us to go.' I will content myself with this extract, but the whole of the remainder of the paragraph is pertinent.

"What I wish to emphasise is this. 'Substantial steps' were promised. In my own heart, I am confident that 'substantial steps' are provided in our proposals. We have not kept back something like hucksters in the market, something which we would be prepared to give as a result of pressure. Everything has been placed on the table for all men to see. In the words of the Report: 'We have carried the advance right up to the line beyond which our principles forbid us to go.'

"But within that line we are prepared to consider criticisms and suggestions. Far be it from me to claim any infallibility for our proposals. I would however say this—that it is for those who criticise to offer their alternative to our plan. We found nothing easier during the course of our inquiry last cold weather than to riddle with criticism each and every suggestion made to us. The problem before us was to select the scheme which would be open to criticism least. For do not forget this. Our task was to devise a transitional constitution containing within itself potentialities of advance, together with the machinery by which at definite periods that advance could be secured. Such a transitional constitution must in the nature of things be peculiarly open to attack, and the Secretary of State and I made it clear in our Report that we recognised this to be the case. Let me quote our own words. 'Hybrid executives, limited responsibility, assemblies partly elected and partly nominated, divisions of functions, reservations, general or particular, are devices that can have no permanent abiding place. They bear on their faces their transitional character; and they can be worked only if it is clearly recognised that that is their justification and their purpose. They cannot be so devised as to be logical. They must be charged with potentialities of friction. Hope of avoiding mischief lies in facing the fact that they are temporary expedients for training purposes, and in providing that the goal is not merely kept in sight but made attainable, not by agitation, but by the operation of machinery inherent in the scheme itself.'

"Criticise then freely. But remember that if your criticism is to be useful, it must be constructive and not merely destructive. You must give us something which we can set up in the place of that which you destroy.

"Let me now sketch in broad strokes our scheme, as I see it. In the domain of the Government of India the fundamental principle is laid down that its authority must remain in essential matters indisputable. That is basic. But consider the advance which, subject to that principle, we propose. An assembly, in the main elected, infinitely more representative of India than the Council as now constituted. An assembly before which all business will normally be brought; able to express its opinion and exert its influence in respect of all matters pertaining to the Government of India. And if the Government through the Council of State retains its present power to make its will effective, the use of that power is conditioned. It can only be exercised on the certificate of the Governor-General in Council that the matter in issue is in the interests of peace, order and good government.

"Surely no one can say that this scheme does not involve a large increase in the influence of the representatives upon the actions of the Government of India.

"I turn next to the domain of the Provinces. Here we come upon the division of functions of Government into the two categories of Transferred and Reserved Subjects. This division has been the object of much criticism, but I doubt whether the wit of man can devise any other whereby the progressive transfer of responsibility can be secured.

"Now what advance is secured in this domain? In the sphere of Transferred Subjects, the will of the Legislative Council is in the main to prevail. But even in the sphere of Reserved Subjects, the development is marked. Here, too, the will of the Legislative Council is normally in the main to prevail. And even in the exceptional cases where the machinery of the Grand Committee has to be set in motion on the Governor's certificate, the powers of the Legislative Council will remain unimpaired; for in the constitution of the Grand Committee will be reproduced the proportionate strength of officials and non-officials in the Councils as at present constituted. Thus, in the domain of Provincial Governments the immediate advance is immense, and the road forward lies open and defined.

"I said that I would not follow up the various criticisms which have been made on our scheme, but Honourable Members will probably expect something from me on the vexed question of communal representation. I cannot help thinking that much more has been read into our proposals than they were intended to convey. We wished indeed to make it clear that in our opinion, communal electorates were to be deprecated for the reasons set out in our report. But it was in the main to the method of securing communal representation by communal electorates that we took exception and not to communal representation itself. The careful reader of the report will see that we regard this as inevitable in India, and that we clearly contemplate the representation of those communities and classes and interests who prove their case before the Committee shortly to be appointed to examine the question. I am most anxious that the fullest representation should be secured to the various classes and communities in India; but I am frankly doubtful myself whether the best method for securing that representation is through a system of separate electorates. However, I am content to leave the unravelling of this important question in the hands of the Committee, who will have the fullest evidence place before them and will be free to make such recommendations as they think right unfettered by our Report.

"One last word on the subject of Reforms. Honourable Members are aware of the stress we lay in the Report on the necessity for educational advance. Last year we approached the Secretary of State with our proposals. But it was suggested to us that in view of the impending discussion on Reforms and especially on the future relation of Local, Provincial and Imperial finances it would be better to postpone their consideration. We have now approached the Secretary of State again; and with his consent our circular letter to local Governments on this vital subject will be published this afternoon."

This plain declaration of policy was a considerable blow to the hopes of the Extremists throughout the country while the position of the Moderates was correspondingly strengthened. The resolution of Mr.

(now Sir Surendranath) Bannerjee, which expressed gratitude for the Reforms proposals as a genuine effort and a definite advance towards a progressive realization of responsible Government, and recommended that a committee consisting of the non-official Members of Council should be appointed to consider the Report, was accepted by an overwhelming majority. It should be noticed that when this committee came to hand in its Report, it was discovered that the detailed recommendations were not of a very far-reaching character. In general, they corresponded with the demands which were, as we have already seen, subsequently put forward in the Moderate Conference ; and their chief importance lay in the fact that the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme was now accepted by the Moderate Party as a basis for future constitutional development.

During the last few months of 1918, the sudden change which came over the aspect of the War took most people in India by surprise. At first it was hardly credited that the long struggle was over. Among the politically minded classes, the reception of the news of victory was enthusiastic. There was, however, a growing feeling of uneasiness in the minds of the left Wing Party lest the termination of Britain's difficulties should mark also the termination of Britain's sympathy towards India's constitutional aspirations. This unfortunate suspicion was to produce lamentable consequences in the course of the next few months. Yet so far as the historian can observe, there was but little foundation for it in fact. No time was lost by the Imperial Government in despatching to India the two Committees as recommended in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, to formulate schemes for the creation of the electorate, the separation of all-India from provincial functions and the transfer of powers from the official to the popular half of the Government in the Provinces. It was decided to amalgamate these committees as two sub-committees under the general chairmanship of Lord Southborough. Questions of franchise were dealt with by one, under Lord Southborough himself ; decentralization, and transferred powers by the other, over which Mr. R. Feetham, a member of the South African Legislature, presided.

This concrete illustration of the determination of His Majesty's Government to take up in good earnest the question of constitutional reforms, served to strengthen the position of the Moderates. It also served to separate off that body of the Left Wing Extremists who were irreconcilable in their determination to have nothing to do with Great Britain or the British Commonwealth. This party took its principal *locus standi* upon racial feeling and hostility to Western Civilization. At

first, it commanded a comparatively small following, but the events of the years 1919 and 1920 were unfortunately such as to place a premium upon the particular sentiments which it voiced so loudly. This party thus came into added prominence in the 1918 session of the Indian National Congress which was held at Delhi. It was notable here that speeches were demanded in the vernacular, despite the fact that they must have been unintelligible to by far the larger proportion of the accredited delegates from other parts of India. The decision of the special Bombay Congress was of course reaffirmed. Nay more, it was strengthened; for the Delhi Congress dropped the time limit of six years during which it had been suggested that Law, Justice and Police were to be reserved subjects in the provinces and demanded instead full initial autonomy at once. This resolution showed the uncompromising spirit, and frank flouting of all dictates of prudence and expediency which marked the new party. India's right to self-determination and immediate Home Rule was also asserted. The whole session was a triumph for the ultra-Left Wing party and by contrast to their attitude the main body of the Home Rule Leaguers became more and more attracted to the moderate camp. The meeting of the Muslim League which took place about the same time showed a similar triumph for extreme doctrines. Anxiety for the fate of Turkey and for the temporal interests of Islam, now that the war was over, were voiced with an uncompromising freedom which could not previously have been permitted.

In the early months of 1919, the political situation in India was extremely delicate. The publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford Scheme and the constitution of Lord Southborough's Committees had alarmed a body of conservative opinion in India which was not confined to the officials. The expression of this opinion in the columns of many newspapers in India and in England was such as to strengthen the apprehension, which we have already seen to be present in the minds of certain sections of the educated classes, lest in the hour of British triumph her previous gratitude to India would be accounted as nothing. And although Indian Nationalist aspirations might have been expected to support Lord Chelmsford, whose administration was proposing, despite opposition of this kind, to introduce the changed conditions, it must be remembered that the scheme drafted by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State did not exactly square with the ideas either of the Moderate or the Nationalist party. More important still, the leaders of Indian political opinion, who had hitherto enjoyed but little opportunity of familiarising themselves with the practical aspects of administrative work, naturally under-

estimated the obstacles to be overcome in carrying through a change so far-reaching as that contemplated by the Dyarchic Scheme. The delay which necessarily occurred between the publication of the scheme, the work of the two Committees, and the examination of the whole by Parliament, did but accentuate the distrust of Government already existing in their minds. This feeling, unreasonable as it may seem in the light of subsequent events, was the most influential factor in the political situation throughout 1919. It was unfortunately fostered by two points upon which Lord Chelmsford laid some stress in his speech at the opening of the Imperial Legislative Council on the 6th February 1919. He reassured both the services and the European commercial community as to the anxiety of Government on behalf of their interests; and he also emphasized the necessity for a piece of legislation in opposition to which educated India was virtually united. His statement both upon the one and upon the other point was temperate and judicious, and the mere fact that it could have been misinterpreted as seriously as was actually the case, shows how difficult was the problem with which the administration of India, through little fault of its own, was now confronted.

In another place it will be necessary to say something as to the reasons which actuated Government in their determination to force through the Rowlatt Act. It is here sufficient to explain that this action was regarded by the educated classes as proof positive that their suspicions as to the *bona fides* of the British were only too well-founded. Even before the beginning of March there had been talk of passive resistance to the Rowlatt Act if it were carried, and when it actually passed into law, this movement was taken up under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi. In the Punjab, in Delhi and in certain parts in the Bombay Presidency, the populace became much excited and the result was the lamentable outbreaks known as the Punjab Disturbances. With the news of these disorders came at first a rally of responsible feeling and responsible opinion to the side of the administration. There was a general realization that agitation, even when directed towards an end so generally approved by Indians as the repeal of the Rowlatt Act, had been carried much too far; and there was a general apprehension lest forces of disorder which had been unchained should break all bounds. But as rumours, often grossly exaggerated, as to the methods employed by the authorities in suppressing the disturbances became more widely known, opinion swung round the other way. There was a keen demand for a Commission of Enquiry, and before long the Nationalist Party had convinced them-

selves that the occasion had arisen for putting the whole administration of India on its trial. These events were to exercise a profound influence upon the course of constitutional reforms.

By the summer of 1919, the Government of India had formulated its despatches upon the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme, and the two committees on franchise and functions had presented their report for submission to Parliament. The publication of the Government of India's despatches was the signal for redoubled activity in criticism on the part of the Indian press, which accused the administration of "whittling down" the reform proposals. But the outcry, which was essentially unreasonable, died away when it became known that His Majesty's Government was asking for the appointment of a Joint Select Committee of the Lords and Commons, to deal with the Government of India Bill. Deputations from all sections of Indian political parties proceeded to England to lay their case before this committee. The eagerness of innumerable Indians to be heard threatened to introduce serious delays into the conduct of proceedings; but thanks to the tact and firmness of Lord Selbourne, who presided, the work of the committee was performed in a way which excited admiration in all quarters.

The first effect of the Punjab disorders upon the situation was a lively apprehension in the minds of the politically minded classes in India lest the outbreak should be seized upon by enemies of India's constitutional aspirations as an excuse for postponing the consideration of the Reforms. Fortunately His Majesty's Government was not deceived; and while there is reason to believe that the magnitude of the crisis through which India had just passed was not entirely realised in England, the view there taken was that the occurrence of the disorders demonstrated the need for pushing ahead with Indian Reforms with the greatest possible celerity.

As it became plain on the one hand that there was no danger of a postponement of the Reforms; and on the other hand, that the Left Wing Extremists had been forced to disclose their real position before the Joint Select Committee by challenging the title of Parliament to decide the time and measure of the advance towards responsible Government, the ultra-Left Wing Party in India began to divert its attention from the constitutional question, upon which it had hitherto sustained a succession of severe reverses, and to concentrate upon the question of the Punjab disorders. At the same time the feeling among Indian Muhammadans regarding the humiliating position in which Turkey now

found herself, became more and more vehement. To the growth of this feeling the unfortunate delay in the announcement of the Turkish peace terms very seriously contributed. Had it been possible to announce these terms shortly after the Armistice they would have been accepted as the decree of fate, but in the long interval a hope had arisen in the hearts of the pro-Turkish Party in India that Government's hands might perhaps be forced in the matter. During the last six months of 1919, feeling was rising steadily. Mr. Gandhi, always the champion of those whose rights he regards as being in danger, took the unprecedented step of identifying himself as a Hindu with a Muhammadan religious movement. Towards the end of 1919 propaganda organizations were set up all over the country with the object of awakening the Muhammadan population to the danger which threatened Turkey. The ultra-Left Wing Party, encouraged by Mr. Gandhi's lead, identified itself prominently with this movement and succeeded during the last months of 1919 and the first three months of 1920 in stirring up a very considerable amount of popular excitement. Since Lord Chelmsford's government had consistently pressed the views of Indian Muslims upon the attention of His Majesty's Government the Khilafat movement was not at first hostile to the existing administration in India ; but before long became so, since its promoters were also the promoters of agitation in connection with the Punjab disturbances. As will be related in another place, the administration had found itself most unfortunately situated from the point of view of making the facts of these disturbances widely known. The outbreak of the Afghan War combined with the inevitable delay in appointing an enquiry committee, allowed the wildest statements to flourish uncontradicted. And when the Committee actually sat, the nature of some of the evidence given before it by certain officials responsible for the suppression of the disorders was such as to play directly into the hands of those who desired to embarrass Lord Chelmsford's administration and to secure the ruin of the Reforms Scheme.

The year 1919 closed with a Royal proclamation signifying His Majesty's assent to the Reforms Bill. This is one of the most impressive declarations ever issued in the history of the connection between India and England. Unfortunately, in this excited political atmosphere, it produced less effect than would otherwise have been the case. But although the Members of the Indian National Congress, who sat at Amritsar with the intention of focussing their gaze upon the Punjab troubles, might refuse to face the real situation, the fact remains that

December 1919 marks the end of one epoch in the history of the connection between Great Britain and India. It ushers in the beginning of a new period, in which India, if only she be so minded, is provided with the opportunity of taking responsible Government for herself.

Broadly speaking the history of the year 1920 from the point of view of the Reforms represents the translation into facts of the words which found a place in the Government of India Act of December 1919. At the opening of the Imperial Legislative Council on the 30th January 1920, Lord Chelmsford remarked :

" The outstanding fact which we have to record is the passing by Parliament of the Reforms legislation and I am sure that Honourable Members would wish me to express our great indebtedness to the Secretary of State in this matter. We who have been associated with Mr. Montagu in this policy, know how much we owe to his great ability, to his fertile resourcefulness and to the enthusiasm which he has displayed in this cause. Tribute has been paid to him in England for the tactical skill and the persuasiveness with which he has handled the Bill in Parliament. We can only know this through hearsay and not of our own knowledge. But from the fact that he has piloted his Bill through Parliament, we may not unfairly infer that that tribute was well founded. I think I shall be only echoing what is in the minds of Honourable Members when I congratulate him and tender him our thanks for the conspicuous service which he has rendered.

" But I do not wish to stop here. It would have been impossible for Mr. Montagu to have accomplished what he has if it had been for the loyal, and devoted manner in which the spade work of Reforms has been performed. I doubt whether many Honourable Members realise to the full what work is involved in the passage of a great Bill through Parliament, especially when the Bill has, as in this case, to run the gauntlet of examination and criticism in a Select Committee. I know what this work has been, and I am sure Honourable Members would wish me to express our gratitude to those who have worked so zealously, so loyally and so devotedly in this field. It is needless for me to say that there have been many others besides those whose names I propose to mention. In a work of this immensity the circles of labour radiate out far and wide. But there are three whose conspicuous labours I should like to mention. My colleagues in the Government will, I am sure, understand why my reference must necessarily be to those who are not members of the Government. The first name is that of Lord Meston, and I am sure you will wish me to congratulate him on the well merited distinction which His Majesty has been pleased to confer upon him. Lord Meston has been in the thick of the Reforms from the very beginning and no one has done more, by masterly philosophical analysis of the problems, to elucidate and straighten out the difficult questions with which we were faced. As Lieutenant-Governor, as Member of Council carrying on his shoulders the double burden of Finance and Reforms, and now as the *vir pietate gravis* commissioned to carry out the thorny task of settling the Financial Relations between the Central and Provincial Governments he has earned and will earn our gratitude. I trust that he is not putting too great a strain on himself, and that when he has accomplished

his present task, he will have many years during which he may help India, the land he has loved, from his seat in the House of Lords.

"My relations with Sir William Marris have been so intimate that I feel some difficulty in placing before you the character and extent of his service. Prior to Mr. Montagu's arrival I appointed him on special duty in connection with Reforms and ever since, whether on duty here or in England, he has brought to the cause his great intellectual powers, his unrivalled industry and his mastery of the pen. He is now working specially under me to perfect the machinery which is required to set the new constitution in motion. He will greatly dislike my mention of him, but his displeasure is a risk which I have no hesitation in taking.

"Constitutions may be projected in men's minds, may float in unsubstantial form as dreams, but at some time or other they must take shape in hard, clear cut legal form. To Mr. Muddiman we are indebted in large measure for the work which has been done in this respect. As one who in his time practised Parliamentary drafting, I know the difficulties and the thanklessness of the task. The draftsman is not his own master. He is not left to himself to turn out his work *teres atque rotundus* completely finished and rounded off. He has to fit in amendments, perhaps thrown at him at the last moment, at variance and inconsistent with the main principles of his structure, and subsequently the critic will point the finger of scorn at lacunæ and inconsistencies. But I am confident that Mr. Muddiman has met these crosses with smiling imperturbability. I am sure Honourable Members will be in accord with me when I thank him for his work.

"Over the bodies of these three gentlemen there has been for the past two years a friendly tussle with the Secretary of State. We have each of us appraised their worth and have clung to their possession. It reminds me of some struggle depicted in Homer over the body of a dead hero. Now he, now I have had the mastery.

"But I cannot stop here. There is a vast multitude of public servants throughout India, whose services have been requisitioned in order that this thing might be accomplished. To them, the vast majority of them unknown to me, I would tender my thanks. The inquiries which have taken place have necessitated demands for information which meant hard, painstaking and accurate work. This has been given loyally and ungrudgingly. What happier augury could there be for the working of our great experiment! Indian Ministers will find a running machine composed of human parts of finest temper and quality ready to their hand. The work which has been done is an earnest of what will yet be done. I am confident that nothing will be lacking in the loyalty and efficient working of the machine of Government.

"And now what of the work which lies ahead of us?

"We have still the best part of a year's strenuous labour before the new Councils can come into being. To deal with the press of work involved a new office has been created in the Government of India under a Reforms Commissioner working in direct relation with myself, assisted by a Secretary, Under Secretary and the necessary establishment; and all Local Governments have similarly placed officers on special duty to deal with local problems. We have discussed in con-

ference with Heads of Provinces all preliminary points which presented any obstacles to immediate progress. It is our aim to take public opinion freely into our confidence, and I will take this opportunity of stating our intentions upon points of wider interest. We contemplate a lowering of the franchise in Madras and the Punjab which will result (so far as our rough estimates indicate) in an increase of something over six hundred thousand voters in the two provinces taken together. We shall provide for some increase in the rural seats which the joint committee wish us to attain, without a reduction of the urban seats. We shall similarly provide for some better representation of the depressed classes. The special case of the urban wage-earner is also being provided for in Calcutta and Bombay where the class is numerous and important. I hope that under the sympathetic and capable guidance of Lord Willingdon and Sir George Lloyd the difficulties about non-Brahmans in Madras and Mahrattas in Bombay are in a fair way to settlement.

"The process of making the electoral rolls has begun or is beginning, and with it will proceed also the shaping of the election rules. Another matter of immediate urgency is the drafting of the rules of legislative and other business for the several Provincial Councils and for the Indian legislature. On all these points it is the aim of my Government and Local Governments freely to consult Indian opinion and so far as may be to carry it with us, and we, as our proposals mature, shall take every opportunity of laying them before non-official advisers and considering their suggestions. Our proposals for the distribution of seats in the Indian legislature have now been for some weeks made known, and no criticism of substance has yet reached the Government of India from any quarter.

"The scheme of Reforms also entails some important legislation. The Council will have noticed the recommendation of the Joint Committee that it should enact legislation of a stringent character dealing with corrupt practices at elections. In due course a Bill will be laid before the Council. Not only is the subject new to Indian legislation, but it bristles with inherent difficulties, in dealing with which the Government will be greatly assisted by Hon'ble Members' knowledge of what is expedient and possible in the conditions of India.

"At a later stage we propose to introduce also measures providing for the devolution upon Local Governments of many powers now vested in the Government of India, and for the rights and duties of the public services. But these are not yet sufficiently advanced for any definite statement about them to be made.

"I may say that we intend, at the earliest possible moment, to publish for information and convenience of reference the Government of India Act, 1915, as amended by the recent Act passed by Parliament, but Hon'ble Members will of course understand that the old law continues in force until the new one is brought into force by notification. Regarding the lifetime of existing Councils we have asked the Secretary of State to sanction an amendment of the regulations which will enable us to continue in existence such of the present Councils as would otherwise expire, until the date on which the new Councils come into existence. I think you will gather from what I have said that nothing is being left undone to carry into operation the great Reform which has just passed through Parliament. We shall want your whole hearted co-operation in our labours. To me

the one thing that matters is to get the work done and to get it well done. Anything else is of supreme unimportance."

Unfortunately, it was extremely difficult throughout the whole of 1920 to induce the politically minded classes of India to look forward rather than back. The nature of the evidence tendered before Lord Hunter's Committee of enquiry, coming as it did at a time when India was profoundly dismayed by political, social and economic after-maths of the war, produced an atmosphere which made the concentration of energy upon the new Reforms almost impossible. It must be recorded that not merely the extreme Left Wing but also a very large number of the Moderates, felt that Indian life and honour had been held but as dust in the balance by some of those responsible for the peace, order and good government of the Punjab. The demand for reparation coupled in less responsible quarters by a demand for Lord Chelmsford's recall grew in violence as the year 1920 proceeded. The announcement of the Turkish peace terms served to confirm the worst apprehensions of those who were genuinely alarmed lest the temporal power of Islam should wither before the triumph of Christian arms. As a result of this the administration, instead of being cheered and encouraged by the sympathy and understanding of those for whom it toiled, found itself pursuing its elaboration of the details of the Reforms almost in obscurity. In the summer of 1920, the non-co-operation movement headed by Mr. Gandhi, came into prominence. Unwarned by the tragedy which had ensued upon his passive resistance movement of 1919, he determined to apply his favourite specific of soul force to the task of bringing pressure upon Lord Chelmsford's administration first, for the revision of the Turkish peace terms, and secondly, for the satisfaction of Indian demands in the matter of the Punjab. The despatch which was sent home by the Government of India as a result of their consideration of Lord Hunter's Report, and the declaration of policy made by His Majesty's Government might have gone far in happier circumstances to satisfy the demands of India upon the Punjab question. But in the atmosphere which has already been described, and taken in conjunction with the lamentable tone which characterised certain speeches in the "Dyer" debates both in the House of Commons and the House of Lords, they were condemned by educated opinion of all parties in India as utterly inadequate, and unsatisfactory. The non-co-operation movement, though condemned by Moderate opinion, became increasingly formidable as the year 1920 drew to a close. In the opening of the Simla Session of the Legislative Council

on the 20th August Lord Chelmsford briefly referred to this movement and deplored the effect which would in point of fact be exercised upon Reforms.

"I now turn to certain matters which alas! have been subjects of acute controversy. May what I say add no fuel to the fire.

"Since we last met, Lord Hunter's Committee has reported on the events of last year in the Punjab, Bombay, and Delhi. My Government forwarded a despatch to the Secretary of State recording their views on the findings of that Committee and His Majesty's Government have passed their judgment on the whole case. There are those, however, who are dissatisfied with the decision of the Government of India and of His Majesty's Government, and they have expressed their dissatisfaction in no uncertain terms. There is much that I could say with reference to the criticisms on this side or on that, but I am content to leave the issue to the verdict of history. For the present moment the matter of paramount importance is that we should concentrate on the problems of the immediate future. Much will depend on the manner in which the new Councils and the new Governments grapple with the task to be laid upon them. Are we to enter upon the new era in a spirit charged with the animosities of the past, or shall we leave those things that are behind and press forward to the things that are before? I am confident that so far as Hon'ble Members are concerned their wish is to write upon a clean slate and leave the past behind. I refrain then from doing more to-day than recording the facts, and, much as I am tempted from the personal point of view to reply to our critics, I would point to the future. There is much work for all of us to do; there are many opportunities opening out for mutual service and co-operation. Can we not steadfastly fix our eyes on these and refuse to be drawn away from our main purpose? It is not then because I underrate the importance or gravity of the events of last year, nor the criticisms on either side which may be passed upon them, that I refrain from discussing them, but because I see in the continuance of those discussions nothing but fresh recriminations tending to further racial exacerbation. There has already been enough, indeed too much of this on either side, and it is calculated to frustrate that spirit of co-operation which lies at the basis of our Reforms, and through which alone we can reach the goal of India's aspirations.

"To turn from this to the Khilafat agitation and the non-co-operation movement. Hon'ble Members are fully aware of the line which my Government have taken in relation to the Turkish peace terms, and I need not further dilate upon it. So far as any Government could, we pressed upon the Peace Conference the views of Indian Moslems, but notwithstanding our efforts on their behalf, we are threatened with a campaign of non-co-operation because, forsooth, the Allied Powers found themselves unable to accept the contentions advanced by Indian Moslems. Could anything be more futile or ill-advised? This policy of non-co-operation must inevitably lead, if persisted in to the discomfort of the community at large, and indeed involve the risk of grave disorder. I am glad to think that everything points to this policy being repudiated by all thinking people, and it is because I and my colleagues have faith in India's common sense that we have preferred to allow this movement to fail by reason of its intrinsic inanity. Can we, for instance, picture to ourselves the legal profession generally foregoing its

practice in support of this policy ? I am proud to belong to this great profession, but I cannot envisage such a possibility, and from one example can we not learn the unpractical nature of this visionary scheme ? Much has been made in speeches and the Press of an answer given by the Secretary of State to a question in the House of Commons. He said :—

“ I am prepared to support any steps which the Government of India think necessary in the very difficult situation now arising. But I will not dictate any steps to the Government of India. I would prefer to leave it to them.”

“ I think Hon'ble Members will agree with me in thinking that he could have given no other reply. There is a point at which no Government could refuse to take action to protect the interests of the community at large, and when that point is reached, Government is bound to, and will, use all the resources at its disposal. That is a platitude, but even platitudes require sometimes to be stated. But, as I have said above, I have every hope that this point will not be reached, but that the common-sense of the people and the opposition of all moderate men will erect an insuperable bar to the further progress of this most foolish of all foolish schemes.”

Unfortunately, the leaders of the non-co-operation campaign secure in the consciousness that their movement possessed, in the then condition of public feeling, a unique attraction for large sections of the educated classes, were not to be deterred by official censure. The campaign was hardly checked in its course by a weighty manifesto issued by a number of moderate leaders from Simla. In vain was the impracticable character of the whole scheme demonstrated in the Press and upon the platform by leader after leader of the National Liberal Party. Mr. Gandhi, with his unique influence over the masses, and the Ali Brothers, with their appeal to the militant fervour of their co-religionists, moved up and down the country in pursuit of their avowed intention of bringing Government to the stool of repentance through a campaign of non-violent non-co-operation.

It would be a mistake to imagine that the non-co-operation movement obtained success from the moment when it appeared upon the horizon of Indian politics. Even in Mr. Gandhi's immediate circle there were many who doubted the possibility of triumph along the lines which he suggested,* but his personality ended by winning the day. This was made amply apparent in the proceedings of a special meeting of the Indian National Congress which was held in Calcutta early in September 1920 to consider Mr. Gandhi's programme. After a keen discussion the mass of the delegates who constituted Mr. Gandhi's following carried the day against the more cautious counsels of the intelligentsia. Non-co-operation was accepted in principle by a narrow, but conclusive,

majority; and a sub-committee was appointed to prepare draft instructions as to the exact operation of the principle. Mr. Gandhi and his immediate band of followers then moved up and down the country, this time enjoying the benefit of the organized Congress machinery for securing the success of their meetings. Beyond stirring up a good deal of popular excitement, the immediate effect of their activities has up to the moment of writing been confined to two spheres, and two spheres only. They have failed to persuade any more than a fractional proportion of title-holders to surrender their titles, or of lawyers to resign their practice. But, on the other hand, they have been successful in causing educational dislocation to a considerable degree, and in effectually preventing any member of the Left Wing Nationalist Party from gaining a seat in the new Councils.

It is rather in connection with the boycott of the new Councils that Mr. Gandhi's campaign of non-co-operation seems destined to exercise a potent influence upon the history of the next few months. We have already seen that the moderates committed themselves from the first to an honest working of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. Their position at this moment was one of considerable difficulty. Upon the question of the Punjab, and to a less extent of the Khilafat, many of them felt as deeply as did the nationalists. On the other hand, the statesmanship of their leaders proved equal to the strain and despite the storm of obloquy levelled upon them in the press and from the platform, they steadfastly refused to join either Mr. Gandhi in his non-co-operation campaign or to budge from their attitude *vis-a-vis* the reforms.

The non-co-operation campaign continued to be waged with much vehemence of thought and expression. There seemed considerable danger lest the more impetuous supporters of this campaign would be led to indulge in speech and action which was calculated to produce that violence which they professed to shun. Accordingly, in the beginning of November, Government found it desirable to make plain beyond the possibility of doubt exactly what its policy was towards this movement. A resolution was accordingly issued which declared that the administration was deliberately pursuing a policy of patience towards the non-co-operation movement so long as its manifestations remained non-violent, and was relying rather upon the good sense of the community to secure the failure of an enterprise so pregnant with disaster.

The studiously moderate tone of this resolution, and its frank exposition of Government policy, served in no small degree to strengthen the hands of the growing body of opinion which regarded the non-co-oper-

ation campaign as chimerical in its aims and dangerous in its methods. But the real trial of strength between those who aimed at complete and immediate self-government whether with or without chaos, and those who believed in a process of orderly development towards responsible government within the Empire, was generally recognised to be the success or failure of the approaching elections.

Mention has already been made of the immense volume of work which the Government of India had been compelled to undertake in the course of the year 1920 in order to secure the realisation in practice of the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee upon the Government of India Act. The framing of election rules, the organization of electorates, the institution of electoral machinery—all these and many other preliminary requisites to democratic Government were accomplished with remarkable speed during the spring and summer of 1920. The rules which were framed by newly instituted Reforms Department of the Government of India were submitted to the Joint Committee in the early summer of 1920 and received the final assent of Parliament before the end of July. In his opening speech to the Imperial Legislative Council on August 20th, Lord Chelmsford had said :—

“ In the speech which I delivered in January last, when opening the previous Session of the Council, I referred to the press of work which the passing of the Government of India Act of 1919 had involved and outlined the steps that were being taken for dealing with it. In the interval that has since elapsed we have forwarded for the sanction of the Secretary of State and have published for general information drafts of all the rules under the Act to which the approval of Parliament is required. In the preparation of these rules we have been generally assisted by the loyal co-operation of the provinces and by the suggestions and criticisms of our advisory committee, whose deliberations were marked by a spirit of reason and moderation that I gladly take this opportunity of acknowledging. We still await the orders of the Secretary of State as regards the important constitutional rules under sections 45-A and 29-A ; but the electoral rules and the rules of legislative business have been approved by Parliament in a form that differs but slightly from the rules as drafted by us. I congratulate the Council on the fact that the electoral rules have been sanctioned at so early a date, because this will enable us to bring the Reforms Scheme into operation sooner than would otherwise have been possible. I am aware of the criticisms that have been passed on some of our rules. It was inevitable that there should be differences of opinion on some points, but I am glad to observe that the provisions to which exception has been taken are comparatively few. Honourable Members will allow me to quote paragraph 1 of the first report of the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament appointed to revise the draft rules made under the Government of India Act :—

“ The Committee desire in the forefront of their report to express their appreciation of the great care and ability which are displayed in the drafts,

and of the remarkable expedition with which this heavy task has been achieved by the Government of India and the Local Governments. As will be seen from the report, the Committee have made but few alterations in the rules as drafted by the authorities in India, and they desire to record their considered opinion that the rules, with these few alterations, are an accurate, but at the same time liberal, interpretation both of the general recommendations contained in their Report on the Bill and of the intentions of Parliament in framing the Act."

"To those in India who have laboured in this field it must be a matter of great gratification to receive this generous appreciation of their work, and I, who have seen this work at close quarters would like to add my humble tribute to that accorded by the Joint Committee."

In that same session of the Council, the last to be held under the old Morley-Minto regime, was also passed the Corrupt Practices Act, which had to be brought into operation before the first elections were held. This Act, as subsequent experience was to show, was of the first importance in India, where the social system lends itself to the application of social, moral and religious pressure in a degree to which the more materialistic West with its cruder forms of intimidation can supply no parallel.

In every province special preparations were made to deal with the business of the elections which were fixed at varying dates in the month of November. As the time for the exercise of the franchise by the new electorate approached, the non-co-operators redoubled their efforts to secure the ruin of the new scheme. Every form of pressure was put upon candidates and voters alike. In some places there can be no doubt that intimidation, either direct or indirect, was freely used. Attempts were also made to procure the boycott of candidates and voters by appealing to religious sentiment. It was even reported in one place that religious mendicants, of the kind whom India reverences so deeply, were openly declaring that any one who voted for a particular leader of the moderate party would be guilty of the incredible enormity of killing 100 kine. Meetings were broken up, candidates were threatened, polling booths were picquetted; but remarkable to relate the attempt to render the elections abortive was a conspicuous failure. Only in six cases out of 637 was an election impossible owing to the absence of a candidate. The actual proportion of those exercising their vote to the total strength on the electoral role varied widely from province to province and from town to town. Broadly speaking, the voting in rural constituencies was more satisfactory than in the cities, but even this generalization cannot be accepted without reservation. The actual proportions varied from 8 per cent. in

Bombay City, where the non-co-operators came nearest to success, to 70 per cent. in some of the urban centres of the Madras Presidency. In the Punjab, which from its unfortunate history during the preceding two years might have been expected to present a fertile soil for the propaganda of non-co-operation, the voting in rural constituencies was as high as 36 per cent., while in the general constituencies throughout the province the figure was as high as 32 per cent. In the United Provinces, where a particularly vigorous campaign of boycott had been conducted, the voting averaged 33 per cent. in the contested constituencies, rising in the case of Lucknow and certain other centres to 60 per cent. As will be seen from the figures given in an appendix, the all-India proportions of voting for the provincial Councils ranged from 20 to 30 per cent.; for the Legislative Assembly the proportion was roughly 20 per cent. and for the Council of State no less than 40 per cent.

The result of the election plainly showed that the non-co-operators had failed in their attempt to secure the ruin of the new machinery. The Councillors had been elected despite the efforts of the opposition, and Mr. Gandhi's campaign had received a corresponding check. The issue between the non-co-operators and the co-operators therefore shifted from the possibility or impossibility of holding the elections, and finally resolved itself into the question as to whether the reforms were genuine or were a Machiavellian device on the part of the Bureaucracy for continuing India's servitude. The issue thus framed, made its appearance on many occasions during the months of November and December 1920. Those who believed or professed to believe that the new Councils were to be a snare and the new Reforms a delusion, were considerably perturbed by the publication in the middle of December of His Majesty's instructions to the Governors who were to preside over the Reformed provincial administrations. The generous tone which these instructions displayed and above all things the authority of His Majesty's name, served to convince many of those who were sceptical as to the wisdom of the course pursued by the Liberal Party, that confidence in the good intentions of the British Government had not been misplaced. The Governors were enjoined by His Majesty to do all in their power to maintain the standard of good administration, the promotion of all measures making for social and industrial welfare and tending to fit all classes of the population without distinction to take their due share in the public life and Government of the country. They were further instructed to see that all those persons now and hereafter to be enfranchised should appreciate the duties and responsibilities and advantages of their

position, and that those who exercised the power of returning representatives to the Legislative Council should perceive the effects of their votes, and come to look for the redress of their grievances and the improvement of their conditions to the working of representative institutions. The Governors were further directed to remember that in considering the advice of their Ministers, due regard must be paid to their relations with the Legislative Council and to the wishes of the people in the province as expressed by their representatives.

The year 1920 closed as usual with the meetings of the great party organizations in India. As had been the case in the year 1919, the moderates and the nationalists held their separate meetings. The session of the Indian National Congress at Nagpur was again the scene of another notable triumph for Mr. Gandhi. Despite the protests of many who had hitherto represented the front rank of extremist stalwarts; despite the resignation from the Congress of many prominent persons who since the special September session had found themselves out of harmony with the spirit pervading it, Mr. Gandhi not only succeeded in securing the confirmation of his non-co-operation programme, but in addition he was able to alter the old "creed" of the Congress in such a fashion as to eliminate the declared adherence of that body to the British connection and to constitutional methods of agitation. The session was marked not merely by Mr. Gandhi's personal ascendancy but also by extreme intolerance on the part of his followers of the slightest criticism of or divergence from, the views put forward by their idol. Well tried leaders like Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Mr. Jinnah, Mr. Khaparde, who but a few months previously had been received with a respect well nigh equivalent to adoration, were howled down ignominiously when they attempted to depict the difficulties in which the country would be landed by the adoption of Mr. Gandhi's programme--a sad illustration of the vicissitudes inseparable from the life of a national hero in India to-day. As a result of the Nagpur meeting, the Congress has become more and more sectional in character. It has now ceased to be representative of anything save the extreme Left of Indian Nationalist opinion; and for almost the first time on record, it was composed very largely of the personal adherents of a single leader.

In retreshing contrast with the impracticable spirit displayed in the session of the Indian National Congress and of the Muslim League at Nagpur, was the sober tone of the debates in the sessions of the National Liberal Federation. Yielding nothing to the nationalists in the depth of their feeling upon the Punjab affair, the moderate leaders none-the-

less displayed a firm grasp of the political situation. While they were not prepared to admit that the Reforms now inaugurated conferred upon India that share of political responsibility to which they conceived she was already entitled, they none-the-less re-affirmed their determination to work the Reforms in such manner as to hasten the date of her constitutional advance. They roundly asserted their conviction of the foolishness of the non-co-operation movement, and expressed their apprehensions as to the consequences to which its continuance was likely to lead. Considering themselves, as they did, the spiritual heirs of the old Congress organization, which prior to its capture by the Extremist Party had always stood for co-operation and ordered progress, they remained fixed in their determination to carry forward the work of the new Constitution. The following quotation from the speech of the Hon'ble Mr. Chintamani, now a Minister in the Reformed Council of the United Provinces, is selected as typical of the spirit which inspires the National Liberal Federation :—

“Remember Mill's saying that one man with a conviction is equal to ninety-nine without one. Do not apologize, do not doubt, do not hesitate. Go forward with the strength of conviction and with the determination that conquers obstacles. Preach the doctrines of the Liberal Party, explain to the people that we are the inheritors of the old Congress, whose objects we are faithfully carrying out, establish Liberal leagues wherever they are not, and bring more of the faithful into the fold. Be sure, in building up our party we but serve the country, we have no other motive. In this national work revered founders of the Congress who are not with us in mortal form, will be with us in spirit. And the faith in me tells me that howsoever we may be misunderstood to-day by a section of our countrymen whose commendable patriotic zeal for immediate political salvation prevents them from correctly appreciating our standpoint, the day will come when the passions and prejudices of the moment will have subsided and persuasive reason will again hold up the guiding lamp, and when our motives as well as our wisdom will be vindicated. Whether it may come sooner or later, and even if it may not come, make no difference. We will not be deflected from what we are convinced is our duty to our Motherland.”

The year closed with preparations for the visit of His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught who was acting as a substitute for the Prince of Wales in the task of inaugurating the Reformed constitution. The non-co-operators had some time past announced their intention of boycotting the royal visitor and though there was little doubt that they spoke for

none but a small section of opinion, the mere fact that such a plan could be mooted publicly, revealed how deeply Indian opinion has been agitated by the unfortunate occurrences which we have had occasion to notice in the course of this review. But despite the noisy clamour of the Left of the Extremist section, the Liberals and the Government pressed on steadily in their determination to steer the ship of State along her new course. The appointment of Lord Sinha, the first Indian to hold the charge of a provincial administration, as Governor of Bihar and Orissa was recognised by all sane and moderate opinion as an augury of better things. As soon as the elections were over and the relative position of different sections in the new electorate could be determined, Ministers and Councillors were appointed to constitute the executive government of the new provincial administrations. In Madras it is interesting to notice, the elections proved that the fears of the non-Brahmin community were unfounded; for it is a significant fact that under the Reformed constitution, for the first time in India's history, the reins of political power will in the new Legislature fall into the hands of non-Brahmins. But perhaps the most sensational of the new appointments and certainly the standing example of Government's determination to accept honestly the revised position of the English and Indian races in India, was provided by the selection of Lala Harkishanlal, who a few months previously had been under sentence for complicity in the Punjab disturbances, for a Ministership in the reconstituted administration of the province.

What may be termed the moral effect of these final preparations for inaugurating the new machinery of Government was very great. So long as the new Government of India Act existed merely as a record upon the pages of the Statute Book, it was possible for the opponents of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms to adopt an attitude of scepticism towards both the design and the execution of the new structure. But with the holding of the elections, with the appointment of the new Ministers and Councillors and with the issue of the Royal instructions to the Governors of Provinces, the Reforms became something real and living, something of which serious account must be taken. At the moment of writing, despite the difficulties through which India has recently passed, there seems every hope that Reformed Constitution will carry the day, despite the efforts of its enemies: and will fulfil the hopes and prayers of its designers by hastening the time when India will achieve full responsible Government within the British Empire.

The character of the first session of the new Indian Legislative Machinery was of the very greatest importance. Upon the manner in

which the members realised and discharged their responsibilities, naturally hung the success of the whole great constitutional experiment at which the Government of India had laboured for the last four years. It was then with a feeling of some anxiety that Indian administrators looked for the opening of the new Council of State and Legislative Assembly.

Since the Legislature met in an atmosphere so unfavourable to calm deliberation, even the most optimistic onlookers might well have deemed that the chances of success in this, the first and most critical session, were somewhat small. Friends and foes of the new dyarchical Government alike prepared to watch the progress of the reformed Indian Councils with the deepest attention.

Past question, the new Constitution derived an excellent start from the presence of His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught. Bearing as he did a message of good will from His Majesty the King Emperor, the Duke had laid aside leisure well earned to re-visit the India he loved, in order, as he said, to heal wounds, to unite unhappy differences, to persuade all men to forgive and forget. His personal inauguration of the reformed Legislatures, both Provincial and Central, provided the occasion for speeches which were balm to the wounds of India. Less perhaps by his actual words, though these of themselves brought a message of peace and good will to thousands of souls momentarily embittered, than by his gracious personality, the Duke accomplished in India a work which no one but the son of Queen Victoria could have performed. It was on the 9th February 1921 that he inaugurated the Parliament of India. His speech was an inspiring one, and it ended with a personal appeal for forgiveness and forbearance on both sides which deeply moved the hearts of every one present. "Since I landed," he said, "I have felt around me bitterness and estrangement between those who have been and should be friends. The shadow of Amritsar has lengthened over the fair face of India. I know how deep is the concern felt by His Majesty the King Emperor at the terrible chapter of the events in the Punjab. No one can deplore these events more sincerely and more intensely than I do myself. I have reached a time of life when I most desire to heal wounds and to reunite those who have been disunited. In what must be, I fear, my last visit to the India I love so well, here in the new Capital, inaugurating a new constitution, I am moved to make your personal appeal, put in the simple words that come from my heart, not to be coldly and critically interpreted. My experience tells me that misunderstandings usually mean mistakes on either side. As an old

friend of India, I appeal to you all—British and Indians—to bury along with the dead past the mistakes and misunderstandings of the past, to forgive where you have to forgive, and to join hands and to work together to realise the hopes that arise from to-day.”

That this appeal did not fall upon deaf ears, soon became amply apparent. The relations between the official Government and the new Indian Legislatures were, throughout the whole of this first critical session, everything that could be desired. The non-official Members of the Legislative Assembly and of the Council of State, who now control an absolute majority over any number of votes which Government can possibly command, have throughout revealed a sense of responsibility, of sobriety and of statesmanship which has surpassed the most sanguine expectations even of those who believe most firmly in India's capacity for responsible government. On the side of the officials, it must be stated, there has been a generous response. Lord Chelmsford remarked when the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State were inaugurated, that the principle of autocracy in the administration of India had now been definitely discarded. The officials have not been slow to exhibit their realization of the change which has come over the spirit of Government in India. They have gladly acknowledged the power of the new Legislatures; have taken them into confidence; have sought their co-operation, and recognised their responsibilities. From the day when the first business of the Session was transacted, the attitude both of the official and of the non-official sides of the House was never for one moment in doubt.

This attitude, so encouraging for the rapid progress of India towards responsible Government, and so happy in its indication that the growing pains of the country are passing away, became more than ever noteworthy in view of the difficulties, already indicated, which beset the new Indian Parliament. It was generally felt that the debate upon the Punjab question would strike once and for all the keynote of the session. On the 15th February 1921, a resolution was moved by Mr. Jamnadas Dwarkadas, recommending the Governor General to declare the firm resolve of the Government of India to maintain the connection of India with the British Empire on the principle of perfect racial equality; to express regret that the Martial Law Administration of the Punjab departed from this principle, and to meet out deterrent punishments to officers who have been guilty; and to satisfy himself that adequate compensation was awarded to the families of those killed or injured at the Jallianwala Bagh. The notable feature of the debate which ensued

was the deep sense of responsibility felt both by the official and the non-official speakers as to the present and future effects of the words they uttered. The speeches of the Indian Members revealed no rancour and no desire for vengeance. They made it plain that they were fighting for a principle. On the other side, the officials re-asserted with an added emphasis which this occasion had for the first time made possible, their abhorrence of the acts which had given rise to such bitter and such justifiable resentment among the educated classes of India. Sir William Vincent, who led the debate from the Government Benches, made plain the deep regret of the administration at the perpetration of those improper actions, and their firm determination that so far as human foresight could avail any repetition would be for ever impossible. He repudiated emphatically the suggestion that Indian lives were valued more lightly than the lives of Englishmen, expressing his deep regret that the canons of conduct for which British Administration stood, had been violated by the acts of certain individual officers. The sincerity and the earnestness of the Home Member's desire to assuage the feelings of Indians exercised a profound effect upon the Assembly. Magnanimously acknowledging the attitude of Government, the Assembly agreed to withdraw the third clause calling for deterrent punishment—a clause indeed which under the circumstances it would have been difficult to put into effect. The resolution as amended was then accepted by the whole house.

The effect of this debate and of the frank admission by Government that they realised and regretted the injury done to Indian national sentiment by the improper acts of certain Martial Law Administrators, exercised a marked influence on those currents of feeling which have already been described. But it did more than this; it showed to all fair minded observers that Government was firm in its determination to give the new Legislative Machinery of India that respect which was its due. The note of harmony and co-operation struck in the course of the debate continued throughout the whole session. If on the one hand the non-official members of both the upper and the lower House showed themselves fully alive to the responsibilities as well as to the privileges of the position of power in which they found themselves, on the other hand the officials exhibited on every occasion their conviction that the Assembly and the Council of State were now sharing with them the government of the country. The appointment of a Committee to examine repressive legislation; the consideration of Press Laws; the despatch of a new delegation embodying some of the most advanced leaders of

Khilafat movement to England in connection with the revision of the Treaty of Sevres, were both typical of the attitude of the officials towards the Assembly.

But if the conduct of the Assembly during the Punjab Debate had revealed at once the dignity, good feeling and statesmanship of the non-official Members, the attitude of the lower House towards the Budget exemplified in yet higher degree, both its sobriety and business capacity. As will be indicated in a later chapter, the disastrous economic history of the year 1920 had resulted in a deficit of £18½ millions, which had to be met by the imposition of further taxation. The narrative of events which has made up this review will have failed in its purpose, if the reader has not yet gathered some idea of the difficulties and temptations which must have beset the newly elected members of the Indian Legislature when faced with the problem of imposing fresh taxation in the heated political atmosphere of the moment. But to the lasting credit of Indian statesmen it must be recorded that they faced the necessity imposed upon them by the financial crisis manfully and with a full sense of their responsibility. With the exception of the charges earmarked for military and political heads, the ordinary administration of the Central as of the Local Governments now depends upon the voting of grants by the Legislatures. It must be plain to any impartial student that the members of the Legislative Assembly might well have courted and sought popularity amongst advanced sections of opinion in India by refusing utterly to participate in the taxation which the executive Government required for carrying on the business of the State. To this temptation the members of the Legislatures rose entirely superior. Exercising their power of the purse to scrutinise closely and in a businesslike fashion the demands for grants presented to them, they none-the-less passed these grants and endorsed the suggested taxation proposals with comparatively few alterations.

From all that has been said it will be apparent that the first session of the Reformed Parliament of India has more than justified the faith displayed in the capacity of Indians by Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu. It has shown that the process of entrusting responsibility to Indian statesmen calls out in return capacity in very rare degree for discharging the obligations which that responsibility entails. Hence it is that before the termination of Lord Chelmsford's eventful and most critical term of office, he had the happiness of observing the translation into practice under the most encouraging auguries of those Constitutional Reforms for which, from the earliest hour of his Viceroyalty he had toiled so hard,

That movement towards the realization of India's nationality which we have been describing in the foregoing pages has not confined itself merely to the areas under the direct rule of British administrators. It has become more than ever apparent throughout Lord Chelmsford's Administration that the Indian States, including as they do no less than one-third of the total area of the Indian sub-continent have a part of the highest importance to play in the India's future.

Of the splendid loyalty which these princes great and small exhibited towards the Royal Throne on the outbreak of the war we have already spoken. It is unnecessary to repeat here the long list of the services which they rendered ; but it would be impossible to conclude this section of the survey of Lord Chelmsford's Administration without some reference to the effect which has been exerted upon the India of the States by the war and its aftermath.

Rightly jealous as the Indian States are of their position *vis a vis* the Throne and strong as is their determination to maintain inviolate their privileges, the conviction has for some time been dawning upon them that there are many developments of the highest interest to themselves which also concern British India. The old traditions of separatism and isolation are beginning to crumble beneath the advancing tide of modernism. The India of the States is beginning to discover ties of common interest, transcending the boundaries of the territories of individual rulers, which link each and every state at once to its sister States and to British India.

During Lord Chelmsford's Administration those ties of friendship and affection which have always distinguished the relationship between successive Viceroys and the Princes and Chiefs of India have been greatly strengthened. Lord Chelmsford was the first to institute a system of annual conferences of the Princes and Chiefs for the discussion, in concert with the Officers of his Government, of questions affecting the States as a whole and of common import to them and to the Indian Empire. The success of these informal conferences soon gave rise to the demand for an institution of a permanent and of a more formal character, and a proposal for the creation of this was put forward in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. In the Conference of the Princes which was held in January 1919, the proposals embodied in the Report were put forward for the collective opinion of the Indian rulers, with the result that after an animated debate the Conference passed a resolution warmly approving the establishment of a Chamber or Council of Princes.

The Recommendations of the Conference were then placed before the Secretary of State, and in the next Conference held in November 1919 Lord Chelmsford propounded a general scheme for a Chamber of Princes approved by His Majesty's Government. The Conference after debating the question passed a resolution warmly accepting the scheme and expressing an earnest hope that the Chamber might be brought into existence during the ensuing year.

The subsequent history of this very important movement pregnant as it is with great consequences for the future of India, may be gathered from the following quotations from the speeches delivered by Lord Chelmsford and by His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, on the occasion of the formal inauguration of the Chamber of Princes on the 8th February 1921. His Excellency, describing how he enlisted the advice and criticism of the Codification Committee of Princes which had been appointed by the Conference and how with their assistance the drafts of the Constitution of the Chamber with the first Regulations and Rules of Business, and the draft resolution concerning Courts of Arbitration and Commissions of Enquiry were moulded into practical shape, continued :—

“I am glad to say that the drafts, finally approved and published, represent almost *verbatim* the general policy approved by the Conference on the advice of their Codification Committee.

There is one departure from the recommendations of the Conference which I fear will be a disappointment to some of Your Highnesses, and that is the adoption of a purely English title for the Chamber. As you are aware, I suspended judgment on the proposed title of *Narendra Mandal* pending further enquiry as to the general feeling of the Princes on the subject. That enquiry disclosed a general consensus of opinion among the Mahomedan Rulers against a Hindu title and in favour of a purely English designation. This preference was also expressed by some Hindu and Sikh Rulers and it was accordingly decided, after reference to the Secretary of State, to use for the present the English title of “Chamber of Princes” as the sole designation. The question of adopting an Indian title has, however, been included in the agenda for the first meetings of the Chamber and it will be open to Your Highnesses to propose an Indian title or titles which will meet with general acceptance.

Another point on which the published constitution differs from the wording favoured by the Committee of Princes, who were consulted on the subject, is the absolute prohibition of the discussion in the Chamber of the internal affairs of individual States and the actions of individual Rulers. The Princes on the Committee were in favour of allowing such discussion, “provided that the Ruler concerned so desires and the Viceroy consents.” His Majesty's Government accepted the view of the Government of India that such a provision might prove embarrassing to the

Viceroy and that the practice, if recognised, would be subversive of the principle on which the Constitution of the Chamber is based. It was decided, therefore, that the rule against the discussion of such matters in the Chamber should be absolute and unqualified.

I think that Your Highnesses on reflection will agree that this decision is reasonable and just. The main function of the Chamber is to discuss matters affecting the States generally or of common concern to the States and to British India or the Empire at large. It would, in our opinion, be fatal to the popularity and success of the Chamber if any countenance were given to the idea that it might be used for the discussion of private affairs of individual States and Rulers. States which desire that the Viceroy may be in possession of independent and expert advice before deciding matters in dispute either between individual States or between an individual State and Government can have recourse to Courts of Arbitration, where these matters can be examined in the privacy essential to such cases. Commissions of Enquiry provide a similar machinery for dealing with the affairs of individual Rulers.

As regards the question of direct relations between the Government of India and the important States, I may inform you that a recommendation has been made to the Secretary of State for the transfer of the more important States in the Bombay Presidency, according to a scheme prepared by a Special Committee, to be carried into effect at some future date, when the conditions appear to be favourable. A scheme will also shortly be placed before His Majesty's Government for the bringing of the important States of the Punjab into direct relations with the Government of India as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made. The Gwalior State will soon be brought into direct touch with the Central Government through a Resident who will be independent of the Central India Agency, and some of the Rajputana States, which were formerly in relations with a local Resident, are now in direct relations with the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana. Other aspects of the question of direct relations are engaging the attention of the Government of India.

Reverting to the question of the Chamber of Princes, Your Highnesses will have received the proposals made by the Committee for the representation of lesser States, whose Rulers are not eligible for admission to the Chamber of Princes in their own right. These proposals, which it is hoped to embody in the Regulations before the next session of the Chamber, will be submitted for Your Highnesses' consideration after the inaugural meeting.

I do not propose to describe the details of the Constitution, Regulations and Rules to-day since these documents have been for some time in Your Highnesses' hands, and they represent, in the main, the fruit of your own deliberations, but there are one or two aspects of the scheme on which it is right that I should dwell on this historic occasion. The Chamber of Princes is an advisory and consultative body and has no executive powers. It represents a recognition of the right of the Princes to be consulted in framing the policy of Government relating to the States and to have a voice in the Councils of the Empire; but the resolutions of the Chamber, though carried by a majority of votes, will be in the nature of advice and will not necessarily be acted on by the Viceroy, who will be bound to take into

consideration not only the merits of the particular resolution, but also the views of the opposing minority as well as the opinions of those Princes who happen to be absent from the Chamber. I think it well to call attention to these points because I have heard it said by critics of the Chamber that it will tend to belittle the position and prejudice the rights of the greater States, who may be outvoted by a combination of States of lesser importance. The criticism is, I think, unjustified by the terms of the constitution and loses sight of the safeguards which I have mentioned.

The Constitution of the Chamber has received the approval of His Majesty's Government and has been promulgated by Royal Proclamation ; it will be inaugurated to-day by His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, on behalf of His Imperial Majesty ; it behoves us all to do our utmost to make the scheme a real success, a source of strength to the Empire, an engine of progress and a means of promoting unity and co-operation between the representatives of His Majesty's Government in this country and the Princes and Chiefs of this great Empire.

I do not think that the Chamber is likely to fail in achieving the objects which I have mentioned. Indeed, I am confident that, with good-will on both sides, it will succeed. But there are certain matters to which I feel it my duty to call Your Highnesses' attention.

First, there is the danger that, after the first excitement attending the opening of the Chamber has passed away, interest in its proceedings may evaporate and the attendance of members may dwindle. I look to Your Highnesses to prevent this process. Attendance at the meetings will always be voluntary and no pressure will be applied to those who prefer to stay away. But I trust that, as time goes on, Your Highnesses will realise more and more the importance of maintaining these assemblages as meetings of a truly representative character, and that even those who now stand aloof will in time forego their scruples and lend their influence towards promoting the objects of the Chamber and so strengthening the bonds which bind us together for the common good.

Secondly, there is the possibility which some critics have noted—I only mention it to dismiss it—that the machinery of this Chamber might be used solely for the protection of the rights and privileges of the Princes without due regard to the obligations which they owe both to the Empire of which they are a part and to their subjects whose happiness and welfare are dependent upon the wisdom and justice of their Rulers. I do not share these apprehensions ; for here again I confidently look to Your Highnesses to uphold the credit of this institution by adopting both towards the Government and its officers a spirit of co-operation without which our deliberations will be of small avail. We are all members one of another and in our union lies our strength. We share between us the responsibility for the good government of India and for protecting the interests and promoting the happiness of the millions committed to our charge. In the exercise of that responsibility we shall, I am sure, continue to work together in harmony and with mutual respect, inspired by the great ideal of an India governing itself through its Princes and elected representatives and owing allegiance to a common Head.

I now invite His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught to inaugurate on behalf of His Imperial Majesty the King-Emperor the Chamber of Princes and to declare it to be duly constituted.

His Royal Highness then spoke as follows :—

Your Excellency, Your Highnesses,—It is by the command of His Imperial Majesty the King-Emperor that I meet you to-day. My duty is two-fold : to convey to Your Highnesses the personal greetings of His Majesty ; and on His behalf to inaugurate the Chamber of Princes. In His Royal Proclamation the King-Emperor has signified His approval of this new institution, and His hopes for its future. Its origin and meaning have just been explained by the Viceroy. I have only one word to add to what His Excellency has said on this subject. An Assembly so unique and so essentially Indian in character should surely not be known only by an English designation. I trust that among the earliest tasks to which Your Highnesses will address yourselves in the Chamber will be that of choosing an appropriate vernacular title which you can unite in recommending to His Majesty the King.

Your Highnesses, of the many ceremonies that it has fallen to my lot to perform, none has given me more pleasure than the inauguration of the Chamber of Princes. Among the Princes here assembled are many with whom I can claim personal friendship of long standing. I rejoice at the opportunity of renewing their acquaintance and of reviving old bonds of fellowship and regard. No pleasure is so keen as that which we share with old friends. I have the happiness of knowing that my own pleasure in to-day's proceedings finds a counterpart in Your Highnesses' own feelings ; and that the function in which it is my privilege to join will stand for all time as a shining landmark in the annals of the Indian States.

We are assembled to-day in the ancient capital of India. This noble hall in which we meet, where the Moghal Emperor surrounded by the splendour of his magnificent Court used to hear the petitions of his people, has been the scene of many imposing ceremonies. It is a fitting stage for the ceremony of to-day. But I stand here at the bidding of an Emperor mightier even than the Moghal ; an Emperor, whose policy is framed with a breadth of vision unknown to the rulers of past ages ; whose acts are inspired, as he himself has declared, by the spirit of trust and sympathy ; whose desire it is that every breath of suspicion or misunderstanding should be dissipated ; and who now invites Your Highnesses, in the fulness of his confidence, to take a larger share in the political development of your Motherland.

The Princes of India have shown for many years past, and more particularly during the Great War, their devotion to the Crown and their readiness to make any sacrifice for the safety and welfare of the Empire. When most was needed most was given. His Imperial Majesty has watched with feelings of deep pride and gratitude the part taken by Your Highnesses in the war, the devotion of those who gave personal service in the field, the patriotic zeal of those who sent their troops to the front and furnished recruits for the Indian Army, the lavish generosity of those who helped with money and material. For all these services His Majesty has asked me to convey to Your Highnesses on His behalf a special message of thanks. Loyalty is a tradition with the Indian States. His Majesty knows well that, in good times or evil, he can always count upon the fidelity and unswerving support of the Indian Princes. But with the memories of the past six years ever present in his mind he cannot forbear, on this great occasion, from making public acknowledgment of your splendid record of achievement during the greatest struggle

in the history of mankind. The help that you gave at the outbreak of the war, when the tale of your deeds and offerings sent a thrill of emotion throughout the British Empire, and your strenuous efforts in the dark days of 1918, when the fate of civilisation seemed to hang in the balance, can only be forgotten with the Empire itself.

I am confident that the same spirit of loyalty and co-operation that Your Highnesses displayed during the war will continue to animate you in the years to come. It is in this spirit, as His Majesty has said, that the problems of the future must be faced. It is in this spirit, I do not doubt, that you will approach the questions that will form the subject of your deliberations in the Chamber. Some of the problems that will arise may make demands on your patience and public spirit. Some may depend for their solution upon a fair interpretation of the letter of treaties and engagements between the States and the British Government. If so, I feel sure that a way will be found to reconcile any doubts or differences that may present themselves. The sanctity of treaties is a cardinal article of Imperial policy. It was affirmed by my beloved mother, the Great Queen Victoria, in her famous Proclamation of 1858. It was re-affirmed by King Edward the Seventh and His present Majesty King George the Fifth, has once more announced in his Proclamation his "determination ever to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes." Nothing is wanting to mark the solemnity of this time-honoured engagement; and no words of mine are needed to re-assure Your Highnesses that the British Government will stand faithfully by its promises. I would only ask you, when you come to discuss any difficult question of practice in your relations with the Government of India or of the interpretation of your treaties, to remember that these pledges will be ever present to the minds of the officers of the British Crown. A generous spirit on your part will find its response in equal generosity on the part of the Government of India. You may rest assured that the Government and its officers will recognise freely the internal sovereignty to which your various treaties and engagements entitle you. We look to the Princes of India, on their part, to continue to administer their States with justice and enlightenment. I am confident that we shall not look in vain.

Your Highnesses, it is a sincere pleasure to me to congratulate you on the place that, as a body, you have achieved for yourselves in recent years in the wider Councils of the Empire. You have been represented in the Imperial War Cabinet and at the Imperial Conference. One of your number took part in the Peace Conference of 1919, and his signature is appended to the Treaty of Versailles. More recently another of your order attended the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva. Your Highnesses, I have witnessed many changes in my life-time. Much of the old order, as I knew it in my youth, has passed away for ever. For all classes the past 50 years have been an era of change, and the Princes of the great Indian States furnish no exception to the general rule. Their conditions of life have been profoundly modified. They have emerged from the seclusion that so long hedged them round and they aspire, and rightly aspire, to play a part in the wider theatre of modern life. I am sure that the part will be a worthy one. The British Government has not been slow to recognise the justice of your aspirations; and I rejoice to think that by my share in to-day's ceremony, I am doing something to promote your wishes and to provide a larger sphere for your public-spirited activities.

Increased opportunities, as I need not remind Your Highnesses, bring in their train increased responsibility. I know well that Your Highnesses will appreciate the trust reposed in you by His Imperial Majesty and His Government and will worthily respond, both as pillars of the Empire, and as rulers striving ever for the greater happiness and prosperity of your own subjects.

I now, on behalf of the King-Emperor, declare the Chamber of Princes to be duly constituted and pray that under Divine Providence, its proceedings may be so guided and directed as to strengthen the bonds of union between the Prince and the Empire and to promote the well-being of this great land of India and enhance her good name among the nations of the world.

CHAPTER VI.

The Economic Life of India.

When the War broke out, there occurred in India as elsewhere, a general dislocation of trade and finance. There was a run on the savings bank deposits and some panic encashment of currency notes. There was also a heavy demand for the remittance of money to London, and in order to maintain the exchange value of the rupee, sterling drafts to the extent of £8½ millions had to be sold between August 1914 and January 1915. This temporary want of confidence, though it soon passed away, left as a legacy a debt of £14 millions, of which £7 millions was met from the gold standard reserve and £7 millions raised in India Bills by the Secretary of State. During the whole of this period prior to Lord Chelmsford's arrival, the vital problem was the consolidation and conservation of India's resources. Very little could be done in the form of direct financial assistance to the mother country, but such indirect help as could be given was given. For example during 1915-16, the home borrowings for capital expenditure were reduced from an estimated sum of £5½ millions to about £2 millions; and £3 millions of the borrowing from the gold standard reserve were paid off. By the autumn of 1915 the effects of the dislocation had passed away, and a considerable demand made itself felt for the products of India. Export trade began to show a marked and growing revival, which made possible not only a continuance of the abstention of borrowing in London but also the imposition of additional taxation in India. Accordingly in the Budget of 1917-18 the Government of India strengthened its position by a programme of taxation which included the revision of the import tariff, (save as regards the important items of cotton piece-goods), the imposition of new duties on the export of jute and tea, a small addition to the salt tax, and the enhancement and graduation of the income-tax. The £7 millions of India Bills, referred to above, were paid off, as well as the £4 millions still owing to the gold standard reserve. Accordingly in 1917-18, India felt herself strong enough to take the step, for which she had always hoped, of making a direct pecuniary contribution

towards the cost of the war. The additional taxation imposed in the previous year had materially added to the strength of her finances, while the insistent demand for her exports made it clear that there would be no prejudicial effect on exchange if a large amount were borrowed for the purpose of remittances to London. India was thus able to offer to Great Britain a special capital contribution of £100 millions—more than her entire annual revenue—towards the cost of the war. In order to meet the recurring charges which this offer entailed, additional taxation was imposed which took the form of a super-tax on incomes, an increase in the export tax on jute and a small surcharge on railway goods. In addition the import duty on cotton piece-goods was raised to the general tariff rate, while the excise duty on local cotton manufactures was maintained at the previous level. This last measure, as has been pointed out earlier in this introduction, removed a long standing grievance arising out of what had always been regarded in India as an unfair discrimination in favour of Lancashire. The proceeds of this taxation were estimated at a figure sufficient to meet the interest and sinking fund charges of the contribution, amounting to £6 millions and also to leave a small surplus in 1917-18. But in point of fact the revenue results of the year turned out to be very much more satisfactory. Agricultural conditions happened to be exceptionally favourable, with the result that the railway profits broke all records; exceeding the estimate by no less than £3·7 millions. Further, although trade had been restricted in volume owing to war conditions, the high prices of commodities liable to *ad valorem* duty resulted in the customs yielding £1·7 millions more than had been expected. Moreover, the raising of the rate for Council Bills, which will be mentioned again later, led to a net gain by exchange of £3 millions, while the salt revenue exceeded the estimate by £1½ millions. As a result of this and minor increases, there was a betterment of income during the period under review of over £12 millions. On the other hand, military expenditure due to the war exceeded the estimate by nearly £3 millions, and there was a material increase on political charges which included expenditure in Persia, and the cost of the militia employed on the North-West Frontier. The net result was an Imperial surplus of £8 millions.

The beginning of the calendar year 1918 which witnessed the German offensive in the west, saw also the concentration of India's efforts upon the prosecution of the war. Until the end of October 1918 there was a period of great and widespread activity. Her external trade during this period was bigger than in either of the two previous years. The

total value of Indian sea and land customs revenue between April and December 1918 reached the unprecedented figure of £9 millions. The Railway revenue expanded, and at one time it looked as if trade remittances through the Secretary of State would be even heavier than the figures for 1917, which had constituted a record.

Prices remained high and there was much speculation based on the expectancy that all this prosperity would continue.

In September 1918 it was recognised that the prolongation of the war justified India's taking a larger share in the cost of the military forces raised in the country, and in consequence liabilities were assumed which resulted in an addition of £12·7 millions to the military expenditure for the year 1918-19. But when the armistice came, imports of all kinds declined sharply. There was a panic in the cloth-market and prices fell. Trade remittances to India completely ceased, with a significant reaction on the Government exchequer. Further difficulties were caused by the unfortunate agricultural situation over a large part of India. During 1918, the monsoon was defective. Famine was declared in certain parts of Bombay and scarcity in certain parts of the United Provinces and the Central Provinces. Further, the great epidemic of influenza which ravaged India in the autumn of 1918, causing a mortality to the appalling figure of 6 millions, weakened the capacity of the rural population to cope with their ordinary work.

Such in brief has been the outlines of India's financial position during the war, and it remains to consider the principal difficulties which Lord Chelmsford's administration had to face in this connection. It must be remembered that funds had to be provided on an unprecedented scale from 1917 onwards for war work, both in India and in countries where Indian troops were fighting. A large share of this outlay was on account of His Majesty's Government which gave India a corresponding credit in London. But the difficulty was to convert this credit into remittances, for gold was unobtainable and silver exceedingly scarce. Thus the repayments of India's war advances continued to bank up in London and were of little help in meeting expenditure in India. The natural consequence was the creation of currency. This could only take three forms, notes, rupees, or gold. To coin and issue the last would have both been wasteful and ineffective; to issue notes freely without a strong metallic backing would have disturbed public confidence. The only course, therefore, was to provide silver rupees in immense quantities. Legislative measures were accordingly adopted in regard both to the exports and imports of gold and silver. Imports

of gold except under license were prohibited after June 1917, and powers were taken subsequently by Government to acquire all the gold imported into India on and after that date. Very considerable imports of gold in Japan and America were thus brought under control, with the result that the reserves were strengthened to the extent of £12 millions. But the effect of these legislative measures could at most be palliative in the face of the enormous demands which arose for metallic coinage. In the autumn of 1917 the high prices of cotton and the increase in the demands for financing food crops grown in India caused a serious withdrawal of rupees. In November and December 1917, 130 millions of rupees were absorbed. Between April 1917 and March 1918 the rupee coinage amounted to over Rs. 230 millions. And as some indication of the difficulties with which the Indian mints were confronted it should be noted that between August the 1st, 1914 and March the 31st, 1918, over 270 million ounces of silver had passed into circulation in India—a quantity which represents more than 41 per cent. of the entire estimated world production. The total result of the demand for coin was that during the two financial years 1917-18 and 1918-19 Government was compelled to coin no less than Rs. 700 millions to take the place of those absorbed. At the beginning of 1918 the silver position was very grave. The Secretary of State purchased as much silver as he could, but there was a decrease in the world output of this commodity, which, combined with a jealous economy of gold and silver reserves in the neutral countries, made it impossible to obtain more than a limited quantity and that at a very high price in the open market. At the end of March 1918 the silver balances available had been brought down to about Rs. 100 millions. As an emergency measure arrangements had been made for opening a branch of the Royal Mint in Bombay for the purpose of coining stocks of gold held in India. Meanwhile a distinctive gold coin, the gold Mohur or Rs. 15 piece, was put into circulation. This helped to restore public confidence to some extent, but the position in Bombay was most critical. The reserve of silver dwindled to insignificance and for several days the maintenance of specie payments hung in the balance. But by degrees the run gradually abated; as every obtainable ounce of silver was poured into the mints. By the end of the first week in June the rupee reserve had diminished to a little more than Rs. 40 millions. Special arrangements had been made meanwhile with the Government of the United States to release some portion of that country's immense silver reserves. Early in June 1918 America consented to let us have 200 million ounces of silver on

generous terms ; and by the beginning of July 1918 the shipments began to arrive in large quantities. The news of its despatch alone saved the administration from declaring inconvertibility. During the succeeding months a position of relative security was reached and by September the stock of rupees had risen to more than Rs. 120 millions. But with October and the commencement of the busy season, absorption once more overtook the coinage and special measures had to be instituted to improve the mint's output. During December 1918, this rose to the considerable figure of Rs. 83·4 millions—a world's record—apart from the concurrent outturn of small coinage amounting to over 100 million pieces in all.

In addition to the currency crisis, the ways and means problem caused considerable anxiety to the Government of India throughout the war. Owing to the financial relations between the Government of India and the Secretary of State, the question always arises not only as to whether the total resources of the Indian Administration in England and in India are sufficient to meet the probable calls on them, but also whether the money is where it is wanted. During the war Lord Chelmsford's administration was confronted with the task of providing for cash outgoings on a very large scale in India on behalf of the Imperial and other Governments. These were repaid to India in London, and except in so far as the Secretary of State could purchase and remit silver there was no method by which the large resources of India in London could be made available for the present needs of the Government of India. For example, in the year 1917-18 the outlay incurred in India on behalf of His Majesty's Government amounted to more than £65 millions. In addition, the Secretary of State's drawings amounted to some £35 millions. Funds had further to be provided for the purchase of foodstuffs, for coinage undertaken in India on behalf of Egypt and for certain other charges. Special liabilities for these purposes reached in 1917-18 some £110 millions. In 1918-19, the funds provided amounted to no less a sum than £140 millions. To meet these huge demands by the ordinary methods was impracticable, and the balance between the proceeds of Treasury Bills, the receipts from purchased silver, and certain other sources, and the total amount required was mainly made up by borrowing in India.

The Government of India had undertaken to raise as much as possible of their £100 millions contribution by offering a loan in India. This was so framed as to attract not only persons already familiar with Government securities but also those classes which had not hitherto

been in the habit of investing their money. The 1917 war loan was divided into four parts. The first was a 5 per cent. loan issued at 95, repayable in 1947 with the option to Government of redemption from 1929 onwards. The second part consisted of $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. war bonds maturing in 1920 and 1922 issued at par free of income tax. The third part was a Post Office section of these issues giving special facilities to the small investor. The fourth part consisted of Post Office cash certificates free of income tax and repayable at fixed rates at any time during the five-year period. The success of this 1917 war loan, which was pushed on by a vigorous publicity campaign, surpassed all expectations. It must be remembered that the largest loan in India of recent years amounted only to £3 millions distributed among 1,172 investors. Remarkable as it may seem the 1917 war loan realised a total of £35½ millions. It was generally expected that the raising of so large a sum of money in 1917 would effectually prevent the realisation of anything like the same figure when the next war loan came to be floated in 1918. But again, the pessimists were disappointed. The 1918 war loan yielded a total of £38 millions, the subscribers numbering no less than 227,706.

The success of these loans entailed important consequences, immediate and prospective. Although the receipts ultimately went to His Majesty's Government by adjustment between the India Office and the Treasury in London, yet the primary benefit of the money subscribed was obtained in India, and went towards financing the heavy expenditure undertaken on behalf of the Home Government. The largeness of the number of subscribers to these loans was a feature full of promise for the future. One of the great obstacles to the exploitation by India of her natural resources has hitherto been the difficulty of obtaining adequate capital in India at reasonable rates. The readiest method of overcoming this difficulty is to encourage the small capitalist to substitute investment for hoarding. In this connection it is to be noticed that Lord Chelmsford's administration has witnessed the realization by responsible authorities of the urgent necessity of improving the banking facilities of India, which are at present very inadequate. There are at present in all India under 100 head offices of Banks with some 320 branches. Only 25 per cent. of the towns with a population of 10,000 and over have either a bank or a branch bank. Moreover, more than 20 per cent. of the 75 towns possessing a population of over 50,000 have no banks at all. It is idle to expect the Indian agriculturist to overcome his age-long tendency to hoard unless proper facilities are

provided to enable him to invest. Accordingly, after lengthy examination, Lord Chelmsford's administration made up its mind to inaugurate a scheme for the amalgamation of the three Presidency Banks of Bengal, Bombay and Madras, into one Imperial Bank of India. An essential feature of this scheme will be the establishment, within five years of its inception, of no fewer than 100 new branches in India. As to the location of 25 per cent. of these branches, the Government of India is to have the right to decide. It will be realised that the potential importance of this scheme is very great, for the concentration of resources and unification of policy which it will permit cannot fail to facilitate the application of existing resources to their maximum advantage. It should further be noticed that towards the end of Lord Chelmsford's administration, the future before the Banking industry in India was recognised by private enterprise. In the course of the year 1917-18, the Tata Industrial Bank, with its remarkably large capital of £8 millions was floated. In 1918-19, this example was followed in other quarters and several banks, each with a capital of over £1 million, were successfully floated.

In the course of the year 1919, the currency position became considerably eased. In the year 1918-19, the total absorption of silver coin by the public had amounted to £31 millions; while between April 1919 and February 1920, the figure was only £14 millions. The stocks of rupees have steadily increased and there has been a remarkable expansion in the country's readiness and capacity to utilize paper money. The average active circulation of notes rose from £48 millions in 1917-18 to £76 millions in 1918-19. But just as during 1918 there had been a crisis in currency, so in 1918 was there a crisis in exchange. As long ago as August 1917 owing to the advance in the price of silver it had been necessary to raise the exchange from the standard rate of 1s. 4d. for the rupee. This enhancement in the rate of Council Bills combined with the stringency of the ways and means position of the Government of India had made it necessary to reduce the weekly allotment of Council Bills with the inevitable effect of seriously limiting trade.

During the course of 1918-19 a relaxation of the earlier stringency set in, and early in July 1918 the weakness of the monsoon and a falling off in the normal supply of export bills seemed to threaten a fall in exchange. In October the wheat export closed down and the demand for remittances quickened. Early in November 1918 the Government of India offered to sell telegraphic transfers on London at the rate of 1s. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. for immediate transfers and 1s. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. for deferred transfers.

This satisfied the immediate demand for remittance, and by the close of the year confidence seemed to be restored. But throughout 1919 the fall of the American-sterling exchange operated to aggravate the rising price of silver. The rate at which India could acquire silver for coinage no longer depended on the price of silver in dollars, and was also adversely affected by the small number of dollars that could be obtained for the pound sterling. The result of the low exchange value in America of the pound sterling and the rapid rise in the American price of silver was to necessitate the raising of the exchange value of the rupee. In May 1919 the rate for Council drafts which had remained stationary at 1s. 6d. for over a year advanced to 1s. 8d. and this was followed by further rises in August, September, November and December 1919, to the rate of 2s. 4d. until in February 1920 a level of 2s. 11d. was touched.

It is necessary to consider for a moment the effect exerted upon the trade by these changes in the rates for Council drafts. The rate for Council drafts has a considerable influence on the rates at which export and import transactions are financed. Their purchase enables the exchange banks to transfer back to India funds which otherwise would accumulate in England through the heavy excess in normal years of India's exports over her imports. An alternative method of thus transferring funds is afforded by the import of gold and silver. During the greater part of the year 1919 the embargo on the import of silver remained in force, but the import of gold was permitted subject to acquisition by Government at rates notified from time to time. The variations in the rates of Council drafts and speculation as to further variations introduced an element of unstability into exchange which has at times hampered the freedom of business operations. And in order to counteract as far as possible these inconveniences, sterling and Council drafts were offered for sale as freely as the resources of the Government in India or at home permitted. Generally speaking, throughout the year 1919 the rise in exchange tempted out remittances and checked bills, thus reducing the demand for Councils. This continued until the gradual decline of the dollar sterling exchange and the rise in the price of silver, which suggested that a further rising of the rate for Councils was due, had the reverse effect, making the demand for Councils more insistent. This see-saw motion continued until January 1920 when a reversal of the position occurred. The Currency Committee had just completed their sittings and their conclusions were awaited. The export trade at the time

was not urgently calling for finance, and the uncertainty as to the future led a large number of remitters to take advantage of the 2s. 4d. rate then prevailing. The two outstanding features of the Committee's recommendations were the linking of the rupee to gold and the adoption of a ratio equivalent to one-tenth of the gold contents in the sovereign. There was a general unanimity of opinion as to the inevitable nature of the committee's conclusions on the first point. The whole of the Indian currency system had hitherto been based on the axiom that the pound sterling could at all times purchase the amount of gold in the sovereign. The divergence between the pound sterling and the amount of gold contained in the sovereign gave rise during the summer of 1919 to certain conditions which rendered it imperative to supply the rupee with some foundation less shifting than the sterling to which it had hitherto been linked. As regards the actual rate to be adopted for the ratio between the rupee and gold, fears were freely expressed in some quarters that the rate suggested by the Currency Commission was too high. In view of what happened subsequently, it is interesting to note that there were two considerations bearing on the choice between a high and a low rate which in the eyes of Lord Chelmsford's administration out-weighed all others. The first was that if the very high prices then prevailing in most foreign countries were brought into relation with Indian prices on an exchange basis at anything like the old level of 1s. 4d. to the rupee, the consequences to the masses of India would have been little short of disastrous. In the next place, a return to a low exchange would have imperilled very seriously all chances of maintaining the convertibility of the notes issued; thereby precipitating a financial catastrophe of the very first magnitude. Unfortunately, the change which came over the trade position of India in the course of the year 1920 set at nought all predictions and involved Lord Chelmsford's administration, which had given its adherence to the report of the Currency Commission to very serious difficulties. Since the armistice India's imports had been consistently and increasingly expanding owing to the abnormal shrinkage which the conditions of war had brought about in this branch of the foreign trade. At the same time, partly from causes of world-wide application, there was a falling off in the demand for India's products by her customers. Those who drew largely upon her during the war, for raw materials and finished products alike, commenced to curtail their requirements, while others who needed her goods found it difficult to offer satisfactory credit facilities. Further, the maintenance of a prohibition on the export

of food-grains dictated by the particular circumstances of India, has also considerably diminished the export trade. The result has been an unprecedented swing round of the trade balance from a surplus of exports to a surplus of imports, with a corresponding sensational fall in the rate of exchange. The result has been the precipitation of a trade crisis of no small magnitude, taking the form of a wholesale repudiation by Indian merchants of goods ordered when the exchange rate was high and delivered when it was low. But the picture is not entirely gloomy, for it has been found possible to remove all restrictions upon the movement of precious metals; full facilities have been restored to the encashment of notes at currency offices; and the return of silver rupees from circulation has continued on an enhanced scale.

The general financial position of India is extremely strong. At the end of November 1919, the national debt amounted to about £378 millions, as compared with a total public revenue of £123 millions. This favourable position is largely due to the care with which, in pre-war years, outlay was restricted to available means. When the war began, almost the whole of India's debt represented productive outlay on railways and irrigation, normally yielding a return which exceeded considerably not only interest on the amount borrowed, but also interest on the small debt classified as unproductive. In March 1919 despite India's war contribution of £100 millions, the amount of the ordinary debt outstanding was actually £13 millions less than the contribution itself. Examination shows that while the average revenue of the last six years has been £97 millions, the average expenditure has been only £95 millions.

This brief review of the financial history of India during Lord Chelmsford's administration is the essential prelude to a proper understanding of the industrial advance which the country has made under his direction. The weakness of India's industrial position has for long been a standing grievance with the politically minded classes; but so long as His Majesty's Government remained immovably wedded to the doctrine of free trade, it was impossible to expect India to progress industrially in the face of the crushing and highly organised competition of Western countries. Unless and until the Government was allowed to foster, by means of state encouragement and artificial barriers, the growth of the infant industries in India, it was impossible to suppose that the country would cease to be anything but a vast store-house of raw materials. Lord Chelmsford early realised the paramount necessity of state interference with uncontrolled freedom of trade, if India

were ever to reach the industrial status worthy of her dignity as a nation. Speaking at the opening of the Madras Industrial Exhibition in December 1917 he said :--

" When I received Lord Pentland's invitation to perform this function to-day, I made, notwithstanding my heavy list of engagements, a special point of accepting it, because I was anxious to emphasize the very great importance I attach to industrial development and to express my thankfulness that the old *laissez faire* policy with regard to industries is dead and buried. Your Presidency made some years back a real attempt to bring into being and to foster industries, but this laudable policy was checked by order. I quote the words of the despatch countermanding the policy: 'The results represent considerable labour and ingenuity, but they are not of a character to remove doubts as to the utility of State effort in this direction unless it is strictly limited to industrial instruction and avoids the semblance of a commercial venture.....The industrial development of the province is more likely to be retarded than promoted by the diversion to State management of commercial enterprise of funds which are urgently required for the extension of industrial and technical instruction.' Thus what might have proved a valuable experiment was most unfortunately nipped in the bud. We have, however, many of us, during these last three terrible years, revised our opinion on most subjects, and on this matter of industrial enterprise I doubt if there are any now who would not say that it is the bounden duty of the State to foster industrial enterprise to the utmost of its ability. Personally I put the matter of industrial development in the forefront of my policy. We cannot unfortunately make great headway at the present moment for obvious reasons, but these months and years of waiting have not been wasted.

The Industrial Commission is pursuing its investigations, and I look forward to receiving its report in the near future. The Munitions Board, meanwhile, has been accumulating for us a wealth of practical experience which will stand us in good stead against the day when we can put our hands to the work."

The Indian Industrial Commission to which His Excellency referred concluded in 1918 an elaborate survey of India's position in Industry. The Report shows how little the march of modern industry has affected the great bulk of the Indian population, which remains engrossed in agriculture, winning bare subsistence from the soil by antiquated methods of cultivation. Such changes as have been wrought in rural areas are the effects of economic rather than of industrial evolution. Money has been invested in commerce rather than in industries, and only those industries have been taken up which obviously offer safe and easy profits. Previous to the war, too much reliance had been placed on imports from overseas, their habitual use being fostered by the Government practice of purchasing stores in England. While India produces nearly all the raw materials necessary for the requirements of a modern community, she is unable to manufacture many of the articles essential like in peace and war. Any technologist will realise

what must be the state of a country that makes no nails, screws, steel springs, iron chains, wire ropes, steel plates, machine tools and internal combustion engines. Rich though India is in raw materials, she is very poor in industrial achievements.

The beginning of a better state of affairs is to be found in the remarkable achievements of the Indian Munitions Board, presided over by Sir Thomas Holland. In our review of India's war services, we have briefly recounted some of the more notable triumphs of the Board. In his speech to the Imperial Legislative Council, Simla Session, 1917, Lord Chelmsford gave a survey of the work accomplished during the first five months of the Board's existence.

"The Munitions Board was founded five months ago, with this main object in view, and its organisation has grown so rapidly along the lines originally planned that its activities now exceed in bulk those of most Government Departments. Of the two main objects kept in view when this organisation was planned, the supply of essential stores for the armies in the field has necessarily been given precedence to the ultimate object of developing established, and of inaugurating new, industries in India. The primary object of the Munitions Board was immediately essential, while the accessory object was regarded as more distantly important. But experience has demonstrated the inventive fertility of necessity; and success beyond expectation has already followed attempts to manufacture in the country articles that formerly could be obtained only from abroad.

In carrying out its primary object, the Munitions Board has gathered together the hitherto isolated fragments of other purchasing departments, and has welded them into a single organised machine for the purpose of regulating contracts and amalgamating demands, thereby buying on a larger scale, and preventing the competitive buying between various Government agencies which previously caused those disturbances of local markets that were neither good for Government nor for the commercial community.

The early activities of the Board were necessarily confined to a regrouping of the centrally controlled official machinery. In co-operation with the local Governments, however, outposts have now been instituted in every province, and the frame-work having thus been established, the development and consolidation of the whole body should proceed on sound lines. It has been necessary hitherto largely to employ existing official agencies; but with the foundations now laid, it is hoped to be possible to obtain the co-operation of representatives of the non-official community in so far as this is consistent with their own competing commercial interests. A few members of the commercial community have already offered their full-time services, and others have undertaken part-time duties as members of local priority committees. With the consolidation of the organisation it is hoped that further representatives of the unofficial community will be able to take part in this new institution.

In revising the indents made by Government officials on the Stores Department of the India Office, and in controlling the applications made by private

importers for permission to import articles on the English list of prohibited exports, it has been found practicable to curtail numerous demands that were formerly made in ignorance of Indian resources, and thus to bring the would-be importer into touch with the local manufacturer. The centralisation of information in this way has revealed the fact that numerous isolated demands, each made on a scale too small to tempt local enterprise, often form in the aggregate a market of a size sufficient to justify the organisation of new industries. To detect the existence of these and to assist private enterprise, a special branch of the Board is devoted to the collection and distribution of industrial intelligence. In extension of work of this nature, arrangements are being made for the distribution to colleges of research problems having a direct industrial value, the distribution of the problems being controlled so as to prevent unnecessary over-lapping and duplication of work.

It would take too long to recite all the activities of the Board, but I will give you one example to show the way in which our present war necessity is being turned to account for industrial development of a kind likely to become permanent. The simultaneous export of raw hides and raw tanning materials has often suggested to economists the desirability of developing the tanning industry in India. Hitherto, enterprises in this direction have been attended with but limited success. In order, however, to meet the War Office demand for leather, tanners in India have now been given orders on a scale that has encouraged them to reform their methods, and, by having to work regularly to a rigid standard of high quality, striking improvement in their work has already taken place. In order more fully to turn to account the various natural tan stuffs of India, the Munitions Board, with the generous consent of a group of Central Indian States, has taken over the tannery at Maihar to test new tan stuffs, new combinations of known materials, new processes, and the manufacture of concentrated tan extracts. The experimental work at this tannery is controlled by a Committee composed of members of the tanning industries and expert leather chemists. Those results which, on an experimental scale, appear to be successful, are being tested on a commercial scale at the Allahabad tannery, recently purchased for the purpose. The results as they become established, will be published for the benefit of tanners in other parts of India, any of whom will be welcome to inspect the processes in actual operation at Allahabad. In co-operation with the Forest Department, the Munitions Board has organised the collection of those materials that are shown by the experimental work to be promising tan stuffs, and has arranged with the Railway Companies for their distribution at uniform and low rates of freight. A certain number of students are already being entertained as apprentices, and it is hoped later on to develop this side of the work by the formation at Allahabad of an institute in which the scientific aspects of tanning will be taught in conjunction with practical work on a commercial scale in the tannery itself.

It is in directions like this that the work of the Munitions Board will grow until, at the end of the war, its machinery should be ready to be utilised with practical effect in carrying out the recommendations of the Industrial Commission.

Such in brief summary is the work of the Munitions Board, vital as regards our present necessities and pregnant with promise for the future; but I should be ungrateful if I were to pass on without recording my grateful recognition of the

services of Sir Thomas Holland. His drive, the unusual width of his scientific knowledge, his business capacity and industry have converted what might otherwise have been a futile experiment into a practical working success. I sincerely trust that his services may long be spared to India, and that, after this war is over, he may be willing to inaugurate what I believe has always been the dream of his heart the industrial regeneration of India."

Before the end of the year 1918 as has already been noticed the Board was controlling expenditure upon war materials amounting to no less than £2 millions per month. The soil was thus to some extent as it were prepared for carrying into operation the recommendations of the Industrial Commission. The Government of India took up the Report energetically. Within a short time of its publication, local Governments were circulated with the views of the Government of India, and Sir Ernest Low was despatched on a tour round the Provinces to elicit their views and to discuss points of difference. By this method the opinions of the local Governments were obtained early in the year 1919, and Lord Chelmsford's administration formulated its final and considered opinion upon the report in a despatch to the Secretary of State in April. In September the Secretary of State replied accepting the two fundamental principles underlying the recommendations of the Commission ; namely, that in future Government must play an active part in the industrial development of the country and that it cannot undertake this work unless provided with adequate administrative equipment fortified by reliable technical and scientific advice. Accordingly it was agreed that suitably equipped organisations were to be set up both in the Provincial and the Central Governments. Most Provincial Governments already possessed organisation of their own under the supervision of Directors of Industries, assisted in some cases by Advisory Boards. Departments of Industries also existed in certain of the more progressive Indian States, notably Mysore. In order to hasten on the work Lord Chelmsford's administration had proposed in its despatch to the Secretary of State three specific measures, for the purpose of dealing with the question, which were obviously most urgent. These were *first*, the creation of an interim central authority known as the Board of Industries and Munitions, for the purpose of designing the new official machinery, establishing a system of co-operation in the Provincial Governments, and closing the war commitments of the Indian Munitions Board ; *secondly*, the formulation of Committees for the establishment of the necessary scientific services ; and *thirdly*, the institution of a system for the local purchase of Government stores. In his speech at the opening of the Imperial

Legislative Council at Simla in 1920, Lord Chelmsford summed up briefly the work accomplished.

"In my speech at the opening of the last Session of this Council, I referred to the creation of the Board of Industries and Munitions—an organisation which would close down the war commitments of the Munitions Board, would work out those specific recommendations of the Industrial Commission to which effect has not yet been given and would eventually prepare the way for the new Department of Industries. In addition to the Reports of the Chemical Services Committee, the Stores Purchase Committee and the Coalfields Committee with which the reconstituted Board is now dealing, I wish to mention one or two other matters of particular importance. The first is the conference of Provincial Directors of Industries held in April last. This conference was in the nature of an experiment; the intention was to ascertain whether, by informal discussion and the interchange of views between the Imperial and Provincial Departments of Industries, ideas could be gained, difficulties cleared away, and some measure of co-ordination secured in the activities of the different provincial organisations. I am happy to say that the experiment proved most successful and there will I hope be another such conference in the near future. I am looking forward to the day when these meetings will not be confined to Government officials, but will include representatives of the greater industrial interests as well."

Independently of the work which has been done to translate the recommendations of the Industrial Commission into practice a number of highly useful surveys have been initiated or completed during the period under review. Reports have been received as to the possibilities of utilising water power in India; and as to the development of the Indian silk industry. A committee has also investigated the possibility of increasing the production of Indian sugar. As symptomatic both for the necessity of enquiry into such matters, and of the benefits which may be expected from an expert investigation of them, it may be mentioned that a report presented to the Secretary of State on the Indian coal industry pointed out that one-third of the coal *in situ* in Indian coal mines is at present being lost on account of bad methods of mining, while three-quarters of a million tons is lost annually, by the wasteful power-working of collieries.

Intimately connected with India's industrial progress in the future is the fiscal question. During the year 1919 much interest was excited by the imposition of an export duty on hides and skins with a rebate on hides and skins tanned within the Empire. It was specially pointed out, when the Bill imposing the duty was introduced in the Indian Legislative Council, that the project formed no part of any general scheme of Imperial preference, but was proposed because the particular duty and rebate were necessary in the interests of India. The incident

served to stimulate in increasing degree the attention which the politically minded classes in India have for long devoted to the question of fiscal autonomy. Great satisfaction was expressed at the recommendation in the Report of the Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill that although fiscal autonomy cannot be granted by Statute without the unconstitutional result of limiting the ultimate control of India by Parliament, it can be assured by the acknowledgment of a convention that the Secretary of State should so far as possible abstain from intervention in fiscal matters when the Government of India and the Indian Legislature agree, and should only intervene to safeguard the international obligations of the Empire. This seems to imply that when the Government of India and the Indian Legislature agree, they are to have practically a free hand so far as fiscal matters are concerned. The attitude of Lord Chelmsford's administration upon this question was clearly explained in his speech to the Chamber of Commerce Conference at Calcutta on the 8th January 1920.

"I suppose that, when the subject of *post-bellum* trade policy is discussed, many people's minds will turn naturally to questions of tariffs. Our Indian tariff has, as you all well know, always been framed on a revenue basis. It has been, in theory at any rate, a tariff of uniform duties for revenue purposes only, and we have traditionally accepted a policy of free trade. No doubt it is possible to find exceptions to this broad statement in some of the items of our tariff, and it is certainly true that at least one recent addition to our tariff has been frankly based on grounds of protection. But while this is so, we must not shut our eyes to what is going on around us, and I would specially direct your attention to expressions of opinion in the Press and elsewhere, not only in this country, but in the United Kingdom. The fact is that preconceived opinions have been somewhat shaken by the events of the past five years, and now-a-days we are not prepared to accept the doctrines of our youth as something sacrosanct, inviolable, and capable of no exceptions whatsoever.

Take, for instance, the large question of Imperial Preference. The principle of preferential duties within the Empire has been accepted already in many of the dominions, and has recently been inaugurated in the tariff of the United Kingdom. Would it, broadly speaking, be to the advantage or to the disadvantage of India to adopt it as part of our settled policy? I am not here going to attempt to answer the question or to pre-judge it in any way. It may be said that it has been pre-judged already by the rebate on the export duty on hides. With this I do not agree; there were special reasons in that case and those reasons were frankly stated in the Legislative Council last September. In fact, I may say that it is not the Government of India's intention to adopt a policy of preference as a general policy, without full discussion and full support from enlightened public opinion. But let the public be enlightened on the subject, and let no one express *a priori* ideas without a close examination of the statistics and of the conditions of the trades concerned. I should like to see the subject freely discussed, and I believe that you,

gentlemen, could do a good deal to clarify ideas on the subject by a careful analysis of the effect of preferential duties on the trades in which you are severally interested. To the best of my recollection we invited you to do this some two or three years ago, but the replies we received did not reveal that careful examination of the statistics in respect of each different commodity which alone could give us the basis of a sound decision. What we want to do is to weigh the advantages and the disadvantages, and strike the balance between the two. I am far from minimising the extreme difficulty and complexity of the subject; but a careful study of it from the point of view of each of our principle trades ought to result in some tangible conclusion which will enable us to decide which way our interests lie. Of course it is our interests, that is to say, the interests of India, which we have first to look to, but it would be unwise to take a wholly parochial point of view, and in developing the tariff policy of the future, we ought to be able to evolve some system which will be to the advantage not of ourselves alone, but also of the Empire of which we are a part. For instance, I know that there has been some difference of opinion as to the value to the tea trade of the preference recently introduced in the United Kingdom. One would naturally be inclined to say *prima facie* that a preference given by the United Kingdom or by other parts of the Empire to certain articles produced in this country, in which we compete with other countries, must have some advantages to us, but we can hardly expect assistance if we give nothing in return."

The possibility of immediate Industrial progress is of course intimately bound up with the economic conditions of the country as a whole. Broadly speaking during the war period of Lord Chelmsford's administration, the economic life of the country received a series of remarkable *stimuli* partially off-set by equally notable set-backs. It is of course obvious that with more than 70 per cent. of the population depending upon agriculture a prime requisite in determining the prosperity of the country is a favourable monsoon. But in addition to this permanent, though incalculable factor, the effect of the war upon India's economic condition has been marked. Broadly speaking, it operated in two principal directions. The shortage of freight has led to restricted imports of many of those commodities for which India was wholly or in part dependent upon the outside world, and in the second place, there has been an enormous demand from Allies and from neutrals for India's own products. Money poured into the country in payment for articles exported, but the supply of things upon which money would normally have been expended ran short owing to the failure of imports. During the year 1917-18 the price of salt, of cotton cloth, and of kerosine, of which the imports were very greatly restricted owing to freight shortage, rose very high. The bountiful monsoon of 1917 caused a surplus of grain, which the cultivators were unable to market. Agrarian unrest leading to market looting broke out and there was a notable tendency

on the part of agrarian interests to organise as a protest against economic conditions. In the large towns, the shortage of transport and consequent limitation of supply, tended to raise the price of foodstuffs more rapidly than in the country districts. The position of the labouring classes became markedly worse particularly in great industrial centres like Bombay. From the year 1917 onwards economic conditions have led to a series of strikes designed to secure a general increase of wages. So long as the food supply of the country was adequate to the demands made upon it, this state of affairs did not become very serious. But the monsoon of 1918 was exceptionally feeble, rainfall being 19 per cent. in defect of normal. Accordingly, scarcity had to be declared in various parts, and a terrible epidemic of influenza, which caused a death roll estimated at the appalling figure of six millions, combined to make the year one of great distress for the poorer classes. The necessity of employing to the maximum advantage the supplies of food in the country aggravated the question of internal transport which was already causing Government an acute anxiety. So large a proportion of the existing railway facilities, seriously depleted as they then were by three years of war, was occupied by the essential military requirements, that the problem of allotting to civil needs the small proportion still remaining available was a difficult one. It was found necessary to institute an elaborate system of railway control, with the idea of apportioning the inadequate railway facilities of the country to its most urgent requirements. It may be mentioned in passing that the whole period of Lord Chelmsford's administration has placed a great strain upon the Indian Railway system, which in addition to discharging India's own requirements—increased to a degree quite unprecedented as a result of war and post-war activities—has had to supply staff and materials for the construction and maintenance of military railways in Mesopotamia and other theatres of war. In consequence, a certain amount of inconvenience has inevitably been inflicted upon the commercial community and the Indian public, with the result that discussion of the future system of management of railways in India has attracted an increasing degree of notice in the press. The inadequacy of India's railway facilities proportionate to her needs became remarkably apparent in the course of the year 1919. As a result of the failure of the 1918 monsoon, the shortage in 1918-19 was one of the worst on record in the last decade. In the middle of the year there were grave reasons for fearing that the stocks of food in the country would not suffice to go round, and a carefully organised system of Government control had to be

instituted. It must be explained that in a normal year, the total production of food-stuffs in India is some 80 million tons. The net exports for the ten years ending 1918 have averaged less than 1·5 million tons per annum—some 2 per cent. of the estimated total out-turn. In times of scarcity the country falls back upon its reserve stocks and upon the safety margin afforded by the surplus ordinarily exported. But in 1918-19 the loss of production due to the failure of the rains may be put at a conservative estimate at no less than 20 million tons. There was thus ample reason to fear that the stock of food was inadequate. Lord Chelmsford's government left no stone unturned in their efforts to grapple with the problem of saving India from starvation. Their success was great. Administrative action through a well designed system of food control, swung over the average net export of 1·5 million tons into a net import of almost the same figure. The supplies of food available in India were carefully conserved, and Australian wheat was imported, with the effect of restoring public confidence and checking the rise of prices. Further, the Burma rice harvest which was fortunately abundant, was made available for India, and between the 1st of January and the end of August 1919, India received nearly 1·3 million tons of rice and 37 thousand tons of paddy from this source. As a consequence of the most strenuous efforts of all concerned, India just pulled through the time of crisis, but it left her with her stocks of grain depleted, and her lower classes considerably pinched. The price of food grains had reached a level never before touched. If the figures for July 1919 are compared with those of July 1914 it will be seen that in the case of rice the rise ranged from 26 per cent. in Assam to 73 per cent. in the Central Provinces. In the case of wheat, the lowest figure was 38 per cent. in Assam, and the highest 100 in the Central Provinces. Even more serious was the case of millets, so largely consumed by the poorer classes. Here the figures of prices ranged from 102 per cent. in the United Provinces to 132 per cent. in Bombay. Fortunately towards the close of Lord Chelmsford's administration the position of India's food supply had more nearly approached the normal. Speaking at the opening of the Imperial Legislative Council on the 20th August 1920, Lord Chelmsford said :—

“The improvement in the position of food-supplies in India to which I referred at the opening of the last Session of the Council has, I am glad to say, been maintained. We felt justified in removing at the end of April the only remaining restrictions on the inter-provincial movements of food-grains, and though the effect was to raise prices slightly in some of the producing provinces, the restoration of free conditions of trade conducted I believe to the benefit of India as a whole. The

good yield of the crops and especially that of rice and wheat has gone far towards replenishing the country's stocks. Much, however, still depends on the future course of the monsoon. The rainfall up-to-date has been defective in many parts of India, and in the Deccan protracted drought has caused considerable anxiety regarding the fate of the early sown crops and the possibility of sowing a full area, but a few days ago good rain was received almost throughout the tracts which have suffered most, and I hope that it has come in time to save the crops and ensure the fodder-supply. In Northern and Central India and in Burma the rainfall has been good or satisfactory. Owing to excessive rain severe floods have occurred in parts of Orissa and Bengal causing some loss of human life and extensive damage to property. I should like here to express my sympathy with the sufferers, whose distress every effort is being made to relieve.

Though the prices of wheat and millets have this year shown generally a marked decline, the price of rice has fallen only slightly below the figure which it reached at this time last year. Under the scheme introduced for control of Burma rice, we have arranged for the import into India of nearly 650,000 tons of Burma rice at controlled rates since the beginning of the year and have set aside a further quantity to meet India's future requirements. We cannot hope that food prices in India will in the near future or, perhaps, ever revert to their pre-war standard. Apart from the depreciation in the purchasing value of money, the demands of the war dislocated and greatly reduced the agencies of normal production, and a long period must inevitably elapse before recovery is complete. It is perhaps, however, not generally realised how favourable are conditions in India in comparison with those in other countries. According to a statement made in Parliament last May food prices since the war had risen in the United Kingdom by 135 per cent., in France by 220 per cent., and in Italy by 306 per cent. In India the prices of rice in Calcutta and of wheat in the Punjab are now only 49 and 38 per cent., respectively above their figures in August 1914."

As may well be imagined the rise in prices of the necessities of life produced its inevitable effect in economic restlessness. The period of stress through which India was passing in 1919 did not check a remarkable upthrust of economic developments. Despite the hampering features of food shortage, want of shipping freight, difficulty of railway transport and complications of the exchange problem, trade and industries flourished throughout 1919 to an unprecedented degree. There was a great rush on the part of the Indian public to invest in new industrial ventures. During the year 1919-20 no fewer than 906 companies were floated with an aggregate capital of £183 millions. Accompanying this rush for investing there was a cry on the part of more conservative for the revival of the swadeshi movement. But it might have been noticed at this period that there was a singular contrast between the prosperity of those who were floating industrial ventures and the penury of the labour upon which those companies directly depended. As a result of the rise in prices and the economic

stress which has been briefly recounted, the position of labour throughout the period under review became increasingly difficult. It is to be noticed that Indian labour though paid low wages as compared to British or American labour is as yet untrained and inefficient, inclined to be slovenly in its work. Already the demand for skilled mechanics and operators is greater than the supply and in the course of the next few years, until new works are able to train their own staff, this disproportion will be on the increase. It has been pointed out by competent judges that industrial success will come in India despite, rather than through, low paid labour. Until the living—and efficiency—standards of the Indian workmen can be raised, he will never be able to turn out as good work as his rival overseas. In order to effect this change, the wages, housing and general conditions of labour in India will have to be raised and improved considerably.

It is noticeable that during Lord Chelmsford's administration, there has been a considerable growth in India of labouring class associations. This has been stimulated by the rise of prices. Labour unions in certain parts of India, notably in Madras, have been constituted since the beginning of 1918, and regular meetings have since been held under the leadership of members of the educated classes. During the years 1918 and 1919, associations for the protection and enforcement of rights of labourers were formed by postmen, telegraphists, railway workers, mill hands, municipal servants and other representatives of Indian labour. There has been increasing indication of readiness on the part of the various administrations in India to recognise their responsibility for the well-being of the labourer. Measures for ameliorating housing conditions in the great towns are actively proceeding; and both official and non-official work designed for the up-lift of the lower classes is busily proceeding. Early in 1920, India was represented at the International Labour Convention held at Washington. This development is significant both of India's changed position within the British Commonwealth and of the growing solidarity of manual workers in Europe and in Asia. Speaking at the opening of the Imperial Legislative Council, in Simla in August 1920, Lord Chelmsford summarised the whole position as follows :—

“ In view of her new international obligations, India must henceforward maintain contact with the International Labour Office and keep abreast of developments in other countries; we wish too to have at our disposal machinery to facilitate the collection and collation of information relating to labour both in this country and abroad, which will also, we trust, be of value to Provincial Governments and to

all who have to deal with local industrial problems. We have already begun to build up a bureau, which we hope will help to attain this end.

And while I am on the important subject of "Labour" I should like to take the opportunity of making a few general remarks. India is an original member of the League of Nations and as such was represented at the Labour Conference at Washington last year. Owing to the short notice we received and the lack of industrial organisation in India, we were unable to consult all sections of employers or employed before nominating our delegates. And while I think you will agree with me that the case for India could not have been better presented than it was by the delegates we selected, we are anxious not to make nominations for the conference to be held next spring at Geneva until opportunity has been given to the interests to be represented of voicing their opinions. I note with pleasure the increasing attention that this matter is receiving from the general public.

Our delegates at Washington found themselves in a position of singular difficulty. Few of the delegates from other countries had any true conception of Indian needs and conditions, and quite a number wished to enforce on India the same restrictions that countries with radically different climatic and economic conditions are ready to accept. Our delegates, though fortified by treaty rights, had difficulty in securing the modifications that they considered essential for India. At the same time they all felt, and I cordially agree with them that the present position in India as regards certain features of factory legislation, is difficult to defend. We are consulting Local Governments in connection with the revision of the Factories and Mines Acts, and hope to be able to put proposals before you very early next year. In the meantime, we have advanced a strong claim for the inclusion of India among the eight leading industrial countries of the world, which are entitled to seats on the Governing Body of the International Labour Office. It would strengthen our claim to inclusion, and would raise the status of our labouring classes and the prestige of the country as a whole in the eyes of the outside world, if we were able to point to an enlightened and efficient system of factory legislation and to an increased interest in the welfare of labour.

But it is not only in its international aspect that the labour question in India deserves your attention. The recent rise in the cost of living, coupled with the growing consciousness of the workers, has led to considerable industrial unrest. Among working men there is no little dissatisfaction with the conditions under which they live. So far, the chief manifestation of this unrest has been an epidemic of strikes in several parts of the country. I need hardly impress upon you the necessity of reducing strikes and lock-outs to a minimum. They result not only in bitter feeling and in great financial loss to the parties directly involved, but also in deep injury to the whole community. If India is to make any real progress under the Reformed Councils, these Councils must have the means of expanding the revenue that they control. No great expansion in revenue is practicable without a substantial and continuous increase in India's resources. This increase will depend chiefly on industrial advance, and nothing will do more to check that advance than continuous conflict between employers and employed. If it proves impossible to check industrial discord, the country will be faced with a contraction of its resources that will seriously hamper the work of our legislators and administrators. Suggestions have reached us from several quarters that Government

should legislate to prevent industrial disputes. But I attach far more importance to the establishment of right relations between employers and employed than to any Government machinery for arbitration and conciliation. England after many decades of bitter strife is realising that there are better means than strikes or lock-outs for settling disputes, and that the only sound policy is to prevent strikes by removing their causes.

I would earnestly impress upon employers the necessity for sympathetic consideration of the claims of Labour. It has too often proved the case that employers, after a long and ruinous struggle, have been forced to concede claims that they might have allowed with honour and with profit as soon as they were presented. It too frequently happens that employers are in imperfect contact with those they employ, and are consequently unable to redress grievances that finally result in very serious disputes. Workers are beginning to demand not merely the right to live in comfort but a living interest in their work. This is a claim that must be taken seriously, and I see no reason why we should not make our new start abreast of the most advanced European countries. So long as Indian industry was organised on a small scale, the close personal contact between the master and each of his men secured intimate, if not harmonious, relations. With the inevitable growth of great factories and mills this contact, in its original form has become impossible, and there is a tendency to allow the bond between employer and employed to become a purely commercial one. It is essential that machinery should be devised which will re-establish under modern conditions personal contact and good understanding. One of the latest developments designed to meet this need elsewhere is the Works Committee, which is intended to enable the employer to realise the difficulties and hardships of his men, and to give the employed an opportunity of making known their needs and of influencing directly the policy of those who control the factory or workshop in which they serve. I have observed with pleasure that this idea has already commended itself to some of the leading employers in India. We are endeavouring to establish similar committees in a few industrial establishments under our control. The welfare of workers and especially the care of women and children and provision for the education of the latter are matters that are engaging the attention of many employers at the present time. My Government is preparing itself, in consultation with Local Governments and employers, to furnish advice and help in this important matter. I sincerely believe that employers, who are willing to meet labour in this spirit and to treat their businesses as being as much the concern of their workers as of themselves, will find their reward not merely in increased profit, for that will not be lacking, but in the gratitude and loyalty of their men, and in the knowledge that they are furthering in the best way possible the contentment and the happiness of their country.

To those who are endeavouring to influence and focus the aspirations of labour I would counsel a similar sympathy and forbearance; their responsibility is even greater than that of the employers. Labour in India is as yet scarcely articulate. But large numbers of working men are being enfranchised and they will look to the leaders of Indian opinion for guidance and help. It will be a tragic and irreparable disaster if India is forced to repeat the long history of industrial strife in England. There will always be men ready to foment strife; some hope to achieve notoriety and influence out of the quarrels of others; more create mischief

through ignorance. The great majority of disputes admit of easy settlement, and there is no direction in which sane and sagacious political leaders can exercise a greater influence for good. In any strike it is the workers that suffer first and longest. And if we have to go through a long period of strife, industry will be crippled and the good start that we are making will be lost. To Honourable Members I would say, if you can bring capital and labour closer together, if you make it your duty to persuade them that their interest lies in co-operation and not in conflict, you will do more in a few years to better the condition of the workers in India than can be achieved by a life-time agitation. The future of industrial India is in your hands.

I would especially commend this matter to your earnest consideration, for as you know Industries under the Reforms Scheme will be a transferred subject and Ministers will need all the help which we can give them in this most important matter."

CHAPTER VII.

Lines of Progress.

In this Chapter a brief account will be given of the progress which has been made under Lord Chelmsford's administration of the development of those departments sometimes called "Nation Building," upon which in the last resort India's progress so directly depends. It will be realised that within the few pages here devoted to this development no adequate account can be given of the work accomplished. Reference may be had in the first place to the detailed departmental reports which constitute the second part of this volume and in the second place to the annual Moral and Material Progress Reports of Indian Administration, which treat the topics here briefly discussed in a more popular and more detailed manner.

Among the most noteworthy lines of progress which have been pursued during Lord Chelmsford's administration must certainly be reckoned that of Education. Despite the fact that throughout the first half of Lord Chelmsford's Viceroyalty, the urgent calls upon India's financial resources necessitated by the war absorbed much money which might otherwise have been devoted to this head, the consistent policy of the administration in concentrating upon the most immediate and important objects such resources as still remained at their disposal was crowned with no little success. The educational system of India has for long been the target of much criticism both informed and uninformed. There can be no doubt that the structure as it exists is top-heavy. While the lower classes are largely illiterate, the middle class, which is the class that mainly patronises higher institutions, is numerically speaking educated to a pitch equal to that attained in countries whose social and economic conditions are more highly developed. As to the reason for this it may be given in a single sentence. The supply of education has tended to follow the direction of the most pressing demand; and considering the chronic shortage of funds it is no matter for surprise that the section of the population which has demanded educational facilities insistently has obtained them at the expense of the section which regards them with indifference and apathy.

One of the greatest difficulties which has confronted Lord Chelmsford's administration in tackling the educational system of India is the immense scale upon which all the problems are framed. It must be remembered that in British India there is a population of something over 240 millions. At the end of Lord Chelmsford's administration, after five years of most strenuous work, there are only just over eight million pupils in all the educational institutions put together. In other words, just over three per cent. of the population is under instruction of any kind, this figure being made up of five per cent. of the males and one per cent. of the females of British India. The annual expenditure from all sources works out at approximately £8½ millions or just over 8d. per head of the population.

The seriousness of this situation was early appreciated by Lord Chelmsford. In the light of the political developments which were to take place in the immediate future, it was plainly a matter for uneasiness. Since India is about to advance upon the road leading to the progressive realization of responsible government, electorates must be brought suddenly into being; and Indians of all classes have to take a greater and greater share of public duties and public responsibilities realising in fact as well as in theory their obligations as citizens of the British Empire. Plainly until the proportion of literates can be raised the mass of India will remain poor, helpless and a prey to political dangers too serious to be contemplated with equanimity. With the gradual assumption by Indians of increasing power over the every day administration of the country, it is plain that the danger of the existing state of affairs is growing; for, as has been well said; uninformed democracies are the greatest peril which beset modern states. But it was not merely from the political point of view that Lord Chelmsford's administration found itself consistently confronted by the blank wall of educational dead-lock. The economic and industrial development of the country which the Viceroy had so keenly at heart was likewise impossible until the general standard of literacy could be raised and until the population could be placed in a position to understand where its true economic interests lay, even when these were carefully explained. The difficulty has been rendered more acute by the necessity for its immediate solution; for upon the realization by India of her industrial possibilities depends very largely her competence to sustain the sacrifices, pecuniary and otherwise, which progress along the road to self-government necessarily demands of every nation. There are three principal defects in the Indian education, to the remedy of which Lord Chelmsford's adminis-

tration has devoted much energy and no inconsiderable pecuniary aid. In the first place, there is a serious lack of properly-trained teachers. Even after constant endeavours on the part of Government to improve the situation, only 34 per cent. of the total teaching cadre have any training qualification, while of the teachers in primary schools upon which the mass of the community depends for its instruction, only 75,000 out of 233,000 are trained. In secondary schools out of 64,000 teachers only 26,000 have received any training. But in the next place, the teaching profession in India is so seriously underpaid that there is no incentive for men of the right sort to enter it. Too often a man takes up teaching because he can find nothing else to do, with the result that pupils are instructed by a changing series of teachers who have not time to learn their trade, and put little heart into their work. In the third place, Indian education is entirely dominated by the examination system. Large-scale external examinations often form the only goal of school and University instruction. These examinations have resulted in the whole course of higher education assuming a predominantly literary type: 2.9 per cent. of the population being found in non-technical institutions, while only 0.05 per cent. is undergoing instruction in professional colleges, special schools, and other institutions which provide technical training. An analysis of the allocation of the total expenditure in India strikingly confirms the previous impression of the narrowness of the lines upon which instruction is conducted. Of the total sum of roughly £8½ millions, no less than £2.9 millions are spent on higher institutions for boys, £2 millions are spent on primary schools for boys and only a meagre £0.8 million on vocational institutions.

The policy of Lord Chelmsford's administration has been consistently directed towards supplementing, to the full extent which the resources at their disposal have permitted, the defects which appear so glaringly in the existing system. By way of focussing the attention of the provincial educational authorities upon certain vital aspects of the problem with which they were confronted, a Conference of Directors of Public Instruction was summoned at Delhi in January 1917. Addressing this Conference, Lord Chelmsford said :—

“Owing to the war it is now necessary for us to select what we can afford to adhere to and to decide what we can with least disadvantage postpone. This is largely a matter in which expert advice is necessary, the advice of men who administer funds and who are accustomed from day to day to select between the good and the better. There is then no question of springing any new and startling educational policy upon an unsuspecting public. Indeed, our task

in India at the present moment seems to be rather to examine and make sure of our foundations. We are all in agreement that primary education should be further extended. I take that as common ground. But schools depend for their efficiency on the quality of their teachers; and inefficient schools represent so much good money thrown away. I would press upon you, then, in the first place concentration on the teaching problem. We want, as I said lately in Calcutta, to raise the status of the teaching profession, to make it a calling with prizes which will induce men to enter it as a life profession. For this we must raise the pay of the teachers. Much has, no doubt, been done in recent years to raise the pay of teachers, but I would ask you to consider whether the pay given now, and more especially the minimum pay, is adequate.

As one who had the task of tackling this particular problem in London some thirteen years ago, I know the difficulties of the question and the need there is for careful preliminary investigation. Having got your teacher your next task will be to train him, and it is impossible, I think, to overestimate the value of training. At the present moment out of 267,000 teachers in India you have only 80,000 who have undergone a course of training. Even if the percentage were higher I would still urge the paramount importance of training. The quality of the teacher is the alpha and omega of educational efficiency.

One last word on this topic. You have secured your teacher and you have trained him. It remains for you to keep him. There can be, I think, no better way of building up a permanent service than by the establishment of a provident or pension fund scheme whose benefits are sacrificed by premature retirement. I hope that the scheme which was evolved some three years ago and which is still under consideration may meet the end which we have in view.

I turn now to the second main subject of your discussion—Technical training. Naturally at the present moment when the Government of India are hoping for a lead from the Industrial Commission in the direction of industrial development, technical training looms large in the educational sphere. There are two things I would wish to say with regard to this question. First consider "technical" in its widest and not its narrowest sense; by this I mean do not overlook the claims of agricultural and commercial education. There are some who say we have nothing to teach the men on the land in this country. I cannot claim to talk with authority on such a question, but having seen something of the work of scientific agriculture in other parts of the world, I take leave to doubt such a statement. The great advance made by scientific agriculture during the last half century justifies us in pressing forward with a policy of agricultural education and, though you would not claim to speak as experts on the agricultural side, your educational experience qualifies you to give us useful hints with regard to an advance along this road.

Again, on the commercial side of education I am surprised to find how little has been done, in spite of India's large and growing commerce, and I am puzzled as to its cause. It may be that it is obvious to you, but I have not yet had any satisfactory explanation given to me. Compared with a technical institution a commercial school is a relatively cheap institution and one would think that there was a great opening in our big towns for good commercial schools.

The second point on which I would lay emphasis is that in technical training in its narrower sense we must not lose sight of workshop practice in outside works. Laboratory training however good, is no real substitute for the discipline of the

workshop. I am well aware of the difficulties which stand in the path and I merely strike this note of warning, that technical training divorced from workshop experience is likely to prove a snare and a delusion.

The subject of women's education is going to engage your attention. You are more familiar than I with the obstacles arising out of social customs which stand in the way, but I would say this, that I view with apprehension the growing inequality between men and women arising out of difference in education. It cannot be good for a country that its women should lag so far behind men in this matter of education. I believe that this apprehension is shared by many Indians; and I think it behoves us to do all in our power to improve women's education so far as we can do so within the limits laid down for us by social customs. In the meantime, we must look to and hope for a gradual change in public opinion and in this we can count, I hope, on the support and co-operation of all educated Indians. I trust, however, that in the consideration of this most important matter we shall enlist the co-operation of women. It is they who know where the shoe pinches and any purely man-made scheme is foredoomed to failure.

There is one more matter with regard to which I should like to say a few words. I am fully aware that it is highly controversial and that it has more than once been the subject of discussion, but it lies so deep in the foundations of our education that I think it well to bring the matter forward, especially at a time when our task is, as I have said above, to examine and consolidate our educational foundation. I refer to the relative claims of English and Vernacular teaching. At the present moment we rely on English as the medium of our higher instruction. This is due mainly to the fact that English is the passport to employment and that Vernacular text-books are not available. But the consequence is obvious, students endeavour to grapple with abstruse subjects through the medium of a foreign tongue and in many cases through their mediocre acquaintance with that tongue have perforce to memorise their text-books. We criticise adversely this tendency to memorise, but, to my mind, it reflects credit on the zeal of the students who, rather than abandon their quest for knowledge, commit to memory whole pages, nay, whole books, which they understand but imperfectly. This is of course a mere travesty of education.

I had an opportunity the other day of conversing with a prominent Indian gentleman on this very subject and he told me his personal experience. When he was at the University he took up History as one of his subjects and found, though he is an admirable English scholar now, that his acquaintance with English was insufficient to enable him to understand his text-book, so he resolved to memorise the whole book. In the course of his examination he had a question, the answer to which he knew lay in a certain page, but he was uncertain what portion of the page was relevant, so, *ex abundante cautela*, he wrote out the whole page. For this he obtained fewer marks than he thought he was entitled to. On remonstrating with the examiner he was told that his answer contained so much irrelevant matter that it was clear that he did not rightly comprehend the question. I think this piece of evidence illustrates the defects of our present system.

I would ask you, and I ask myself, as university men how should we have fared in our education if it had been wholly through the medium of a foreign tongue? I doubt whether we would not have abandoned the attempt in despair; and I

am lost in admiration for the grit of those boys who make a gallant attempt to surmount the difficulties imposed on them by a vicious system.

The remedy seems to me to lie in one of two directions, either we must teach in the Vernacular as long as we can, and put off to the latest possible moment the use of English as a medium of instruction, or we must concentrate our attention more closely on the teaching of English. Or can any middle course be suggested which is sound on educational lines? I understand that it was arranged some two years ago in the Legislative Council that local Governments should be addressed on this subject generally when the war is over. I have no intention of bringing up the question for decision in advance of the time so arranged, but I wish it to receive thoughtful consideration without bias so that when the time comes not only will you have discussed and thought over it in your own provinces and be ready to give us your opinions, but the best minds in India will also be equally ready with their opinion."

This interest in and attention to educational problems so conspicuously displayed by Lord Chelmsford has had the effect of applying a stimulus of no mean order to the Provincial Governments. Beginning first with primary education it may be mentioned that during the five years the total number of primary schools in India has risen from 131,000 to 150,000, and the pupils have increased from 5.5 millions to 5.9 millions. As might be expected, the position of primary education varies widely in different parts of India. Burma leads the way with nearly 7 per cent. of her male population in the primary schools. Then come Madras, Bombay, Bengal and Assam, with between 5 and 6 per cent. The Central Provinces and Bihar have just over and just under 4 per cent. respectively, while towards the end of the list come the North-West Frontier Province and the Punjab with 3 per cent., and the United Provinces with 2.9 per cent. As long ago as October 1916 a scheme had been put forward by the Education Member of Lord Chelmsford's administration for compulsory primary education, entailing recurring expenditure rising in ten years to Rs. 5½ crores, of which some $\frac{4}{5}$ ths was to be found by the local Governments and the Government of India and $\frac{1}{5}$ th by the local Boards. With a view to meeting the difference of opinion which arose between the Finance and the Education Departments, Lord Chelmsford suggested the following formula. First, that the policy of the Government of India was to bring about the doubling of the children in primary schools within a relatively short period, which in favourable circumstances might be fixed at about 10 years; secondly, it should be laid down that it is the duty of local bodies, *i.e.*, District Boards, Municipalities, and the like, to provide adequate primary education facilities within their areas; thirdly, the circumstances in which it may be necessary to enforce this duty must

be a matter for the discretion of the local Governments ; fourthly, that the proportions in which the various authorities should contribute should be $\frac{1}{3}$ rd by the Government of India, $\frac{1}{3}$ rd by the local Government and $\frac{1}{3}$ rd by the local bodies. The Secretary of State, however, found himself unable to sanction the Government of India's proposals designed to carry out this policy ; for he considered that the whole question of educational progress was so closely allied to the general Reforms question that it might profitably be deferred till it could be considered with reference to the shape which the Reforms proposals were likely to take. But although Lord Chelmsford's administration were disappointed in their efforts at supplying an immediate impetus so considerable as that which would have been constituted by this scheme, they none-the-less succeeded in accomplishing much along two lines of advance. The first was the acceleration of progress under a voluntary system, by means of careful local surveys supplemented by enhanced grants. The second line of advance was the introduction of measures of compulsion. Education, it must be remembered, has been under the old régime a subject for Provincial expenditure, and the interest which Lord Chelmsford's administration has taken in its development may be gauged from the fact that during last five years grants totalling some £7 millions have been devoted to it from the Central revenues. Primary education has come in for a substantial share ; no less than £200,000 being earmarked for it alone in the Budget of 1918-19. Assisted by this pecuniary aid, and encouraged by the stimulus of the interest of the Central Government, the local Governments have made notable efforts at advance along both the lines laid down. Despite the economic difficulties of the period, which were such as to place a considerable handicap upon the expansion of primary education, a very satisfactory progress has been made. In the course of the year 1919-20 Primary Education Acts applying to Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, United Provinces, the Punjab, Bombay, the Central Provinces and Madras received the assent of His Excellency. The main features of these Acts were first, that they all applied to Municipalities ; while the Bengal and the Bihar and the Orissa Acts are further applicable to Unions. In the case of the Punjab Act, it is applicable to District Boards, Cantonments, small towns, and notified areas. In the second place, the principle of compulsion is applicable to both sexes in Bombay and United Provinces between the age of 6 and 11, while in the case of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and the Punjab it will apply to boys only, the age limits being 6 and 10 in the first two provinces and 6 and 11 in the last named. In the third

place, no fees will be charged under the Bombay, United Provinces and the Punjab Acts. In the case of Bengal, compulsory education will not be free, but provision has been made for the remission of fees on grounds of poverty. In the fourth place, all the Acts provide certain penalties for guardians and employers of labour who prevent children of prescribed ages from attending schools.

The problem of the supply of trained teachers in adequate numbers has similarly been pressed upon the local authorities by Lord Chelmsford's administration. Towards the end of 1918 the Central Government gave a grant of £200,000 a year for expenditure upon the training of teachers. Existing institutions have been much improved and their number is increasing year by year. None-the-less this rate of increase is disproportionately small considering the importance of the place which the trained teacher must occupy in the future of Indian education ; and one of the practical justifications for handing over the somewhat imperfect machinery of Indian education to the newly-appointed popular ministers is to be found in the fact that without such a concentration of resources, as no alien Government can hope to apply, the educational system of India can hardly be placed upon a sound and satisfactory footing.

Of all the branches of education which have displayed progress under Lord Chelmsford's administration, perhaps the most noticeable strides have been made by University education. The defects peculiar to the Indian University system are lack of organisation, wide inequality of efficiency among affiliated colleges and an inferior standard of instruction. If secondary education can be radically improved, much will be done to improve the colleges also. But it was clear to Lord Chelmsford's administration that the whole system of "affiliating" Universities, though useful in its day, has by this time become worn out in India and is unwieldy. Throughout the latter portion of Lord Chelmsford's term of office, there have been important developments in this sphere. It now seems clear that the right policy is to let the better colleges stand on their own legs as unitary universities, while the remaining and weaker colleges continue under some kind of revised system of affiliation. There has been a natural tendency for the affiliating university, microbe-like, to divide itself into sections, in each of which the achievement of centralised institutions is possible. But the great triumph of the period under review lies in the fact that the lines of future progress have been laid down once and for all by the masterly report of the

Calcutta University Commission. The condition of Calcutta University had for some time been causing anxiety to Lord Chelmsford's Government; and the appointment of the Commission, announced in the Viceroy's Convocation speech of January 6th 1917, was primarily due to his personal determination that something should be done to remedy the defects of the existing institutions in Calcutta and elsewhere. This Commission, presided over by Dr. (now Sir Michael) Sadler, consisted of seven members, of whom four came direct from England. It met in October 1917, and after receiving written replies to its *questionnaire* from more than 400 witnesses in Bengal and other provinces, and taking evidence from hundreds of persons, completed its labours in March 1919. Its reference empowered it to investigate the relations between University and secondary education, and also the bearing of University studies upon professional and technological training. In the course of this investigation the Commission visited the Universities of Madras, Bombay, and the United Provinces as well as the University of Mysore, and the Osmania University of Hyderabad. Visits were also made to most of the Colleges and many of the High Schools of the country districts of Bengal. The report of the Calcutta University Commission served to confirm the impression already formed by Lord Chelmsford's administration as to the defects of the existing system of education in India. Criticisms directed against secondary education by the Commission resolve themselves as a whole into this; that secondary education as at present understood does not equip those who undergo it for citizenship. The Commission recommended a radical reform of secondary education as a preliminary requisite not only to University reform but also to genuine national progress. They pointed out that work in the intermediate stage must be removed altogether from the province of the University; and the future stage of admission to the University must correspond with the present Intermediate rather than with that of the present Matriculation examination. In order that this change may be carried out, it is necessary to transfer training of the intermediate type from the University to other institutions of pre-University standard. With this end in view, the Commission recommended the creation of new institutions to be known as intermediate colleges, whose courses are to be framed in such a manner as to afford preparation not merely for the usual degree courses of the University in Arts and Science, but also for the medical, the engineering, and the teaching professions, as well as for careers in agriculture, commerce and industry. Equally radical were the recommendations of the Com-

mission in regard to Universities proper. It was proposed that the typical university of India should be a unitary teaching entity wherein all formal instruction will be given in the name of the University by officers of the University under the direct control of the University authorities. In its purest form, this system admits of the interposition of no collegiate organisation between the University authorities and the students. The University of the future must also be residential, the residences being arranged in large units known as halls or in smaller units known as hostels. The teaching work is to be organised in departments, each under the responsible charge of a principal teacher, whose duty it is to supervise the general organisation of work in his subject throughout the whole University. So far as machinery is concerned, the departure from existing practice is to be found principally in the institution of full-time salaried vice-chancellors, and in the reorganisation of the present executive and deliberative bodies which control Indian Universities. In place of the existing Senates, which up to the present have decided not merely academic questions, but also general questions of University policy, there are to be two bodies; first, a representative University Court which would represent interests wider than those of the teaching faculty, and secondly, an academic council, which, being staffed by University and college teachers, would be the supreme body in academic matters and the final authority for most of the ordinary academic business. There would also be a small executive council entrusted with financial and administrative duties and with considerable powers. It would not be concerned with details of purely academic business, but would discuss matters with a committee of representatives elected from the University Court.

Vigorous action was taken upon the recommendations of the Calcutta University Commission. Within a few months of the presentation of the Report, a centralised University on the lines recommended was founded at Dacca. The reform of the Calcutta University in general accordance with the recommendations laid down in the document is at present being undertaken. A centralised university has also been constituted at Lucknow. Allahabad and the Punjab are similarly being reformed. Universities are also projected at Nagpur for the Central Provinces and at Delhi. Entirely new Universities have been founded at Patna for Bihar and Orissa, and at Rangoon for Burma. A Mohamadan University, corresponding to the Hindu University at Benares has been founded at Aligarh. In a word the last two years of Lord Chelmsford's administration have witnessed an unprecedented activity

in the growth of the machinery for healthy and sound University education.

Technical education has also received its share of attention. A recurring grant of £200,000 has been set aside by the Central Government for the improvement of medical and technical education. During the year 1918-19 a special grant of £60,000 was ear-marked for industrial education. The demand for this branch of study has now greatly increased as a result of the premium which the war had placed upon Indian industries. With the growth of industries in different parts of the country, the difficulty of placing in suitable positions boys who have passed through technical institutions is gradually disappearing. Lord Chelmsford's administration has had the hearty support of public opinion in its insistence upon the vital importance of distributing throughout the country suitable centres in which technical training is available. In the course of the Calcutta University Commission Report, great stress was laid upon the provision by the University of technical institutions. But, as must be obvious from the fact that more than 70 per cent. of the population of India live by agricultural pursuits, the particular kind of technical education which is above all necessary for the speedy development of the resources of the country, is agricultural education. The Central Government maintains an Agricultural Research Institute at Pusa, which has during the years of its existence performed most admirable work in the selection of seeds and the improvement of Indian crops. There are also agricultural colleges in Bombay, Bengal, Madras, United Provinces, the Punjab, Central Provinces and Bihar and Orissa. As a result of the propaganda work which is done by these and similar institutions a keen demand is now growing up among the cultivators themselves for new manures, for improved implements and for scientific methods. Already the agricultural graduate is increasing in market value; and it seems likely that in the near future there will be a widespread demand on the part of progressive land-holders for educational institutions which will enable their sons to understand and to apply effectively the results of the research work which is being carried out by the experts of the Agricultural Department.

Lord Chelmsford's administration has also witnessed important progress in the development of India's natural resources. Principal among these must be counted the Forests, which are already a source of considerable profit to the State, yielding a net revenue of rather more than £1.25 millions. The Central Government has given much

encouragement to local Governments in the exploitation of the Forest resources within their area upon sound lines. An important resin industry has grown up in the United Provinces and in the Punjab. The lac industry has also further developed. But before the Forest industries of India can be established upon a thoroughly sound basis, there is need of expert investigation upon a more extensive scale than has hitherto been possible. The Indian Industrial Commission in its Report had decided that the Forest Research Institute of Dehra Dun did not possess an equipment sufficient to meet the calls upon it; and as a result of their recommendations a general scheme for the enlargement of this institution was submitted to the Secretary of State. The Government of India during the year 1919 sanctioned an expenditure of some £20,000 sterling; and deputed officers in England, to purchase plant for the Institute, and to America, to conduct research into forest economics.

Perhaps the most important condition of the exploitation of India's natural resources with all that that exploitation implies is the prosperity and extension of the irrigation system. During the war period of Lord Chelmsford's administration, it was not found possible to undertake any large new schemes. But with the cessation of strain upon finances which the war necessitated, a period of great, and indeed unprecedented activity in irrigation began. During the year 1918-19, for example, there were no fewer than 15 major works under consideration at an estimated cost of nearly £2·6 millions. Further, projects for seven major works estimated to cost about £6½ millions awaited sanction. Eleven projects are being further investigated by the local Governments concerned under the orders of the Government of India. Among the most notable of these latter is the proposed Sarda Oudh Canal which will, if constructed, rank among the largest irrigation works in the world, commanding over eight million acres. At the present moment no less than 13 per cent. of the total crop area in India is irrigated by Government irrigation works, the estimated value of the crops raised in a single year exceeds by more than 25 per cent. of the total capital outlay on irrigation works. Some idea of the enormous scale on which this work is carried on in India may be gathered from the fact that during the years 1918-19, an area of no less than 25 million acres was irrigated. There can be no doubt that among the most valuable of the resources which enabled the country to pass through the economic crisis of 1918-19 almost unscathed, must be reckoned the irrigation system of India, the product of the untold skill and devotion which has

for so many years been devoted to it. It is impossible in the space at our disposal to do justice to a subject of this importance, and reference is invited to the detailed reports contained in the second Volume of this Summary.

Mention has already been made in another place of the difficulty caused throughout Lord Chelmsford's administration by the unsatisfactory condition of internal transport. During the war so large a proportion of the existing railway facilities was occupied by central military requirements, that it became difficult to allot equitably to civil needs the small proportion still remaining available. At one point in the war, preferential traffic including coal occupied no less than 80 per cent. of the total rolling stock ; moreover, as Lord Chelmsford's administration drew on, it was noticeable that while the tendency of the traffic was to increase rather than to diminish, the capacity of the railway to handle the traffic was increasingly impaired. As a result of the Delhi Conference in 1918 a Communications Board had been appointed to co-ordinate the requirements of traffic and the facilities available for their discharge. And even after war conditions had passed away, it was found necessary to maintain the system of traffic control. Throughout the whole economic crisis of 1918-19, the function performed by the Railways can with difficulty be over-estimated. The system of food control initiated by Lord Chelmsford's administration, mention of which has been made above, depended for its efficiency upon the proper regulation of traffic. And although in the course of the control, private trade was necessarily hampered to a considerable degree, there can be no doubt that the railways were utilised for national needs in a manner more efficient than would have been possible, had no such control existed. But quite apart from the fact that the Indian Railways have stood of late between the country and the horrors of famine, the railway system has for sometime figured to an ever-increasing degree in her domestic economy. It is not easy to realise without considerable thought, the importance of the part which modern communications have played in facilitating the rise and progress of Indian Nationality. A study of the figures which are given in the Departmental Report on Railways will show that the habit of travelling is becoming increasingly popular in India. It is no exaggeration to say that the railways have done for India what she has never hitherto been able to do for herself ; they have destroyed the barrier of immense distances, and have taught the educated classes all over the country to realise their unity in common aspiration. It is significant that a slowly dawning

realisation of this is now making itself felt, in the popular demand for increased railway facilities. During the last year of Lord Chelmsford's term, there were recurring complaints in the public press as to the inconveniences inflicted upon India by the inadequacy of her railway transport. And it is significant that Lord Chelmsford's administration considered it advisable during the year 1920 to appoint a Railway Commission which had as its object the investigation of the system of State *versus* Company management and the general improvement of efficiency throughout the whole system. It is also noteworthy that during the period we are reviewing, partly as a result of war experience, the utilisation of mechanical transport in India for military and other purposes has increased steadily. Already this development has proved of some service in relieving railway congestion; and with the increasing attention now being devoted to road communications, the system may well admit of almost indefinite extension in the future. The pressing demands for mechanical transport on the Frontier have served to stimulate development upon the civil side. But before this line of advance can play any considerable part in the solution of the communications problem, a great development of India's roads must take place. At present the economic loss caused by the inaccessibility of many agricultural districts in the rainy season is great and cannot be removed until the system of trunk roads is extended. Lord Chelmsford's administration witnessed steady progress in this direction every year. For example, between 1916-17, the mileage of metalled roads maintained by public authorities increased from 54,000 to 55,000, and of unmetalled roads from 142,000 to 144,000. Considerable attention has been devoted, we may notice, to civil aviation; and an Air Board was constituted with the Government of India to advise on matters connected with this important subject. It seems unlikely that at present civil aviation will afford much assistance in solving the normal communications problem in India; although its applicability to such individual difficulties as fast communication between Karachi and Bombay, and between Calcutta and Rangoon, will probably become of increasing importance in the near future.

As additional evidence of the popular demand for improved communication facilities between various parts of the country, mention may be made of the unchecked growth during Lord Chelmsford's administration of the traffic handled by the Posts and Telegraphs Department. As an index of this it may be noticed that although the Indian Post Office is still at the beginning of things, the number of postal articles

handled during the year 1919-20 was 13·67 millions—an increase of no less than 1·77 millions upon the figure for the preceding year. The increase in telegraphic traffic has been equally remarkable. In 1914-15, at the beginning of Lord Chelmsford's administration the number of messages transmitted was 16 millions. By 1918-19, this had risen to 21·3 millions, which was of itself an increase of nearly 1·5 millions over the increase for 1916-17. There has also been a great and increasing demand for telephones ; and a notable contribution by Lord Chelmsford's administration towards the solution of India's communication difficulties has been the institution of trunk telephone lines, which now operate over such great distances as Delhi to Lahore, Simla to Lahore, Rawalpindi to Murree, and between Calcutta and the Coal Fields. The possibilities before this development are already seen to be almost incalculable ; and its result may still modify the entire character of official as well as commercial methods.

Closely connected with these lines of development along the material side is the equally important problem of training the people of India in self-government. Lord Chelmsford's administration recognised the paramount importance of urban and rural self-government as the great training ground from which political progress and a sense of responsibility take their start. His Excellency's personal interest in this, the first of the three roads towards Indian self-government referred to in his speech to the Imperial Legislative Council in September 1917, has resulted in striking progress during his administration. In May 1918, the Government of India issued a resolution announcing the general principles for the extension and development of local self-government. These were first, that local bodies should be as representative as possible of the people whose affairs they were called on to administer ; second, that their authority in the matters entrusted to them should be real and not nominal ; thirdly, that they should not be subjected to unnecessary control, but should learn by making mistakes and by profiting by them. As a corollary to this it was laid down that the general policy should be one of the gradual removal of unnecessary Government control by the substitution of outside for inside control and by the reduction of outside control so far as was compatible with safety. The resolution advocated the relaxation of internal control by the introduction of a greater use of election in the choice of members and chairmen of local bodies, and of external control by such means as the removal of unnecessary restrictions in connection with taxation, budgets, and sanction of works and local establishments. Lord Chelms-

ford's administration recommended that there should be a substantial elective majority in both municipalities and rural boards and suggested that, apart from officials, who should count as supernumeraries without the right of voting, the proportion of nominated members on a board should not ordinarily exceed one-fourth. It was pointed out that the increase in the elective allotment, if it was to be of value, must be accompanied by a substantial extension of the franchise. They considered that the municipal chairman should ordinarily be elected from non-officials, but that municipalities should be able to elect an official as chairman by a majority of the non-official votes or to ask Government to nominate a chairman. In the case of district and sub-district boards also, the Provincial Governments were asked to arrange for the election of chairmen and wherever possible to encourage the appointment of non-official chairmen. In the case of large cities it was recommended that the ordinary official work should, as was already the practice in the Bombay Presidency and the United Provinces, be largely in the hands of a special executive officer whose appointment should require the approval of Government, and who should not be removed without Government sanction. While the Government of India recognised that the powers of outside control exercised by Commissioners and Collectors in relation to local bodies should be maintained, they suggested the creation of a central body in each province with a view to co-ordinating the experience of the local bodies and to providing for improvement, control and guidance through the agency of an inspectorate. The development of embryonic municipalities, such as notified areas, was left to the discretion of local Governments, subject to the general remarks that they should be allowed as full authority as was possible, and that their powers should be gradually enhanced. The resolution also dealt with the question of providing some organisation for the development of village life in villages in which corporate life survived and in which common traditions existed; and laid down certain principles for the development of the *Panchayat* system in selected areas and for the confirmation of judicial and administrative functions of the *Panchayats*.

As a consequence of this comprehensive resolution, the general relaxation of Government control over local bodies has steadily proceeded, and there is every hope that before long the additional responsibilities thrown upon the members of these institutions will induce them to take a greater interest in their work. It has for some time been pointed out in the Indian press, in reply to accusation of notorious inefficiency

in the case of many of the municipal boards, that the members have not hitherto received a fair chance to acquire the necessary training, inasmuch as there has been usually a skilled executive officer, fulfilling the functions of the chairman of the Board, able and willing to discharge all the requisite duties. But with the relaxation of official control over individual municipalities, and above all, with the handing over of local self-Government to popular ministers under the Reforms Scheme, it may well be hoped that the next few years will witness a great change in the efficiency and vitality of the Indian system of local self-government. It is on the experience to be gained from the administration of local civic affairs that the country must to a large degree rely for the increase of its dependence in the higher spheres of government.

During the whole of Lord Chelmsford's administration, these institutions have done excellent work under considerable strain. It has already been mentioned that the Central Government has found it necessary from time to time to deal with high prices and scarcity. In almost every case the agency through which the efforts of the Central and Provincial Governments have been transmitted to the people, is that of the local bodies. In many provinces shops were opened by municipalities and district boards which supplied salt, grain and kerosene to the people at a time when these commodities were obtainable elsewhere only at prohibitive prices. During the terrible epidemic of influenza in 1918, which was responsible for the death of some 2 per cent. of the total population of British India, the provincial administrations and the local bodies, to whom is mainly entrusted the maintenance of sanitation and public health, made whole-hearted and public-spirited endeavours to ameliorate the sickness and suffering occasioned by the outbreak. It must be remembered that the epidemic struck India at a time when war demands had depleted her sanitary and medical personnel, which at best is inadequate when considered in relation to her size and the people. Lord Chelmsford's administration shewed itself fully alive to the importance of sanitary work, and has made substantial grants from the central revenues for the purpose of improving public health. A Central Public Health Board consisting of official and non-official members has been established with a view to the co-ordination of preventive and curative methods, the organisation of research and the creation of similar Boards in the Provinces. Medical work among Indian women has also been encouraged; and an exhibition in Maternity and Infant Welfare which was held in Delhi in February 1920 under the patronage of Her Excellency Lady Chelmsford, has proved to be the beginning of

a campaign which will, it is hoped, eventually reduce the terrible infant mortality of India. Lord Chelmsford's administration has throughout afforded stimulus and encouragement to the strenuous efforts which the Governments of the Provinces have been making in their attempt to bring home to the population of India the importance of improved sanitation. Here again it is really a question of education; for until public opinion has been raised to the right degree of receptivity, the meagre resources of the administration can accomplish little in the face of social customs at variance with modern sanitation. Towards the close of Lord Chelmsford's administration, in almost every part of India successful attempts have been made to enlist the sympathies of the educated classes in national health campaigns. Voluntary agencies mainly represented by the various societies of service have now been recognised by Government in many places.

CHAPTER VIII.

Government and the People.

Throughout Lord Chelmsford's administration any differences of opinion which manifested themselves between the educated public of India and the Government have found expression in their most statesmanlike guise in the sessions of the Indian Legislative Council. While there can be little doubt that from the point of view of the enthusiastic reformer, the régime provided by the Morley-Minto Councils has been unsatisfactory, yet the most acid critic of these Councils must admit that, without the apprenticeship they have afforded, it would be well nigh impossible to believe that the more representative Assemblies constituted under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms have any chance of success. A survey of the questions and resolutions which have been answered and discussed respectively in the course of the Imperial Legislative Councils of Lord Chelmsford shows that, between the years 1916-17 and 1919-20, the number of questions asked has risen from 232 in the former year to 542 in the latter year. Equally striking has been the growth of resolutions. In the year 1916-17 the total number of resolutions discussed was only 17, while in the year 1919-20 that number had risen to 51.

Lord Chelmsford from the first, emphasized the policy which his predecessor had initiated, by taking the Legislative Council very fully into his confidence. The speeches which he delivered at the opening of each session of Council constitute a valuable survey of the activities of his administration; and the frequency with which they have been quoted in this brief introduction will serve as an index to their importance to the historian of the future. It was typical of His Excellency's attitude towards the Council that in 1917 he was able to induce the Secretary of State to consent to admitting resolutions in the Simla Sessions; and roughly a year later, in the beginning of 1918, he introduced another change which resulted in increasing the scope and utility of Council discussions. Speaking at the opening of the Imperial Legislative Council at Delhi on the 6th February 1918, Lord Chelmsford said :—

“ There is one matter involving a change in the procedure in the discussion of our Financial Statement to which I should first like to invite the attention of Hon'ble

Members. As they are aware, the present system is that the Financial Statement is introduced without any general discussion on its proposals. Hon'ble Members of course have power to move Resolutions on what are known as the first and second stages of the discussion, but there is no general discussion on the financial policy of my Government until the Financial Statement reappears as the Budget, when financial proposals are presented to Council in their final shape at the end of the session. I think there has been a general feeling that this system, which is rendered necessary by the existing rules, is unsatisfactory, as on the one hand we have not the advantage of a free interchange of views as to our general policy at the time when this would be most valuable to us, and on the other hand Hon'ble Members are certainly handicapped in dealing with our Budget proposals, especially where legislation is involved, for on a Bill only those matters which arise directly out of the proposed legislation can be brought up for discussion and, when once the Bill has been passed a discussion at the end of the session must largely be infructuous and academic. Accordingly we addressed the Secretary of State last November proposing certain amendments in our rules for the discussion of the annual Financial Statement, and we have recently received his sanction to our proposals. The necessary amendments will be notified in the Gazette in due course, and will be in your hands very shortly. But I may explain briefly for the information of Hon'ble Members, that the main changes we propose are that, after the Financial Statement has been introduced in accordance with our present practice, its further consideration shall be postponed for some days in order that Members may have an opportunity of making themselves acquainted with its contents, which is not always an easy task. On the appointed day, which this year will be the 8th March, we shall proceed to a general discussion of the Financial Statement. This discussion will take the place of the Budget discussion at the end of the session, which, as I think Hon'ble Members will recognise, has not been very profitable. Members will be at liberty to offer any observations on the statement as a whole or on any question of principle involved therein. After this general discussion has terminated we shall proceed to the second and third stages of the discussion of the Financial Statement, which will represent what are under the existing rules called the first and second stages, and at these stages Members will be at liberty to move resolutions in the same manner and to the same extent as is permissible under the existing rules. The Budget will be laid before the Council at a subsequent date when the Hon'ble Finance Member will explain the changes he has made with reference to the opinions expressed by the Council or on the basis of later figures, but there will then be no discussion. To this extent the existing procedure must be maintained. Hon'ble Members will, I hope, agree that we have endeavoured to give them a system which provides a more effective and satisfactory method of bringing forward their criticisms and suggestions regarding our policy at a stage when that policy has not been cast into final shape.

Certain further changes will also, I think, be necessitated by this revision of the existing system. As Hon'ble Members are aware, it is our present practice when new taxation is imposed to proceed immediately after the Financial Statement has been introduced with any Bills that may be proposed for additional taxation. This is, as Hon'ble Members will readily understand, necessary for obvious reasons. But if a period for consideration and discussion is to be interposed, it will be equally necessary that any taxation Bills which may subsequently be introduced should, if

and when passed, be made to relate back to the date of their original announcement. It is of course only on this understanding that the present somewhat inconvenient procedure can be revised."

For a detailed account of the resolutions which have been moved in the Legislative Council during Lord Chelmsford's administration the reader is referred to the summary of the work of the Legislative Department which will be found in the second part of this volume. It is only fitting, however, to mention very briefly some of the outstanding legislative measures which by their frequency and importance have served to mark out the administration of Lord Chelmsford from that of his predecessors. During the first half of his administration as might naturally have been expected, the Council was very largely concerned with war measures. Indeed, such was the interest excited in the Members of the Legislative Council by the additional opportunities for discussion and for moving resolutions which were afforded to them, that Lord Chelmsford found it necessary on occasions to address a warning, designed to remind Members of the danger of allowing their attention to be distracted from the war. Speaking at the opening of the Imperial Legislative Council in the Delhi Session of 1916, His Excellency remarked :—

"In this connection there is a matter which I regard as of great importance and which I wish to bring to the attention of the Members of this Council. Lord Hardinge in his speech of the 12th January 1915 appealed to your predecessors in office to abstain from any action which might provoke controversy or bitterness at a time when the Empire was engaged in a death-struggle with a powerful and implacable enemy. That appeal did not fall on deaf ears, and the Council as then constituted loyally and patriotically recognised that, while the Empire was fighting for its very existence, domestic differences must be stilled. I think, however, there must have been many who were present at the meeting in 1915 who cherished hopes that 1917 would find us with peace within our borders and able to resume the ordinary course of our debates. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and it is as necessary for me as it was for Lord Hardinge to invoke your co-operation in this matter. Though feelings of impatience and discontent are not unnaturally generated when we see matters on which we may feel strongly continuously deferred or postponed, yet prudence and common-sense, and above all our deep sense of loyalty to the Empire, must recognise the necessity of such a course in times like these. I do not wish to dwell on this, but it must be evident that in some of the various items of business to be laid before this Council there is a tendency to press the discussion of what are obviously controversial questions.

I cannot help thinking that this is due in part to that very natural impatience at the postponement of measures to which I have already alluded, and in part to the fact that this is a new Council, and that new Members are unaware of the unwritten understanding which obtain in the last Council.

I leave it now with Members, but I hope that you quite clearly understand that I have no desire at all to check Members in their legitimate desire to obtain informa-

tion on subjects in which they may be interested. I may assure the Council that I should exercise with extreme reluctance the powers of disallowance in regard to both resolutions and questions which are vested in me by the rules, for I think it should rarely be necessary for me to exercise them. I would also ask Members to remember that there are now a large number of local Councils, and that resolutions which can be discussed and questions which can be answered in those Councils ought not to be brought up here. The whole scheme of the present Council system contemplates the discussion of matters of local interest as far as may be in the Councils which are specially fitted to deal with these questions."

In justice to the Council it must be said that this warning produced the desired effect. During the years of Lord Chelmsford's administration, a series of war measures of great importance was passed. Perhaps the most notable of those of the year 1917-18 was the Indian Defence Force Act, which constituted a force liable for military service in India, introducing compulsory military training for European British subjects, between the ages of 16 and 50, while it made provision for the establishment of special corps or units of persons other than European British subjects who offered themselves for enrolment. During the subsequent years of the war an important series of Acts, such as the Indian Transfer of Ships Restriction Act, the Gold Import Act, and the Indian Soldiers Litigation Act, were put through, and as the war drew to a close a series of legislative measures was passed with a view to preventing the subjects of States then at war with His Majesty from obtaining that control over certain vital industries which had proved so serious a handicap to the successful prosecution of the struggle by the Allies. Among these may be mentioned particularly the Indian non-ferrous Metals Industry Act, the Indian Companies (Foreign Interests) Act, and the Enemy Trading Orders Validation Act.

Among the important fiscal measures of Lord Chelmsford's administration may be mentioned the Indian Income-tax Act of 1918, which consolidated and amended the law relating to income-tax; the Excess Profits Duties Act of 1919, which raised money by the imposition of an excess profits duty; the Indian Tariff (Amendment) Act of 1919, which provided for levy of an *ad valorem* duty of 15 per cent. on raw hides and skins exported to foreign countries with a rebate of 10 per cent. for hides and skins exported for tanning to any place within the British Empire; the Indian Coinage (Amendment) Act, which gave effect to the change from Rs. 15 to Rs. 10 in the legal tender ratio of the sovereign; the Indian Paper Currency (Amendment) Act 1920, which prescribed the permanent constitution of the Paper Currency Reserve; and the Imperial Bank of India Act, which provided for the amalgamation into a single bank

of the Presidency Banks constituted under the Act of 1876. Among the more interesting measures of general legislation may be mentioned the series of Acts which constituted the Patna, Dacca, and Aligarh Universities ; and the Usurious Loans Act of 1919, which was perhaps the most important measure of the whole of that year. The object of this Act was to empower the Civil Courts to afford relief in the case of unconscionable bargains between moneylenders and debtors. It introduced a much-needed measure of relief for a large class of victims, and brought to a successful conclusion proposals which had engaged the attention of Government for many years. The Charitable and Religious Trusts Act of 1920 was passed to simplify and cheapen the legal process by which persons interested can obtain information regarding the working of religious and charitable trusts, and to impose a more efficient control over the action of the trustees. The Indian Territorial Force Act of 1920, to which reference has already been made, removed a long standing grievance by providing opportunities for training the citizens of India for the defence of their own country. The Corrupt Practices Act of 1920, introduced as a result of the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill, was designed to secure purity of elections and to make punishable under the ordinary Criminal Law certain malpractices possibly connected therewith.

Among the most prominent measures relating to temporary crisis, mention should be made of the Cotton Cloth Act of 1918, which was passed to provide for a system of control for the cheap supply of cotton cloth to the poorer classes of the country ; of the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, generally known as the Rowlatt Act, to which reference has already been made ; and of the Indemnity Act of 1919 which was to indemnify officers of Government and other persons for acts done *bond fide* under martial law during the lamentable disorders of that year.

A number of Ordinances of a necessarily temporary nature were made and promulgated by Lord Chelmsford during the period of his administration. The larger proportion of these were war measures, rendered necessary by emergency. Those which excited most attention were the six issued to meet the crisis arising out of the disturbances in the Punjab and other parts of India. All these Ordinances in the ordinary course expired six months after their promulgation.

Of all the gifts which British administration has brought to India that of internal tranquillity must be ranked first. Upon this the progress of the country, whether upon social, political or industrial lines, necessarily depends. This, more than anything else, has been the prime factor in

producing the spirit among the educated classes which works for national unity. The immensity of the problem involved in preserving peace among the 240 million people in British India is not easy to realise. Year in and year out, the ceaseless battle between the forces of order and disorder goes on ; and the front-line troops of the former are the police. To them more than to any other body of public servants is due that peace which is the first essential of all progress. None-the-less throughout Lord Chelmsford's administration, as throughout the periods of preceding Viceroy, the police have been unpopular in India. For all their work, they are little trusted by the vocal section of Indian public opinion. A happier state of things seems indeed to be dawning. The indiscriminate attacks which filled the Press during the early years of Lord Chelmsford's Viceroyalty have to a large extent disappeared ; and in the cities at least the work of the police is beginning to be appreciated. But in India the constable is still regarded rather as the potential oppressor than as the friend of the peaceful citizen. As to the justification for this attitude there is much to be said both on one side and on the other ; but considering the small cost of the civil police, which works out at an average of about one rupee per head per annum of the population the wonder is rather that the responsibilities of the force are discharged so adequately.

Many of the defects of which the police can fairly be accused arise from the fact that in the subordinate ranks the pay is not sufficient to attract men of the right stamp. It has long been realised by the administration that it is false economy to starve the police service, but until public opinion is educated up to taking the same view, it has been difficult to remedy matters. In the general financial embarrassments of the war it was found impossible to proceed far with schemes for improving the pay and prospects of the police service ; but after the war period, schemes for rendering the pay and prospects of the rank and file of the constables more attractive, for providing them with suitable accommodation and for maintaining a more adequate leave reserve were either under consideration or in actual operation almost everywhere. Discipline shows signs of steady improvement ; and departmental punishments are on the decline. The expenditure sanctioned for schemes of improvement in 1918-19 amounted to more than £200,000, and this is already beginning to produce beneficial results.

Throughout the entire period of Lord Chelmsford's administration circumstances were such as to place a severe strain upon the police system of India. In the first place the unsettling of the minds of the

population through war anxieties has not facilitated the task of preserving internal order. Reference may briefly be made to the serious disturbances which have taken place between the Hindus and the Musalmans from time to time in various places in India ; which may be taken as an indication that the temper of the people on the whole has been the reverse of tranquil. In addition, the effect of the high prices arising from the war has naturally been to increase substantially crime of a certain type. Burglary and dacoity have been particularly rife ; and although, in certain areas which were distinguished for their prominence in recruiting, the more adventurous spirits were drawn off to the war, on the whole it is true to say that during the first half of Lord Chelmsford's administration, the increased predilection of the population toward crime was such as to make the task of the police no easy one.

When Lord Chelmsford came to India anarchy was still hovering over Bengal. For a full discussion of the history of the anarchical movements in India it is necessary to refer to the report of the Sedition Committee presided over by Mr. Justice Rowlatt in 1918. Here it is sufficient to say that in Bengal, between 1906 and 1918, 311 outrages were committed, 1,038 persons were accused, and 84 only were convicted. At the time when the war broke out, the efforts of the police were baffled by the policy of terrorism pursued by a handful of desperate men. In 1915-16, for example, there were 64 outrages in Bengal, with 14 murders, 8 of the victims being police officers. With the passing of the Defence of India Act, and the operation of the rules made under that Act to impose restrictions upon persons implicated in anarchical or revolutionary movements, the outrages fell in number, so that, from January 1917 to February 1918, there were only 10. In the year 1917-18, for the first time since 1912, no police officer was assassinated in Bengal. At the same time supporters of the anarchical movement were still at work, as was shown by the collection of weapons brought to light by the diligence of the police. Although the party which hopes to attain its end by violent crime is still alive, before the end of Lord Chelmsford's administration there were ample signs that its influence was steadily waning. In the year 1919, it is true, there was one sensational conspiracy case, in which it was proved that a secret revolutionary society existed in Mainpuri, to which some 50 persons scattered up and down various adjacent districts of the United Provinces belonged. But the success with which these wretched criminals, who perpetrated outrages of an unspeakable kind upon harmless villagers, were brought to justice by the help of multitudes of persons, reveals more clearly

than anything else the growth of public opinion against crime of this description. It is not too much to hope that, with the entry of India upon her career of progress towards responsible government, those impatient spirits who previously found an outlet for their energies in anarchical crime will be able to devote themselves to the promotion by constitutional means of the end which they have at heart.

A tragic aftermath of the era of revolutionary activity occurred in connection with the so-called Rowlatt Bills. The difficulty of dealing with the anarchical movement, up to the time when Government acquired the exceptional powers conferred by war legislation, was well brought out in the report of the Rowlatt Committee; and certain proposals made by that Committee formed the basis of legislation which was introduced early in 1919. In view of the salutary effect of the powers vested in Government under the Defence of India Act, the Rowlatt Committee concluded that the principal requirement of the situation was the strengthening of the ordinary machinery of law and order in such fashion as to lend it permanently something of the power which had been conferred upon it in war time. Accordingly in the spring session of the Indian Legislative Council of 1919, two Bills were introduced. The first was framed to enable anarchical offences to be tried expeditiously, without right of appeal, by a strong court consisting of three High Court Judges. This procedure was only to be brought into operation when the Governor-General was satisfied that in a particular part of British India offences of a revolutionary character were prevalent. In circumstances where the Governor-General was satisfied that movements likely to lead to the commission of offences against the State were being extensively promulgated, further powers were to be assumed. In an area where these conditions prevailed the local Government was to have power to order persons whom it believed to be actively concerned in such a movement to furnish security to reside in a particular place or to abstain from any specific act. In order to ensure that the powers of Government were not exercised unreasonably the Bill provided a safeguard in the constitution of an investigating authority, which was to examine the material upon which the orders against any persons were framed. In the third place, when the Governor-General was satisfied that certain offences were being committed to an extent which threatened public safety, the local Government was given power to arrest persons reasonably believed to be connected with such offences, and to confine them in such places and under such conditions as were prescribed. The Bill further provided, subject to similar provision as to investigation, for

the continued detention of dangerous characters already under control or in confinement. The second of the Rowlatt Bills was intended to make a permanent change in the ordinary criminal law, the possession of seditious documents with intent to publish or circulate the same being made punishable with imprisonment. Promise of official protection against violence was to be extended to an accused person willing to turn King's evidence. District Magistrates were to be authorized to direct a preliminary inquiry by the police in the case of certain offences, for which at present a prosecution cannot be launched without the sanction of the local Government. Persons convicted of an offence against the State might be ordered by the court to execute a bond of good behaviour for a term not exceeding two years after the expiration of their sentences. The introduction of these Bills in the Legislative Council, while educated public opinion was in the humour described in a preceding chapter, led to violent agitation in many parts of India. The first Rowlatt Bill having been passed, with certain modifications, through the Legislative Council, Mr. Gandhi headed a passive resistance movement against it. Misrepresentation as to the character and scope of the Act spread far and wide, with the result that a series of conflicts was precipitated between the excited masses and the forces of law and order in several parts of India. The upshot of these was the very serious outbreaks of April and May 1919 in the Bombay Presidency, in Delhi and in the Punjab. It is unnecessary here to give an account of these disorders and of the measures taken to suppress them, as they have been fully analysed in the Hunter Committee report. During the whole summer of 1919 India was full of rumours as to the severity of the means adopted to curb the outbreaks ; and, in his speech at the opening of the Simla Session of the Imperial Legislative Council., Lord Chelmsford made the following statement :—

“ Since the close of the last session there have been events of a grave character disturbing the peace and tranquillity of this country, and I cannot pass them over without mention. Last session certain Hon'ble Members during the passage of the Rowlatt Bill gave me warnings of an almost minatory character that if that Bill passed into law, there would be agitation of a serious nature. I think Hon'ble Members will realize that no Government could deviate from a policy which it regarded as essential on account of any threat of agitation. However, there were those who thought that it was necessary to make good this threat, and as a consequence the deplorable events occurred which are to be the subject of an inquiry. It is not my intention to discuss these events, but I would point out this, that it is easy to minimize their gravity after the disorders have been put down. No one who had the responsibility of dealing with them is likely to forget this issue which they had to face. Murders and arson were committed, telegraph wires were

cut, railway lines were torn up, and for some days my only sure communication with the Government of the Punjab was by means of the wireless. Ocular proof of the gravity of the situation with which we were then faced, and of the damage done, is still manifest in many of the districts which suffered; and to anyone who would attempt to minimize the trouble I would say: 'Go into these districts and see for yourself the vestiges of senseless destruction which are still there.'

The policy of my Government was clearly set out in our resolution of the April 14th. I promised support to the head of each local Government for such measures as he thought it might be necessary to take, and that support was given unwaveringly throughout. No one deplotes more than I the need there was for stern action, but the result of our prompt measures was that the disorders were quelled and peace restored. It is my desire now, and it is that of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, to exercise clemency towards the unfortunate misguided men who were led away by 'some educated and clever man, or men' to use Mr. Gandhi's words, to commit outrages. For some time past Sir Edward Maclagan has been busily engaged in reviewing the sentences passed, and in every case possible he has tempered justice with mercy.

And for those cases which have come before the Government of India I have no hesitation in claiming that they received the most careful consideration, and that orders were passed with the greatest possible despatch.

For some times past my Government has been in correspondence with the Secretary of State upon the question of an inquiry into these disorders. We have both been anxious to settle this question as quickly as possible, but an announcement has been delayed largely by the difficulty of procuring the services of a suitable Chairman. It was only on Saturday last that I heard that Lord Hunter had agreed to come to India in that capacity. The Committee is now complete, and will consist of:—

CHAIRMAN :

Lord Hunter, formerly Solicitor-General for Scotland.

MEMBERS :

- (1) The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin.
- (2) The Hon'ble Mr. Rice.
- (3) Major-General Sir George Barrow.
- (4) Sir Chimanlal Setalvad.
- (5) Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad.*

Their instructions will be to inquire into and to report to the Governor-General in Council regarding the causes of, and the measures taken to cope with, the recent disorders in Delhi, the Punjab, and the Bombay Presidency. The proceedings of the Committee will ordinarily be public, but the Chairman will have authority to direct them to be held *in camera* when he considers that the public interests so

* To whom were afterwards added, in deference to the wishes of the Council, Mr. Thomas Smith, a non-official European of Cawnpore, and the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narain.

require. It is hoped, that the Committee will begin its sessions next month. The members have a difficult task before them; and I trust that people of all classes of opinion will do nothing to add to their difficulties by the needless importation of irrelevant or intentionally inflammable material.

After disorders involving so great an upheaval of normal conditions, such an inquiry as I have just announced is the one inevitable consequence. The second, and no less necessary sequel, is the passing of an Act indemnifying those officers of Government who were called upon to undertake the onerous and ungrateful task of restoring order, and the validating of such Acts as the stress of circumstances required. Whatever the findings of the Commission may be, such a measure would be necessary; and in justice to our officers we are bound to indemnify them at the earliest convenient moment."

It is unnecessary here to repeat what has already been said as to the effect which was produced upon the educated public of India by the course of the inquiry conducted by the Hunter Commission when it commenced its sittings towards the end of the year 1919. It is sufficient to remark that the feeling then aroused, which, was augmented throughout the year 1920 by the shock conveyed to Muslim India by the publication of the Treaty of Sevres, was such as to threaten both the peace of India and the success of the Constitutional Reforms. From the summer of 1919 onwards to the end of 1920 Lord Chelmsford's administration was fiercely assailed in the Press. Very wild charges were made against it; and the feeling of the advanced section of the educated classes was raised to a white-heat. Long before the end of Lord Chelmsford's term of office the agitation against Government's policy in the matter of the Punjab disturbances had passed all bounds of reason. The Extremist Party, which had throughout 1918 and the beginning of 1919 begun to lose ground, at once regained all that it had lost. Those who had made it their lifelong policy to advocate the maintenance of the British connection found themselves unable to gain a hearing. The historian of the future will doubtless be able to assess both the policy of Lord Chelmsford's administration and the attitude of its critics in their proper perspective; but, to one who writes while the clamour of controversy is still ringing in his ears, it may well seem that the Government of India has been crucified for sins that are not its own.

It must in fairness to the administration be pointed out that the feeling of humiliation and helplessness which was eating into the soul of educated India as a result of the discovery of the treatment to which their countrymen had been subjected by certain individual administrators of martial law, was such as could with difficulty have been remedied by any Government of the modern type. In former days a monarch who could have ordered condign punishment for all those connected, no matter

how remotely, with the martial law régime in the Punjab might conceivably have remedied the grievance in a manner which India would have understood and appreciated ; but the calm and judicial processes of an inquiry such as was conducted by Lord Hunter, and the measured terms in which praise and condemnation must under these conditions necessarily be awarded, were wholly inadequate to achieve that rehabilitation which the national self-respect of India was now passionately demanding. Hence it was that the publication on the 28th May 1920 of the report of Lord Hunter's Committee, together with the despatches concerning it which had passed between the Government of India and the Secretary of State, failed to assuage the bitter feelings which had been aroused before its issue. Into the details of this report it is impossible to enter. It will suffice to say that the Committee was unfortunately divided upon racial lines, and its conclusions were presented in the form of a Majority, and a Minority, Report. This of itself served to accentuate the rapidly rising bitterness between Indians and Englishmen. Most of the findings of fact were unanimous and, despite difference of opinion as to the conclusions to be deduced therefrom, there was considerable common ground. That common ground covered the whole of the events in Delhi and in the Bombay Presidency, as well as much of the narrative of events and the causes of disturbances in the Punjab. Certain measures which had been adopted in the suppression of the disturbances were condemned in both reports, but with varying degrees of severity. This was true in particular of the condemnation of the firing at Jallianwala Bagh. The most important point on which there was an essential difference of opinion related to the introduction of martial law in the Punjab. The majority, consisting of the President and the English members, believed that a state of rebellion existed, necessitating or justifying the adoption of martial law. The Minority, consisting of the Indian members, believed that the disorders did not amount to rebellion, and that the disturbances might have been suppressed without abrogating the control of the civil authorities. Neither the Majority nor the Minority Reports were in any doubt as to the essential seriousness of the outbreaks. As to the causes of the outbreaks, there was also substantial agreement. The Committee found that the explanation for the general and widespread disturbances in the Punjab was to be sought in the causes of a general state of unrest and discontent among the people, particularly the inhabitants of the larger towns. The increased interest in political agitation caused in recent years by the Home Rule movement had received a great impetus from the new

doctrine of self-determination. Meanwhile, however, the restrictions imposed under the Defence of India Act had become more essential as the war drew to its climax. These restrictions had affected the daily life of the ordinary citizens much more lightly in India than in Europe; nevertheless, particularly when imposed on political agitation, they had been, however necessary, the more galling to the educated classes, in view of the fact that the political future of India was under consideration. The Punjab had done more than its share to respond to the call of the Empire for recruits for the army, and the strain had fallen mainly on the country districts which the local Government considered necessary to protect from any anti-Government agitation likely to hamper the work of recruitment. After the conclusion of the armistice in November 1918 hopes had run high amongst the educated classes that the services rendered by India in the war would receive immediate recognition. But these hopes were not at once fulfilled; and disappointment was caused by a combination of circumstances, such as high prices, scarcity, food-stuffs restrictions, and the anxieties of the peace settlement, especially as it affected Turkey.

The committee next considered the agitation against the Rowlatt Bills. They found that this was largely, if not mainly, responsible for creating the feeling against Government which had provoked such serious disorders; and they cited various false rumours as to the provisions of the Bill which had inflamed popular feeling. They next examined the history and progress of the *Satyagraha* movement inaugurated by Mr. Gandhi on the 24th February 1919. After a careful review of this movement in all its aspects the Committee found that a familiarity and sympathy with disobedience to laws was engendered by it amongst large numbers of people and that the law abiding instincts which stand between society and outbreaks of violence were undermined at a time when their full strength was required. From its first inception the *Satyagraha* movement was condemned by prominent leaders of moderate opinion in India as likely to promote disorder and breach of the peace, and the organizer himself recognized later that in embarking on a mass movement he had underrated the forces of evil. The Majority of the Committee expressly found that the recruiting campaign and the action taken in the Punjab to raise subscriptions to the war loans were not responsible for the unrest. They concluded by saying that there was no evidence that the outbreak in the Punjab was the result of a prearranged conspiracy to overthrow the British Government in India by force, but that it was difficult, probably unsafe, for Government not to assume

that the outbreak was the result of a definite organization. Apart from the existence of any deeply laid scheme to overthrow the British, a movement which had started in rioting and become a rebellion might have rapidly developed into a revolution.

In the introductory chapter of their report the Minority stated that they were in substantial agreement with the findings of the Majority as regards the causes of the disturbances, with this reservation, that they did not concur in the opinion that the Punjab authorities were justified in assuming that the outbreak was the result of a definite organization. They were unable to agree that the riots were in the nature of a rebellion, and they said that it was an unjustifiable exaggeration to suggest that the events might have developed into a revolution. They entirely agreed with the Majority in their estimate of the *Satyagraha* movement and its offshoot—civil disobedience of laws. They developed their views on the real character of the disorders, including their causes, more fully in Chapter II of their report. Here they referred to the general conditions existing in the beginning of 1919, the strain placed on India by her war efforts, the hardship of high prices, the inconveniences and restraints imposed by war measures, the hope of alleviation excited by the armistice, and the subsequent disappointment caused by famine, epidemic, and a more stringent Income-tax Act ; the belief that the proposals of the Government of India as regards the reform scheme were illiberal and intended to whittle it down ; and the delay of the Turkish settlement. They argued that many of the foregoing causes affected the Punjab more than other provinces and they instanced other special factors such as war weariness, food-stuff and traffic restrictions ; Sir Michael O'Dwyer's speeches ; press restrictions ; the orders prohibiting the entry into the province of outside politicians—all tending to cause general irritation amongst the educated classes. While refraining from any discussion of the merits of the Rowlatt Act they held that its introduction and enactment in the face of India opinion was a fertile source of discontent which was fostered by misrepresentations in the Punjab. They asserted that Indian leaders were not responsible for the misrepresentations, and they condemned Government for failing to explain the Act to the masses until after the *hartal* of April 6th, although misrepresentations were current before that date. They accepted the estimate of the *Satyagraha* movement formed by the Majority, but they disclaimed the view that the disorders in the Punjab could be attributed to any active presentation of the *Satyagraha* doctrine by organizations working within the province. They found that there was no organization to bring

about the disturbances and they quoted the evidence of various official witnesses in support of this conclusion. The anti-British and anti-Government outburst which occurred were in their opinion purely the result of sudden mob frenzy. The Minority concluded that although there was thus no evidence of organized conspiracy in the Punjab, the civil and military authorities persuaded themselves that open rebellion existed and took action accordingly.

That part of the Committee's Report which excited the greatest interest was unquestionably the examination of the nature of the Martial Law Orders promulgated by military commanders in the Punjab. The Majority found that some of the orders passed were injudicious and served no useful purpose; criticizing severely, among other things, the order passed by General Dyer known as the Crawling Order, which, it must clearly be realised, had been at the time repudiated with horror by every high officer, civil and military, the moment he heard of it; the Roll-call imposed upon students at Lahore; and the order requiring Indians to *salaam* Europeans. The Minority were more severe in their condemnation and expressed their belief that many of the orders were issued purely for punitive purposes and in such a way as to cause racial humiliation.

The opinion of the Government of India upon this Report was given in a long despatch. Broadly speaking, the conclusions, of the majority commended themselves in most instances to Government, but the condemnation of certain individual acts on the part of officers responsible for the administration of Martial Law found more severe expression in the despatch than in the Majority Report. The Government accepted the view that the administration of Martial Law in the Punjab was marred in particular instances, by misuse of power, by irregularity and by injudicious and irresponsible acts. They further stated their belief that in his conduct at Jallianwala Bagh General Dyer acted beyond the necessity of the case, beyond what any reasonable man would have thought it to be necessary and that he did not act with such humanity as the case prompted.

The comments of His Majesty's Government upon the Report and the Despatch were published simultaneously. From the popular point of view the most important passages in this document were those which repudiated emphatically the doctrine of "moral effect" upon which General Dyer based his action. His Majesty's Government also expressed strong disapproval of certain specified instances of undue severity and of improper punishments and orders during the Martial Law régime, and

instructed the Government of India to see that this disapproval was unmistakably marked by censure or other action upon those officers responsible for them. His Majesty's Government also expressed profound regret for the loss of life which the disturbances had occasioned, and instructed the Government of India to prepare a code of regulations calculated to ensure, should it subsequently be necessary to invoke the aid of Martial Law, a system adequate to repress disorder and to punish its promoters, while subverting no more than the fulfilment of these requirements necessitates, the ordinary rights and course of life of the people at large.

From what was already been said, it is hardly necessary to enlarge upon the failure of the Hunter Committee Report and of the Despatches appended thereto to satisfy a large and very vocal section of opinion in India. As we have already noticed the only course which could have produced such a result would have been something startling and dramatic, something calculated to appeal to the imagination even though it had been accomplished at the expense of justice. Such a course of action no modern Government could possibly entertain. It was however, unfortunate that there was no specific and detailed repudiation of the doctrine, which certain of the Punjab officials were popularly believed to hold, that the lives of Indians were valued more cheaply than the lives of English. In the eyes of Government, a doctrine so subversive of the basic principles of British administration might well seem to stand self-condemned ; but unfortunately public confidence had been severely shaken, and a specific repudiation would have satisfied a desire, which, lacking it, remained clamant throughout the rest of the period under review. And when to disappointment at the cold and detached language of the Report and of the Despatches there was added the further disappointment of punishment regarded as inadequate for the misdeeds of the principal offenders, widespread indignation made itself manifest throughout a large section of the educated classes in India. Throughout the whole of this agitation the Government of India persisted in the course which it believed to be just. It is hardly necessary to point out that the cry for the blood of officers responsible for the administration of Martial Law evoked a counter-cry among influential sections of English opinion both in India and in Great Britain. Many persons belonging to the English commercial and official community in India felt very deeply upon the matter, and the tone of the Anglo-Indian Press was, with certain exceptions at least as strong in its condemnation of Government for taking any action against the impugned officers as was the condemnation of the Nationalist Press on the ground that the action taken was inadequate. Nor was the

task of the Government of India rendered easier by the tone which pervaded certain of the speeches delivered in the House of Commons and the House of Lords when the Punjab Disturbances came up for review. Some of these speeches made it clear that there existed in England influential sections of opinion which viewed as nothing less than culpable weakness, and as a criminal concession to popular clamour the determination of Government to punish those officers whom it considered as having failed to discharge their duty with a proper sense of responsibility. Difficult as it was for Indian sentiment to appreciate the fact at the time, the Government of India took its stand honestly on what it believed to be sure and firm foundations. It yielded to the clamour of the extremists on neither side, refusing on the one hand to inflict upon its officers such penalties as it believed to be excessive ; and on the other declining to allow those persons whom it regarded as having been guilty of improper conduct to escape on the plea of the emergency under which they had acted. The cases of the officers whose conduct had been impugned were examined with great care. In the case of General Dyer, the Government of India directed the Commander-in-Chief to deal with him as circumstances required. The General was accordingly removed from his command and informed that no further employment would be given him in India. More than this, since he occupied the substantive rank of full colonel, could not be done. Further action lay with the Army Council. The fact that the Army Council considered it necessary merely to relieve him of his command, and to refuse him further employment, could not fail to exercise a profound influence upon the scale of punishment allotted to other officers whose improprieties were universally regarded as less serious. The fact, however, remains that, by the end of the period under review, the major portion of those officers whose conduct had been censured by the Hunter Committee had left India. The balance had received severe censure from Government and, as to the serious effects of such a censure upon the personal happiness, immediate position, and future prospects of an officer, it is wholly unnecessary to enlarge. But as must generally be the case under a bureaucratic administration, the distasteful work of punishment was performed without that parade of ostentation which alone might have satisfied Indian opinion.

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